This series of articles on the work of Peter F



Yüklə 180,5 Kb.
səhifə1/4
tarix15.08.2018
ölçüsü180,5 Kb.
#62931
  1   2   3   4

This series of articles on the work of Peter F. Drucker have been taken from The Wall Street Journal, online edition, December 27, 2005
The Five Deadly Business Sins

By PETER F. DRUCKER
October 21, 2005


(This article originally appeared in The Wall Street Journal on Oct. 21, 1993)

The past few years have seen the downfall of one once-dominant business after another: General Motors, Sears and IBM, to name just a few. But in every case the main cause has been at least one of the five deadly business sins-avoidable mistakes that will harm the mightiest business.

• The first and easily the most common sin is the worship of high profit margins and of "premium pricing."
 

The prime example of what this leads to is the near-collapse of Xerox in the 1970s. Having invented the copier -- and few products in industrial history have had greater success faster -- Xerox soon began to add feature after feature to the machine, each priced to yield the maximum profit margin and each driving up the machine's price. Xerox profits soared and so did the stock price. But the vast majority of consumers who need only a simple machine became increasingly ready to buy from a competitor. And when Japan's Canon brought out such a machine it immediately took over the U.S. market -- Xerox barely survived.

GM's troubles -- and those of the entire U.S. automobile industry -- are, in large measure, also the result of the fixation on profit margin. By 1970, the Volkswagen Beetle had taken almost 10% of the American market, showing there was U.S. demand for a small and fuel-efficient car. A few years later, after the first "oil crisis," that market had become very large and was growing fast. Yet the U.S. auto makers were quite content for many years to leave it to the Japanese, as small-car profit margins appeared to be so much lower than those for big cars.

This soon turned out to be a delusion -- it usually is. GM, Chrysler and Ford increasingly had to subsidize their big-car buyers with discounts, rebates, cash bonuses. In the end, the Big Three probably gave away more in subsidies than it would have cost them to develop a competitive (and profitable) small car.

The lesson: The worship of premium pricing always creates a market for the competitor. And high profit margins do not equal maximum profits. Total profit is profit margin multiplied by turnover. Maximum profit is thus obtained by the profit margin that yields the largest total profit flow, and that is usually the profit margin that produces optimum market standing.

• Closely related to this first sin is the second one: mispricing a new product by charging "what the market will bear."


 

This, too, creates risk-free opportunity for the competition. It is the wrong policy even if the product has patent protection. Given enough incentive, a potential competitor will find a way around the strongest patent.

The Japanese have the world's fax-machine market today because the Americans who invented the machine, developed it and first produced it charged what the market would bear -- the highest price they could get. The Japanese, however, priced the machine in the U.S. two or three years down the learning curve -- a good 40% lower. They had the market virtually overnight; only one small U.S. fax-machine manufacturer, which makes a specialty product in tiny quantities, survives.

By contrast, DuPont has remained the world's largest producer of synthetic fibers because, in the mid-1940s, it offered its new and patented nylon on the world market for the price at which it would have to be sold five years hence to maintain itself against competition. This was some two-fifths lower than the price DuPont could then have gotten from the manufacturers of women's hosiery and underwear.

DuPont's move delayed competition by five or six years. But it also immediately created a market for nylon that nobody at the company had even thought about (for example, in automobile tires), and this market soon became both bigger and more profitable than the women's wear market could ever have been. This strategy thus produced a much larger total profit for DuPont than charging what the traffic would bear could have done. And DuPont kept the markets when the competitors did appear, after five or six years.

• The third deadly sin is cost-driven pricing.


 

The only thing that works is price-driven costing. Most American and practically all European companies arrive at their prices by adding up costs and then putting a profit margin on top. And then, as soon as they have introduced the product, they have to start cutting the price, have to redesign the product at enormous expense, have to take losses -- and, often, have to drop a perfectly good product because it is priced incorrectly. Their argument? "We have to recover our costs and make a profit."

This is true but irrelevant: Customers do not see it as their job to ensure manufacturers a profit. The only sound way to price is to start out with what the market is willing to pay -- and thus, it must be assumed, what the competition will charge and design to that price specification.

Cost-driven pricing is the reason there is no American consumer-electronics industry anymore. It had the technology and the products. But it operated on cost-led pricing -- and the Japanese practiced price-led costing. Cost-led pricing also nearly destroyed the U.S. machine-tool industry and gave the Japanese, who again used price-led costing, their leadership in the world market. The U.S. industry's recent (and still quite modest) comeback is the result of the U.S. industry's finally having switched to price-led costing.

If Toyota and Nissan succeed in pushing the German luxury auto makers out of the U.S. market, it will be the result of their using price-led costing. To be sure, to start out with price and then whittle down costs is more work initially. But in the end it is much less work than to start out wrong and then spend loss-making years bringing costs into line -- let alone far cheaper than losing a market.

• The fourth of the deadly business sins is slaughtering tomorrow's opportunity on the altar of yesterday.


 

It is what derailed IBM. IBM's downfall was paradoxically caused by unique success: IBM's catching up, almost overnight, when Apple brought out the first PC in the mid-1970s. This feat actually contradicts everything everybody now says about the company's "stodginess" and its "bureaucracy." But then when IBM had gained leadership in the new PC market, it subordinated this new and growing business to the old cash cow, the mainframe computer.

Top management practically forbade the PC people to sell to potential mainframe customers. This did not help the mainframe business -- it never does. But it stunted the PC business. All it did was create sales for the IBM "clones" and thereby guarantee that IBM would not reap the fruits of its achievement.

This is actually the second time that IBM has committed this sin. Forty years ago, when IBM first had a computer, top management decreed that it must not be offered where it might interfere with the possible sale of punch cards, then the company's cash cow. Then, the company was saved by the Justice Department's bringing an antitrust suit against IBM's domination of the punch-card market, which forced management to abandon the cards -- and saved the fledgling computer. The second time providence did not come to IBM's rescue, however.

• The last of the deadly sins is feeding problems and starving opportunities.
 

For many years I have been asking new clients to tell me who their best-performing people are. And then I ask: "What are they assigned to?" Almost without exception, the performers are assigned to problems -- to the old business that is sinking faster than had been forecast; to the old product that is being outflanked by a competitor's new offering; to the old technology -- e.g., analog switches, when the market has already switched to digital. Then I ask: "And who takes care of the opportunities?" Almost invariably, the opportunities are left to fend for themselves.

All one can get by "problem-solving" is damage-containment. Only opportunities produce results and growth. And opportunities are actually every bit as difficult and demanding as problems are. First draw up a list of the opportunities facing the business and make sure that each is adequately staffed (and adequately supported). Only then should you draw up a list of the problems and worry about staffing them.

I suspect that Sears has been doing the opposite -- starving the opportunities and feeding the problems -- in its retail business these past few years. This is also, I suspect, what is being done by the major European companies that have steadily been losing ground on the world market (e.g., Siemens in Germany). The right thing to do has been demonstrated by GE, with its policy to get rid of all businesses -- even profitable ones -- that do not offer long-range growth and the opportunity for the company to be number one or number two world-wide. And then GE places its best-performing people in the opportunity businesses, and pushes and pushes.

Everything I have been saying in this article has been known for generations. Everything has been amply proved by decades of experience. There is thus no excuse for managements to indulge in the five deadly sins. They are temptations that must be resisted.

Mr. Drucker is a professor of social sciences at the Claremont Graduate School in California
The American CEO

By PETER F. DRUCKER
December 27, 2005 11:02 a.m.


(This article originally appeared in The Wall Street Journal on Dec. 30, 2004)

CEOs have ultimate responsibility for the work of everybody else in their institution. But they also have work of their own -- and the study of management has so far paid little attention to it. It is the same work, whether the organization is a business enterprise, a nonprofit, a church, a school or university, a government agency; and whether it is large or small, world-wide or purely local. And it is work only CEOs can do, but also work which CEOs must do.

In any organization, regardless of its mission, the CEO is the link between the Inside, i.e., "the organization," and the Outside -- society, the economy, technology, markets, customers, the media, public opinion. Inside, there are only costs. Results are only on the outside. Indeed the modern organization (beginning with the Jesuit Order in 1536) was expressly created to have results on the outside, that is, to make a difference in its society or its economy.

The CEO's Tasks

To define the meaningful Outside of the organization is the CEO's first task. The definition is anything but easy, let alone obvious. For a particular bank, for instance, is the meaningful Outside the local market for commercial loans? Is it the national market for mutual funds? Or is it major industrial companies and their short-term credit needs? All three of these "outsides" deal with money and credit. And one cannot tell from the bank's published accounts, e.g., its balance sheet, on which of these "outsides" it concentrates. Each of them is a different business and requires a different organization, different people, different competencies and different definitions of results. Even the very biggest bank is unlikely to be a leader in all these "outsides." For which of these to concentrate on is a highly risky decision and one very hard to change or reverse. Only the CEO can make it. But also the CEO must make it. It is the first task of the CEO.

The second specific task of the CEO is to think through what information regarding the Outside is meaningful and needed for the organization, and then to work on getting it in usable form. Organized information has grown tremendously in the last hundred years. But the growth has been mainly in Inside information, e.g., in accounting. The computer has further accentuated this inside focus. As regards the Outside there has been an enormous growth in data -- beginning with Herbert Hoover in the 1920s (to whose work as secretary of commerce we largely owe the data on GNP, on productivity, and on standard of living). But few CEOs, whether in business, in nonprofits, or in government agencies have yet organized these data into systematic information for their own work.

One example: Every major maker of branded consumer goods knows that few things are as important as the values and the behavior of that great majority of consumers who are not buyers of the company's products, and especially information on major changes in the non-customers' values and habits. The data are largely available. But few consumer-goods manufacturers have so far converted them into organized information on which to base their decisions (one well-publicized exception is the Shell Petroleum group of companies). Again it is primarily the CEO who needs this information and whose work it is to organize getting it.

The definition of the institution's meaningful Outside, and of the information it needs, makes it possible to answer the key questions: "What is our business? What should it be? What should it not be?" The answers to these questions establish the boundaries within which an institution operates. And they are the foundation for the specific work of the CEO. Particularly:

• They enable the CEO to decide what results are meaningful for the institution.


 

This is particularly important, particularly critical, and particularly risky for institutions that lack the discipline of the "bottom line," that is, for non-businesses. And non-businesses constitute the great majority of organizations in every developed society. But even for businesses, the bottom line is not by itself adequate as a definition of results -- the same bottom line may have very differing meanings according to how an institution defines "meaningful results." To decide what results a given bottom line represents is a major job of the executive. It is not based on "facts" -- there are no facts about the future. It is not made well by intuition. It is a judgment. Again, only the CEO can make this judgment, but also the CEO must make it.

This judgment is so risky that all pre-modern economies tried to avoid making it. In fact, the Modern Enterprise -- the one major institutional innovation of the Modern Economy -- was in large part created as the systematic risk-taker and risk-sharer, thereby enabling the individual strictly to limit the personal risk of investing in future expectations.

By thus making possible these time decisions in very large numbers and on an enormous scale, the Enterprise can be said to be the one invention that created the Modern Economy -- far more so than any other invention, whether material or conceptual. With the invention of the Enterprise the Executive came into being as a distinct role and function, with one of his or her major tasks being the making of the decision between short-term yields and deferred expectations. Making this decision requires a good deal of very hard work on the part of the CEO. (Both Machiavelli's "Prince" and Shakespeare's "The Merchant of Venice," two Renaissance masterpieces the background of which is the emergence of the modern economy, are built around the challenge of this decision).

• The answers to the question "What is our business? And what should it be?" enable CEOs to decide what is meaningful information for the business and for themselves.
 

This too is a high-risk decision. That U.S. business executives, for instance in the '50s and '60s, decided (in many cases quite deliberately) that what was going on in Japan was not particularly meaningful information for them and their companies, explains in large part why the Japanese export push caught them so unawares and unprepared.

It is information about the Outside that needs the most work. For far too many institutions -- and not only businesses -- define Outside in large part as their direct competitors. Toy makers tend to define the Outside as their toy-maker competitors; a hospital as the two competing hospitals in the same suburb, and so on. But the most meaningful competitors for the toy maker are not other toy makers but other claimants on potential customers' disposable dollars. The most meaningful information about the toy maker's Outside is therefore what value the toy presents to the potential buyer. (Customer Research, in other words, may be more important than market research -- but also far more difficult).

• The CEO has to decide the priorities.


 

In any but a dying organization there are always far more tasks than there are available resources. But results are obtained only by concentration of resources, especially by concentration of the scarcest and most valuable resource, people with proven performance capacity.

There is constant pressure on every CEO to do a little bit of everything. That makes everybody happy but guarantees that there are no results. The CEO's most critical job -- also the CEO's most difficult job -- is to say "No." To do so is not just a matter of will power. It requires an inordinate amount of study and work -- work which only the CEO can do but again work which the CEO must do.

• The CEO places people into key positions. This, in the last analysis, determines the performance capacity of the institution.


 

Every organization says, "We have better people." But this is, of course, impossible. Once an organization grows beyond a handful of people, it is subject to statistics' most ruthless law: the law of the great number, which dictates that there is only "normal distribution." What differentiates organizations is whether they can make common people perform uncommon things -- and that depends primarily on whether people are being placed where their strengths can perform or whether, as is only too common, they are being placed for the absence of weakness. And nothing requires as much hard work as "people decisions." The only thing that requires even more time (and even more work) than putting people into a job is unmaking a wrong people decision. And again, critical people decisions only the CEO can make.



No Real Counterpart

The CEO is an American invention -- designed first by Alexander Hamilton in the Constitution in the earliest years of the Republic, and then transferred into the private sector in the form of Hamilton's own Bank of New York and of the Second Bank of the United States in Philadelphia. There is no real counterpart to the CEO in the management and organization of any other country. The German "Sprecher des Vorstands," the French "Administrateur Delegue," the British "Chairman," or the Japanese "President" are all quite different in their powers and in the limitations thereon.

The American CEO is, however, fast becoming a major U.S. export. Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder are trying to make over their countries' top political job in the image of the U.S. president. In business the CEO model is being adopted even faster all over the world, e.g., in the recent restructuring of Europe's largest industrial complex, the German Siemens Group. And what makes the American CEO unique is that he or she has distinct and specific work.

Mr. Drucker is the author, most recently, of "The Daily Drucker," just out from HarperBusiness. This is the first in a three-part series on management.
The Rise, Fall
And Return of Pluralism
November 15, 2005

By Peter F. Drucker, a professor of social science and management at the Claremont Graduate University and a former president of the Society for the History of Technology. He is author, most recently, of "Management Challenges for the 21st Century," just out from Harperbusiness.

(This article originally appeared in The Wall Street Journal on June 1, 1999)

The history of society in the West during the last millennium can -- without much oversimplification -- be summed up in one phrase: The Rise, Fall and Rise of Pluralism.

By the year 1000 the West -- that is, Europe north of the Mediterranean and west of Greek Orthodoxy -- had become a startlingly new and distinct civilization and society, much later dubbed feudalism. At its core was the world's first, and all but invincible, fighting machine: the heavily armored knight fighting on horseback. What made possible fighting on horseback, and with it the armored knight, was the stirrup, an invention that had originated in Central Asia sometime around the year 600. The entire Old World had accepted the stirrup long before 1000; everybody riding a horse anywhere in the Old World rode with a stirrup.

But every other Old World civilization -- Islam, India, China, Japan -- rejected what the stirrup made possible: fighting on horseback. And the reason these civilizations rejected it, despite its tremendous military superiority, was that the armored knight on horseback had to be an autonomous power center beyond the control of central government. To support a single one of these fighting machines -- the knight and his three to five horses and their attendants; the five or more squires (knights in training) necessitated by the profession's high casualty rate; the unspeakable expensive armor -- required the economic output of 100 peasant families, that is of some 500 people, about 50 times as many as were needed to support the best-equipped professional foot soldier, such as a Roman Legionnaire or a Japanese Samurai.

The knight exercised full political, economic and social control over the entire knightly enterprise, the fief. This, in short order, induced every other unit in medieval Western society -- secular or religious -- to become an autonomous power center, paying lip service to a central authority such as the pope or a king, but certainly nothing else such as taxes. These separate power centers included barons and counts, bishops and the enormously wealthy monasteries, free cities and craft guilds and, a few decades later, the early universities and countless trading monopolies.

By 1066, when William the Conqueror's victory brought feudalism to England, the West had become totally pluralist. And every group tried constantly to gain more autonomy and more power: political and social control of its members and of access to the privileges membership conferred, its own judiciary, its own fighting force, the right to coin its own money and so on. By 1200 these "special interests" had all but taken over. Every one of them pursued only its goals and was concerned only with its own aggrandizement, wealth and power. No one was concerned with the common good; and the capacity to make societywide policy was all but gone.

The reaction began in the 13th century in the religious sphere, when -- feebly at first -- the papacy tried, at two councils in Lyon, France, to reassert control over bishops and monasteries. It finally established that control at the Council of Trent in mid-16th century, by which time the pope and the Catholic Church had lost both England and Northern Europe to Protestantism. In the secular sphere, the counterattack against pluralism began 100 years later. The Long Bow -- a Welsh invention perfected by the English -- had by 1350 destroyed the knight's superiority on the battlefield. A few years later the cannon -- adapting to military uses the powder the Chinese had invented for their fireworks -- brought down the hitherto impregnable knight's castle.

From then on, for more than 500 years, Western history is the history of the advance of the national state as the sovereign, that is as the only power center in society. The process was very slow; the resistance of the entrenched "special interests" was enormous. It was not until 1648, for instance -- in the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended Europe's Thirty Years War -- that private armies were abolished, with the nation-state acquiring a monopoly on maintaining armies and on fighting wars. But the process was steady. Step by step, pluralist institutions lost their autonomy. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars -- or shortly thereafter -- the sovereign national state had triumphed everywhere in Europe. Even the clergy in European countries had become civil servants, controlled by the state, paid by the state and subject to the sovereign, whether king or parliament.

The one exception was the United States. Here pluralism survived -- the main reason being America's almost unique religious diversity. And even in the U.S., religiously grounded pluralism was deprived of power by the separation of church and state. It is no accident that in sharp contrast to Continental Europe, no denominationally based party or movement has ever attracted more than marginal political support in the U.S.

By the middle of the last century, social and political theorists, including Hegel and the liberal political philosophers of England and America, proclaimed proudly that pluralism was dead beyond redemption. And at that very moment it came back to life. The first organization that had to have substantial power and substantial autonomy was the new business enterprise as it first arose, practically without precedent, between 1860 and 1870. It was followed in rapid order by a horde of other new institutions, scores of them by now, each requiring substantial autonomy and exercising considerable social control: the labor union, the civil service with its lifetime tenure, the hospital, the university. Each of them, like the pluralist institutions of 800 years ago, is a "special interest." Each needs -- and fights for -- its autonomy.

Not one of them is concerned with the common good. Consider what John L. Lewis, the powerful labor leader, said when FDR asked him to call off a coal miners strike that threatened to cripple the war effort: "The president of the United States is paid to look after the interests of the nation; I am paid to look after the interest of the coal miners." That is only an especially blunt version of what the leaders of every one of today's "special interests" believe -- and what their constituents pay them for. As happened 800 years ago, this new pluralism threatens to destroy the capacity to make policy -- and with it social cohesion altogether -- in all developed countries.

But there is one essential difference between today's social pluralism and that of 800 years ago. Then, the pluralist institutions -- knights in armor, free cities, merchant guilds or "exempt" bishoprics -- were based on property and power. Today's autonomous organization -- business enterprise, labor union, university, hospital -- is based on function. It derives its capacity to perform squarely from its narrow focus on its single function. The one major attempt to restore the power monopoly of the sovereign state, Stalin's Russia, collapsed primarily because none of its institutions, being deprived of the needed autonomy, could or did function -- not even, it seems, the military, let alone businesses or hospitals.

Only yesterday most of the tasks today's organizations discharge were supposed to be done by the family. The family educated its members. It took care of the old and the sick. It found jobs for members who needed it. And not one of these jobs was actually done, as even the most cursory look at 19th-century family letters or family histories shows. These tasks can be accomplished only by a truly autonomous institution, independent from either the community or the state.

The challenge of the next millennium, or rather of the next century (we won't have a thousand years), is to preserve the autonomy of our institutions -- and in some cases, like transnational business, autonomy over and beyond national sovereignties -- while at the same time restoring the unity of the polity that we have all but lost, at least in peacetime. We can only hope this can be done -- but so far no one yet knows how to do it. We do know that it will require something that is even less precedented than today's pluralism: the willingness and ability of each of today's institutions to maintain the focus on the narrow and specific function that gives them the capacity to perform, and yet the willingness and ability to work together and with political authority for the common good.

This is the enormous challenge the second millennium in the developed countries is

bequeathing the third millennium.

How to Save the Family Business


Yüklə 180,5 Kb.

Dostları ilə paylaş:
  1   2   3   4




Verilənlər bazası müəlliflik hüququ ilə müdafiə olunur ©genderi.org 2024
rəhbərliyinə müraciət

    Ana səhifə