Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

 

During the firefight “Zenit” soldier Capt. Anatoliy Muranov was shot through both thighs. MVD adviser 

Major V. Sisin tried to help him and delivered him to the Embassy polyclinic but Muranov died from pain shock and 

loss of blood. 

 

 

A large number of Afghans were taken prisoner and a guard was posted around the building. Soviet MVD 

advisers assisted the paratroopers and “Zenit” troops. 

 

 

Senior MVD adviser Kosogorskiy had ordered the arrest of Minister of Internal Affairs A. Sh.  Payman but 

he was not in the building. He had fled in his underwear to where Soviet MVD advisers were living and was identified 

there by Maj. Nazarov. The next morning Payman was delivered to the command staff of the operation where Gen. B. 

S. Ivanov suggested he sign an appeal to the Afghan people for the need to maintain peace and order in the country. At 

1400 28 December this appeal was broadcast over the radio. 

 

 

On 29 December the new Minister S. M. Gulyabzoy and Commander of the Tsarandoy Lt. Col. Asgar, who 

had previously been held in Pol-e Charkhi Prison, arrived at the MVD and got down to work. 

 

 

The HQ of the Central Army Corps (TsAK) and its security subunits were deployed in the “House of the 

Peoples” building complex – in all, more than 1000 men with artillery, APCs, and small arms weaponry. A 

paratrooper company, six “Zenit” troops, and six military advisers were allocated for its capture. 

 

 

The mission included: seizure of the facility, establishment of control over the command and control system 

of TsAK HQ; involvement of the staff sympathetic to the new government in verification of personnel loyalty 

[fil’tratsiya]; isolation of Amin’s supporters; and ensuring the HQ’s activity was in the interest of neutralizing [any] 

actions of military units against Soviet troops. 

 

 

The entire group was broken into subgroups. At the start of the operation the first subgroup took the barracks 

and the guns of the anti-aircraft battalion, the artillery depot in the “House of the Peoples” courtyard, and the signals 

battalion barracks under guard. The commander of the subgroup summoned a senior Afghan officer who turned out to 

the deputy for political affairs of the artillery battalion and informed him via an interpreter that Amin had been 

overthrown. A democratic government had come to power in the country at whose request Soviet troops were helping 

it maintain order in Kabul. In the curt form of an ultimatum the commander demanded that conditions be met which 

precluded bloodletting. The Afghan officer readily accepted all our conditions and organized their fulfillment together 

with the chief of staff of the [signals] battalion. The military adviser to the signals battalion commander convinced him 

not to offer resistance. At 2015 the situation in this sector was completely under control of the subgroup. 

 

 

While driving into the groups of the Corps HQ the other subgroup encountered fire from an APC and small 

arms. The paratroopers and “Zenit” troops opened return fire and quickly suppressed resistance. The APC was 

destroyed. 

 

 

The commander of the group summoned a staff officer and through an interpreter congratulated him on the 

victory of the victorious forces of Afghanistan, demanded he disarm his company and the officers of the Corps HQ. 

 

 

One of the captured officers said on his own initiative that Corps commander Dust had hidden in one of the 

HQ rooms with nine members of his personal guard. When an assault group rushed into the building and suggested 

that Dust surrender the Afghan defenders returned fire. In the ensuing battle the assault group suppressed resistance 

with automatic weapons fire and grenades and took the HQ personnel prisoner except for the Corps commander and 

his bodyguards who had helped him escape over rooftops to the grounds of a military publishing house. 

 

 

Making use of the calm, the commander of the group organized the extinguishing of a fire and the rescue of 

communications equipment and weapons with the aid of Afghan officers and soldiers who had expressed loyalty to the 

new regime. 

 

 

By the morning of 28 December the fire in the building had been put out and the communications center had 

been brought into working order. All the combat vehicles of the group took up positions to defend the facility. On the 

rear side of the building two BMD crews suppressed hotbeds of resistance by Afghans using machine gun and 

automatic weapons fire. 

 

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With the coming of daybreak they began to comb the HQ building and the surrounding terrain in the course 

of which they detained an Afghan soldier who informed them that N. Dust was hiding in a building of the military 

publishing house. The commander of the group suggested that the Afghan soldier pass on a demand to  Dust that he 

surrender, explaining to him in detail the situation in the country. 

 

 

Convinced that the Soviet officers were speaking the truth, Dust handed over his weapon and was taken under 

guard. 

 

 

The commander of the group together with the military advisers immediately began to use the Corps 

commander to issue orders to TsAK formations and units to recognize the new government and cease resistance. Dust 

issued orders to the following units: the 88

th

 Artillery Brigade; the 4

th

 and 15

th

 Tank Brigades; the Pukhantun Military 

Academy; the 26

th

 Airborne Regiment; the 37

th

 “Commandos” Regiment; the 7

th

 and 18

th

 Infantry Divisions; the 190

th

 

Artillery Regiment; the TsAK intelligence battalion; the 9

th

 Mountain Infantry Division; the 41

st

 Infantry Regiment; 

and also individual units and subunits deployed in the provinces of Bamian, Wardak, Parwan, Kapisa, Kabul, Lowgar, 

and Nangarhar. 

 

 

On the morning of 28 December TsAK HQ intercepted a telegram with an order of the governor of the 

province of Nangarhar in which an infantry division and the 444

th

 “Commandos” Regiment were ordered to march on 

Kabul. The TsAK HQ advisers were informed that division commander Sabur was the brother of the captured TsAK 

signals battalion commander. They convinced him to get in touch with his brother and explain the political situation to 

him and draw him to the side of the new Afghan government. The division’s march on Kabul was halted. 

 

 

By morning of 28 December HQ security was being carried out by dual Soviet-Afghan posts. And the next 

day the Corps HQ was relocated to the “House of the Peoples” and functioned normally. Operationally significant 

information came into the HQ constantly and was relayed to the command of the operation. 

 

 

The seizure of the Afghan Military Counterintelligence (KAM) building turned out to be a quite difficult 

mission. The forces selected for this target included two paratroopers platoons, 12 military advisers, and 6 “Zenit” 

troops headed by Rafaehl Shafigulin, who had at his disposition 3 BMDs, 2 GAZ-66 automobiles, and 2 anti-aircraft 

guns. They began to advance at 1830. 

 

 

According to the plan to seize and blockade the target developed by the group and coordinated with the 

advisers, it was proposed to get in through perimeter entrances. The BMDs breaking in were to pull up to the main 

building and blockade it. The personnel who rushed in were to disarm the security force along the perimeter and the 

seizure group (21 men), having broken into the main building, were to disarm the facility’s workforce and seize 

designated people. It was decided not to enter into combat with the security force, limiting themselves to cutting them 

off from the main target with the BMD-mounted machine guns and anti-aircraft guns. 

 

 

When breaking into the grounds one of the combat vehicles received damage and lost the ability to move. The 

seizure group commander, who was in this vehicle, decided to assault the nearest door with part of his group. Under 

the cover of fire of the BMD the group broke into the building where it linked up with adviser Chuchukin, who had 

been there since before the operation. Then the group began to carry out its main mission and put out a fire which had 

broken out. The “Zenit” troops and paratroopers of the second group broke into the building through the main 

entrance. The operations of the combined group were quick and decisive. The enemy inside the building decided not to 

resist and surrendered their arms. Among the captured Afghans were all the designated people, even several members 

of the government. The facility’s security force, which had been cut off, heard the noise of battle and abandoned their 

location. During the night about 150 Afghan soldiers returned in individual groups and surrendered their weapons. The 

security force of the remaining buildings and services surrendered after an appeal via a megaphone. 

 

 

The remaining facilities in the Afghan capital were seized without any special problems. 

 

 

Shooting at night did not surprise anyone in Kabul then and therefore residents of the capital and Embassy 

officials slept quietly and when they woke up in the morning Afghanistan already had a new government. 

 

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