Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

mission of reporting the decision by the morning of 25 December over two signatures (his and Kolesnik’s). When they 

were leaving the telephone booth Magometov said to Kolesnik: “Well, Colonel, this will now make you or break you.” 

 

 

They wrote the report right there and the cable was sent by 0200. They went to the embassy together but then 

Kolesnik hurried off to the battalion. He had to prepare to carry out the combat mission…He had been appointed 

commander of the operation by the Defense Ministry which gave it the codename “Shtorm-333.” 

 

 

 Command of KGB special subunit operations had been entrusted to Gen. Yu. Drozdov, the Chief of the 

Directorate of Illegal Intelligence. Yuriy Andropov and Vladimir Kryuchkov pointed out to him by government 

communications telephone the necessity of thinking everything through down to the details, the main thing being to 

ensure the safety of the participants of the operation. In reply to Kryuchkov’s question: “Can someone else be sent?”, 

Andropov replied, “We’ll handle it ourselves.” But Lt.General Boris Ivanovich, who was present at the conversation, 

asked that Col. Grigoriy Boyarinov, the Chief of the Advanced Officers’ Training Courses, command and coordinate 

the operations of the special forces groups, which was also done. 

 

 

According to Valeriy Yemyshev, an officer of group “A”:  

After the first group led by Valentin Shergin was sent to Afghanistan at the beginning of 

December there was some tension in the group; many thought that the matter was not limited to this, 

but no one knew anything specifically. 

 

 

On the morning of 22 December Robert Petrovich Ivon called me; he was then the acting 

subunit commander since Colonel Gennadiy Nikolayevich Zaytsev was in the hospital. He turned to 

me as secretary of the Party organization and said that a team of 30 men were needed to carry out a 

mission in Afghanistan. They had to fly out the next day; the specific mission would be given on the 

spot. Major Mikhail Romanov was the commander of the group being sent but he himself would 

remain on site. 

 

 

I went to the subunit right away. Part of the people had already gathered there. They were 

coordinate the list. They began to prepare for the flight.  They prepared all night and in the morning 

they flew to Afghanistan from Chkalovskiy Airfield [outside Moscow] on a Tu-134 which, I was 

told, was Andropov’s personal aircraft. They first landed in Gur’yev and then Tashkent to refuel.  

Upon arrival in Bagram they quartered us in hardstands and tents.  We met there with our guys who 

were guarding the future rulers of Afghanistan. Yuriy Izotov requested three men of our group. 

Romanov gave him Chudesnov, Vinogradov, and Savel’yev. They spent the night in Bagram and in 

the morning they put us in busses and went to Kabul. 

 

 

Soldiers from the “Grom” group were setting the sights of their weapons; still, there were the mountainous 

conditions and a new climate. They brought up the gear, bulletproof vests, and helmets. They had sewn additional 

pockets into the Afghan uniforms in order to put grenades and weapons magazines [in them] more comfortably. 

According to Romanov, commander of the “Grom” group:  

They moved to the Embassy in Kabul, where they stayed until the evening of 24 December. 

I received a specific mission – relocate to the area where Amin’s external security force was and 

remain there for further instructions. 

 

 

We ended up a kilometer from the Palace and could see it well. A convincing structure with 

strong walls. A real fortress standing on a high ground… 

 

 

They joined up with the “Zenit” special forces group which was located in another place, 

next to the Palace. This was also a Committee [KGB] subunit, formed through First Main 

Directorate channels. Good guys. I became good friends with the commander of the group, Yasha 

Semenov. We had a password then: “Yasha” – “Misha”, and the response “Misha” – “Yasha”. There 

were not many of us – about 25. 

 

 

And according to “Grom” officer Sergey Golov:  

In Kabul they quartered us in an unfinished barracks next to the Taj-Bek Palace. We started 

trying to equip the place somehow because December is a quite severe month in the Afghan capital 

 

41

---

although this is a southern country. For example, in order to wash ourselves in the morning we had 

to first break ice in rubber basins. 

 

 

Then they issued us Afghan uniforms of coarse camel’s hair wool fabric. Neither I nor 

Lesha Bayev could get a uniform of the right size at first, but then they stretched it (it stretches well) 

and we were barely able to put them on. We got acquainted with the guys from the “Zenit” group; 

we then had to attack the Palace together. 

 

 

…Having returned from the Embassy at 0300 25 December to the battalion’s location, Col. Kolesnik 

supervised preparations for the combat operations to seize the Palace. Lt.  Col. Shvets gave him active assistance. The 

operations plan envisioned seizure of the defensive sectors by three companies at the designated time (initially the 

operation was scheduled for 25 December; the assault on the Palace was then postponed to 27 December); they were 

not to permit Afghan battalions (three infantry and one tank) to advance toward the Taj-Bek Palace. The company of 

Sr. Lt. Kurban Amangel’dyyev was to act against the infantry battalion situated south of the Palace. The company of 

Capt. Ismat Kudratov covered from the north (tank and infantry battalions were located here); the paratrooper 

company of Sr. Lt. Valeriy Vostrotin was to act from the east. Also, a “Fagot” anti-tank guided missile platoon and an 

AGS-17 grenade launcher platoon were arrayed against the [Afghan] tank battalion. The operations of these 

companies were supported with the fire of two “Shilka”’s [anti-aircraft guns]. Lt.Col. Shvets was designated the one 

responsible for this sector.  One more company of the “Muslim” battalion  (commanded by Vladimir Sharipov) and the 

platoon of Lt. Rustam Tursunkulov were designated to support the direct assault on the Palace. The special KGB 

groups “Grom” (led by Mikhail Romanov) and “Zenit” (led by Yakov Semenov) were to act in concert with them. 

They, too, were supported by two “Shilkas.” Part of the men of the “Muslim” battalion were supposed to seize and 

disarm the anti-aircraft and construction regiments located not far from Taj-Bek. They also provided for security and 

reserve forces. 

 

 

One of the most important missions was the seizure of three Afghan tanks dug in south of the Palace which 

held all the approaches to Taj-Bek in their sights. A group of 15 men (including tank specialists) were allotted for this 

mission headed by deputy battalion commander Capt. Makhmud Sakhatov. It also included four snipers from KGB 

special subunits. The success of the operation depended on these actions to a large degree. They began first. The 

battalion command well knew that the mission could be carried out only if surprise and military stratagems were 

employed. Otherwise, no one would come out alive. 

 

 

According Gen. Yuriy Drozdov the paratroopers were distinguished by their bearing, smart appearance, 

organization, and discipline.  I want to especially talk about Valeriy Vostrotin himself. There were many legendary 

commanders, sergeants, and soldiers during the “Afghan” war who were examples of bravery, valor, and comradeship. 

Vostrotin is one of the best. He fought three times in Afghanistan. At first he was a company commander. He was 

seriously wounded in July 1980. He commanded a battalion. He was wounded again. At the concluding stage of the 

“Afghan” war he commanded an airborne regiment.  He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for 

displaying courage and heroism. 

 

 

But this was much later. Then, in order not to provoke suspicion prematurely, they developed a diversionary 

scenario of events. They started to carry out decoy operations: shooting, going on alert and occupying designated 

security sectors; deployment… At night they shot off illumination flares. They warmed up the armored personnel 

carrier and BMP [infantry combat] engines on schedule and moved them from place to place. At first this caused 

concern from the command of the Palace security brigade. For example, the first time the flares were launched the 

battalion’s position was momentarily illuminated by the searchlights of the anti-aircraft regiment and Major Jandad 

arrived. They explained to him that routine combat training was going on, they were practicing guarding the Palace 

and they were illuminating the area in order to preclude the possibility of a rebel attack. 

 

 

The Afghans subsequently regarded such actions more calmly but requested that the engines not “make so 

much noise” as it was disturbing Amin’s sleep. The battalion commander and “Major Kolesov” themselves visited the 

brigade commander more than once and calmed him down. But the “maneuvers” of the battalion continued on the 25

th

, 

26

th

, and the first half of the 27

th

 of December. They thus ensured the surprise of the special forces personnel’s 

operations. 

 

 

42

---