Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

in planning combat operations, increasing the combat ability of the Afghan armed forces, and 

resolving various problems of combat activity. In addition, this group decided the most varied 

problems, both of a military, as well as of an economic, political, and social nature. 

 

In connection with the fact that the first time the USSR OG MO was in Afghanistan was 

only on occasion, mainly to lead large operations, in March 1985 a group of representatives of the 

General Staff was sent to Kabul (five men in all), headed by the general for Afghanistan-related 

special assignments of the Chief of the USSR General Staff, Major-General B. V. Gromov (March 

1985-May 1987) and Major-General V. S. Kudlay (May 1987-January 1989). 

 

Operations groups were also sent to work among the [40

th

] Army’s troops from the 

Turkestan Military District HQ. 

 

With the start of the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1988 a special Operations Group of the 

USSR Armed Forces General Staff  under the command of Lieutenant-General  A. G. Gaponenko 

began to work in Afghanistan; it dealt with creation of a three-month emergency supply for the 

Afghan armed forces in key areas of the country (Kandahar, Jalalabad, Ghazni, Gardez, etc.) and at 

guard posts. 

 

On 16 December the order was given to mobilize the field HQ of the 40

th

 Army. The First Deputy 

Commanding General of the Turkestan Military District General-Lieutenant Yu. V. Tukharinov was appointed the 

Commanding General of the Army. 

 

A plan for deployment of troops to Afghanistan had not previously been developed in the General Staff and 

therefore an overall directive for the mobilization of troops and their control organs was not issued. Formations and 

units were brought into readiness after the corresponding verbal orders, for Ustinov. 

 

The formation of an expeditionary contingent of troops for deployment to Afghanistan began in mid-

December at an accelerated tempo. Formations and units deployed in the Turkestan Military District which almost all 

had been cadre-strength and filled out constituted its backbone. They were brought up to strength using local resources 

from the reserves. Considering that as a rule the representatives of the Central Asian republics served in construction 

units and motorized rifle units their training was low. Troops were brought into readiness administratively, on the basis 

of individual instructions of the General Staff. A total of more than 30 such instructions were issued in three weeks.

40

 

Evidence of the rushed nature of the deployment is that there were no specific plans  to send Soviet troops to the DRA 

in the USSR Defense Ministry before the middle of December. 

 

On the evening of 17 December the “Zenit” troops and the “Muslim” battalion were given the task of moving 

into Kabul, into the Dar-ul-aman area where the DRA leader had relocated his residence. According to the plan the 

next act against Amin was to be carried out after he moved to Taj-Bek. The “Muslim” battalion and a  “Zenit” group 

were concentrated in the designated area by the close of 18 December. On the evening of that same day Col. Vasiliy 

Kolesnik received an order in Moscow from the Chief of the General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate, General of 

the Army Petr Ivashutin – fly to Afghanistan in civilian clothing to carry out a special government assignment. They 

sent Lt. Colonel Oleg Shvets with him.  Having quickly filled out the documents necessary in such cases  (they 

brought the foreign passports to them right at the plane) they departed Moscow’s Chkalovskiy Airfield at 0630 on 19 

December on an An-12 aircraft for Bagram via Baku and Termez. KGB officers Major-General Yuriy Drozdov and 

Captain 2

nd

 Rank Ehval’d Kozlov and also a military commissary official flew with them. 

 

According to Maj. Gen.  Yuriy Drozdov, Chief of the USSR KGB Directorate of Illegal Intelligence:  

On 18 December 1979 at the end of a meeting Chief of the 1

st

 Main Directorate Vladimir 

Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov said that KGB Chairman Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov was 

summoning both of us to his office by 1900 regarding an important issue. Inasmuch as it was  not 

acceptable to ask clarifying questions about the upcoming conversation but the management 

documents requiring Andropov’s attention had been reported to Kryuchkov I thought that that more 

detailed information about the content of the documents being reported was being required. 

 

 

35

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The KGB Chairman warmly greeted us and offered some hot tea with lemon. He quickly 

examined the urgent documents regarding the activities of illegal intelligence and started to talk 

about the situation in Afghanistan. Concluding the conversation, Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov 

asked me to fly to Kabul for several days, familiarize myself with the situation on the spot, and look 

at what the officers of the Directorate who had arrived there in November were doing. In conclusion 

he said: “The situation there is complex, serious events are impending, but you’re the only one of us 

who has really fought.” 

 

I asked, when should I fly? Yuriy Vladimirovich looked at Kryuchkov, who had been 

included in the conversation, and said: “Tomorrow morning at 0630, Chkalovskiy Airfield.” 

Proceeding from the content of the conversation I asked our representative in Kabul to be informed 

about my flight and the nature of the assignment. Andropov said this would be done by Kryuchkov 

and warmly bade me goodbye. 

 

Having returned to Directorate ‘S’ I called and Captain 2

nd

 Rank Ehval’d Kozlov to my 

office and said to him that early tomorrow morning we were flying to Kabul for several days. 

Kozlov replied in a naval manner, “Aye-aye”, without asking a single question. They followed the 

situation in his department in a crisis center and it was clear without words what needed to be done 

before the flight. As Aleksandr Vasil’yevich Suvorov used to say, “Soldiers’ meetings are short. 

They harnessed the carriage and went.” 

 

I returned home late that day. I replied to the inquiring and alarmed look of my wife that 

early tomorrow morning I was flying out to Afghanistan for several days and was confident that I 

would return before New Year’s. She said nothing in reply, but just looked at me with increased 

alarm. 

 

On the morning of 19 December sitting in the car along the road to the airport  I recalled 

everything that I knew about Afghanistan. It needs to be noted that our predecessors regarded this 

country quite seriously as a region of possible operations of the Russian Army. What awaited us… 

 

Kozlov was given an attaché case at the airfield in Moscow to hand to the KGB officer who met him in 

Afghanistan. 

 

They only arrived at Bagram late at night. Drozdov and Kozlov were met by Kostromin, an official of the 

KGB residency in Kabul, to whom the attaché case was handed.  Having spent the night in a mud hut at the airfield, 

the next morning they went to Kabul with embassy security officer Bakhturin. The special representative of the KGB 

in Afghanistan Lt. General Boris Ivanov greeted Yuriy Drozdov with a question: “Why did you fly in?” He replied 

there should be a cable from Vladimir Kryuchkov about this. Afterwards it was proposed that they familiarize 

themselves with the situation and the location where the group of “Zenit” troops were deployed. Then Ivanov asked 

Kozlov about the attaché case. When the latter replied that the case had been handed to Kostromin and left at the mud 

hut at the airfield Ivanev changed expression. Kozlov had to quickly go back to Bagram. Fortunately the attaché case 

was laying where it had been left – in the mud hut. As later became clear, it held a cassette with a recording of an 

address to the people by Karmal. If it had gotten into the hands of the Afghans the operation would have been ruined. 

And there were many such misunderstandings but luckily for us they all ended up well and did not influence the 

preparations for the operation. The truth is, Karmal also made a recording of his address while he was in Bagram. 

 

Vasiliy Kolesnik, who had spent the night in the first hardstand they found with Oleg Shvets, also went to 

Kabul on the morning of 20 December where they were presented to the Chief Military Adviser Col. Gen. Sultan 

Magometov, Vladimir Pechenko, and Col. Aleksandr Baranayev, the Military Attaché to the DRA… 

 

After receiving the assignment and studying the situation Kolesnik and Shvets went to where the battalion 

was located, near the Taj-Bek Palace, in an unfinished building with windows without glass. Instead they had ponchos 

drawn over them and “bourgeois” heating stoves had been installed, and cots in two circles. The Afghans gave them 

overcoats of camel’s hair.  The winter in Kabul was very severe that year and the temperature at night fell to –20

o

 C. 

They bought food in the bazaar.  In general, they were satisfied. Major Dzhamilov, the deputy for logistics to the 

 

36

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