Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

 

 

From the memoirs of Valeriy Yemyshev: “Mikhail Mikhaylovich gathered all of us together and assigned the 

mission of assaulting the Palace. They broke us up into crews and each crew was specified an approach route to the 

building, specific places to attack, and targets in the Palace itself. The mission of my crew was to put the telephone 

communications on the first floor next to the duty officer’s room out of order. They postponed the start of the assault 

several times. Before landing I remember that Gennadiy Zudin, Dmitriy Volkov approached and asked for a smoke. I 

gave Zudin a package of “Dymok” cigarettes and he smoked them all”. 

 

 

From the memoirs of Vladimir Fedoseyev: “When Mikhail Mikhaylovich gathered us together he gave each 

of us 100 grams of vodka, sausages, and bread. But the mood was so strong that the vodka ran out and no one began 

to eat the bread and sausages. Afterwards they again formed into crews. I ended up in Balashov’s crew.” 

 

 

At that time Hafizullah Amin, not suspecting the events taking shape, was in a state of euphoria because he 

had managed to achieve his goal – Soviet troops had entered Afghanistan. On 27 December during the day he held a 

lavish dinner, receiving several Politburo members and ministers with their families in his luxurious Palace; in 

particular Panjshiri, the wives of Zeray and Shah Wali were present. The formal occasion on one hand was the 

anniversary of the founding of the PDPA and on the other the return of CC PDPA Secretary Panjshiri from Moscow. 

He assured them that the Soviet leadership approved the version of the death of Taraki and the replacement of the 

country’s leader. The visit had strengthened relations with the Soviet Union. They had confirmed in Moscow that the 

USSR would give broad military aid. 

 

 

Amin, in spite of the fact that he himself had deceived Brezhnev and Andropov in September (he had 

promised to save Taraki’s life when the latter had already been suffocated), trusted the Soviet leaders. Why? If you 

don’t throw out the version that he was tied to the CIA then most likely he received such instructions. Or thought they 

don’t put victors on trial, they make friends…with them. It’s possible that he did not doubt that “the Russians 

recognize only force”. In any case he did not only “surround himself” with Soviet military advisers and consult with 

senior KGB and Soviet Ministry of Defense officials but completely trusted…only doctors from the USSR. And in the 

final account he rested his hopes on Soviet troops. He did not trust Parchamists and expected an attack from them and 

from the mujaheddin. But he became a victim of political intrigue from a completely different direction. 

 

 

 

At the reception Amin triumphantly told those present: “Soviet divisions are already on their way here. 

Paratroopers are landing in Kabul. Everything is going beautifully. I am in constant touch by telephone with Cde. 

Gromyko and we are discussing together how to best formulate the information to the world about the extension of 

Soviet military aid.” 

 

 

A speech by Amin was expected during the day on Afghan television. The most senior military officers and 

political leaders had been invited to the Palace to record his speech. But the action carried out by the KGB interfered 

with this. 

 

 

During the dinner, which was prepared by Soviet chefs, Amin, his children, sister-in-law [Translator’s note: 

nevestka, which can also mean daughter-in-law], and many guests unexpectedly felt ill. Several lost consciousness, 

including Amin. His wife immediately summoned the commander of the Presidential guard Major Jandad who began 

to call the Central Military Hospital (Charsad Bistar) and the Soviet Embassy polyclinic in order to get help. The food 

and pomegranate juice were immediately sent for testing. Cooks under suspicion were detained. Security was 

intensified. However the main culprits had already managed to escape. 

 

 

At 1500 the Soviet Embassy informed Yuriy Drozdov that the time to begin the assault (“H-hour”) had been 

set at 2200 and then changed to 2100. Later it was periodically confirmed and finally became 1930. 

 

 

Then, at the request of the Chief of the Main Political Directorate Muhammad Ekbal Waziri and at the 

insistence of the Chief of the Political Department of the Chief Military Adviser in the DRA General-Major Sergey 

Tutushkin, Soviet doctors in Kabul, the Chief of the Central Military Hospital of the Afghan army Lieutenant Colonel 

Weloyat Habibi, and the Chief Surgeon of the Hospital Abdul Kayum Tutahel arrived at the Palace. 

 

 

When the commander of plastic surgery [khirurgicheskoye usileniye] group of the hospital Colonel Viktor 

Kuznechenkov and other doctors arrived at the outer guard post, and usual, started to hand over their weapons they 

 

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still were searched, which had never been done before. And they were dealt with in a rather harsh manner. Their 

documents were examined more carefully than usually when entering the Palace and they were searched again. Had 

something happened? 

 

 

They understood when they saw people lying and sitting in the entrance hall, on the stair steps, and in the 

room in unnatural positions. Those who “had come to their senses” were writhing in pain. The doctors decided right 

away: mass poisoning.  They decided to give the victims medical aid but Lieutenant Colonel Weloyat Habibi ran up to 

them and led them away to Amin. In his words the chief of state was in serious condition. Amin was lying in one of 

the rooms undressed to his undershorts with his jaw dropped and eyes rolled. He was in a serious coma. Had he died? 

They felt his pulse – the beating was barely perceptible. 

 

 

Colonels Viktor Kuznechenkov and Anatoliy Alekseyev, not thinking that they were disrupting any plans, 

started to save the head of “a country friendly to the USSR”. First they put his jaw in place, then restored breathing. 

They took him to a bathroom, washed him, and began to pump his stomach and force diuresis. After this they moved 

him to a bedroom. Injections and again injections, medicine droppers, and needles in the veins of both arms…This 

work continued until 6 P.M. 

 

 

They managed to save Amin’s life, but feeling that some alarming events were about to happen, Alekseyev 

sent the women out of the Palace in a timely manner, referring to the need to do laboratory analyses… 

 

 

The incident alarmed the officers (Jandad, Ekbal) greatly as they were responsible for protecting the 

Chairman of the DRA Revolutionary Council. They set up additional (even external) posts comprised of Afghan 

servicemen and called the tank brigade – have them be ready to help.  But they could not expect help from anywhere. 

Our paratroopers had completely blocked off the Afghan military units located in Kabul. 

 

 

This is what Vladimir Salkin said about what happened in Kabul, for example: “In the evening, at about 

1830, an order came to brigade commander Ahmad Jan to deploy one battalion to the city. At this time the adviser to 

the brigade commander Colonel V. N. Pyasetskiy and I were constantly next to the commander. He ordered the 

commander of the first tank battalion to be in full combat readiness and he would issue the order to leave later. 

Momentarily the tank engines roared. The first battalion was ready for action. From time to time Pyasetskiy looked at 

his watch, expecting new orders to the brigade. At 1900 Viktor Nikolayevich himself asked Ahmad Jan to get in touch 

with his command…However the latter could not call because of a lack of communications. 

 

 

Pyasetskiy advised him to check the status of the telephone wire at the brigade’s base. A signals platoon was 

quickly summoned and the soldiers started to careful inspect communications. This took about 30 minutes. 

 

 

…Suddenly four airborne combat vehicles at full speed broke through the gates of the military compound and 

encircled the brigade HQ building without slowing down. A Soviet captain jumped out of the first vehicle. Entering the 

building, he presented himself, called Pyasetskiy aside and talked with him. Then he delivered a small flask containing 

an alcoholic beverage and suggested drinking it. Turning to the brigade commander, the captain said there was 

trouble in the city and it was inadvisable for the brigade to leave. After consulting, the commander gave a 

“standdown” order to the first battalion…” 

 

 

Quite a bit of time would pass while they shook Amin a long time and, when he came to his senses, asked 

with surprise, “Why did this happen in my house? Who did it? Was it an accident or sabotage?” 

 

 

About 6 P.M. Magometov summoned Kolesnik to talk and said: in connection with unforeseen circumstances 

the time for the assault was postponed and it needed to start as soon as possible. And so they began the operation 

before the set time. After literally 15-20 minutes the seizure group headed by Captain Sakhatov went in the direction 

of the hill where the tanks were dug in. Among them were two men each from “Grom” (Dmitriy Volkov and Pavel 

Klimov) and “Zenit” (Vladimir Tsvetkov and Fedor Yerokhov). The tanks were protected by sentries but their crews 

were in barracks located 150-200 meters away from them. The KGB officers – Vladimir Tsvetkov from “Zenit” or 

Dmitriy Volkov” from “Grom” were to shoot the sentries. One company of the “Muslim” battalion laid in a designated 

area ready to support Sakhatov’s group with effective fire. 

 

 

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