Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

 

 

At 1850 a “Zenit” detachment of 14 reconnaissance saboteurs headed by Valeriy Rozin and two Border 

Guards officers in automobiles left the Soviet Embassy grounds for the General Staff building. An Afghan, Abdul 

Wakil, was with them. They arrived at the site about 1900. One “Zenit” group climbed up to the second story in the 

left wing of the building where the staff of the Chief of the General Staff M. Yakub was located. The rest remained on 

the first floor in the entrance waiting for the established time. 

 

 

They paid attention to the fact that the Afghans in the building (the external guard force, the posts in the 

entrance and on both floors, people in civilian clothing, and officers) were considerably more than had been 

determined when scouting the target. In the communications center room, besides three signalmen on duty, there were 

about 15 Afghan soldiers with automatic weapons. In the side parts of the building at the left and right entrances 

besides the usual two sentries there were 7-10 more Afghan soldiers each. Several soldiers were in rooms on the first 

floor. 

 

 

Probably there had been a leak about the operation, possibly even about the hour it was to begin. From 

indirect signs the Afghans were awaiting our operations and took specific steps to organize resistance. Opposition was 

considerably weakened thanks to the unexpected change of the beginning of the operation to an earlier time. 

 

 

The operation was carried out with a cover story of the Commander of the 103rd Airborne Division General 

Ivan Ryabchenko becoming acquainted with the Chief of the Afghan army General Staff General M. Yakub. 

 

 

About 1900 the division commander, the adviser to the Chief of the General Staff Gen.  Kostenko, Gen. 

Vlasov, Col. Letuchiy, Maj. Rozin (he wore an airborne camouflage uniform over his special forces uniform and he 

posed as the deputy to Ryabchenko for technical affairs), and interpreter Pliyev walked into the office of the Chief of 

the General Staff. They handed over their weapons before they entered the reception room. The Afghans searched 

them. Officer P. Lagoyskiy escorting Gen.  Ryabchenko and also Zenit officers  Irvanev and  Vasil’yev stayed in the 

corridor in front of the reception room. Yakub greeted his guests affably and invited them to a table. There was a radio 

in Yakub’s office with which he maintained direct communications with division commanders. They reported to him 

about readiness from time to time. A conversation began. Gen. Vlasov presented the division commander to the Chief 

of the General Staff of the DRA Armed Forces. They began to discuss issues of mutual cooperation and coordination. 

Ryabchenko had not been informed about the operation which had been prepared and therefore behaved naturally and 

seriously.  The presence of Yakub’s radios [SIC, plural] was a surprise for the military advisers; they did not know 

when the Chief of the General Staff had obtained them. As the time for the beginning of the operation approached 

Gen.  Vlasov and Kostenko left Yakub’s office under various pretexts. 

 

 

At this same time the reconnaissance saboteurs had collected in the entrance and corridors of the first and 

second floors of the General Staff. They covered the majority of the Afghans located there. In order to distract their 

attention and achieve the effect of surprise they established contact with the Afghans, treated them to cigarettes, held 

conversations with them about their having arrived with the division commander and ensuring his security. 

 

 

At 1930 a strong explosion rang out in the city. Judging from the facial expression Yakub also heard it but 

continued to talk. Obviously had already guessed everything but did not lose his self-control. Then he hurried to the 

table where a German 9 mm MG-5 automatic weapon was lying. Major Rozin threw himself in the way. Hand-to-hand 

combat began. It needs to be said that Yakub himself was physically very strong (almost two meters tall and more than 

100 kg) and with well-rounded training. At one time he had graduated from the Ryazan’ Airborne School, and he 

spoke Russian well and was a great friend of the Soviet Union. Of course, it would have been difficult for Rozin if at 

that moment  Lagoyskiy,  Irvanev, and Vasil’yev, who had remained in front of the reception room, had not burst into 

the office with several Afghans. Not understanding what was going on, Gen. Ryabchenko was sitting in his seat but 

interpreter Pliyev also entered the fray. First they put the radio out of commission, depriving Yakub of the opportunity 

of giving an order to division commanders to begin combat operations. In the ensuing firefight Yakub’s assistant was 

killed and Yakub himself was wounded. The Chief of the General Staff quickly hid in a lounge where, as it turned out, 

there were several more senior Afghan army servicemen as well as the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. Pliyev 

suggested that the Afghans who had hid in the Chief of the General Staff’s lounge surrender. And they began to come 

out one at a time with hands raised. 

 

 

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At that time the group consisting of V. Kudrik, V. Stremilov, and A. Mashkov disarmed the sentry at the 

entrance to the communications center on the first floor in brief hand-to-hand combat, cut the outgoing telephone wire 

trunks in the landing, and suppressed the resistance of the guard force with automatic weapons. The “Zenit” troops put 

the most vulnerable and important parts of the communications center out of commission.  The command and control 

of formations and military units located in Kabul was paralyzed which to a large extent ensured the success of the 

operation in the Afghan capital. 

 

 

“Zenit” officers Kim and Nam covered the entrance to the first floor of the right wing of the building, not 

letting soldiers from the security company enter. The entrance to the left wing was controlled by Baranov and 

Povolotskiy. At the same time they did not let Afghan servicemen out of the rooms. 

 

 

Pestsov and two Border Guards remained in the entrance and helped liquidate the guard force at the main 

entrance. 

 

 

After the communications center was put out of order Kudrik, Stremilov, and Mashkov run up to the second 

floor to help support Titov and Klimov of the “Zenit” detachment operating there. Hand-to-hand combat and shooting 

in the rooms of the second floor were the most prolonged and fierce. The Afghans, concentrated in the rooms of the 

second floor, fired furiously. Some part of the Afghan servicemen hid on the third floor. 

 

 

Meanwhile the situation in the office of the Chief of the General Staff had somewhat calmed. The wounded 

Yakub was lying in the lounge and the remaining Afghans surrendered. They were tied up and placed under guard in a 

separate room. 

 

 

Shots and grenade explosions were heard through the entire building. General Kostenko hid in his office and 

almost fell victim to his own countrymen. When the battle situation in the office of the Chief of the General Staff was 

actually over Abdul Wakil appeared. He talked in Pashto to the wounded Yakub for a long time and then shot him 

with a pistol. 

 

 

As they managed to put down the resistance of the Afghans in various places in the building they gathered the 

prisoners in a large room. In the final account they collected about 100 people there. Many of them were in shock. And 

although they were all disarmed they nevertheless presented a real threat to the small handful of “Zenit” troops. Then 

Rozin ordered that they all be quickly tied up [but] there was no rope. They used communications cable for these 

purposes which was found where possible. 

 

 

They did not begin to assault the third floor of the building. The Afghans stuck there could not leave since all 

the exits were controlled by “Zenit” troops. 

 

 

The battle lasted more than an hour. When the shooting had started to die down a company of paratroopers, 

who had arrived about 40 minutes later than the time set in the plan, quickly advanced on the General Staff building in 

airborne combat vehicles [BMDs]. The paratroopers opened massed intensive fire at the windows from machine guns 

and automatic weapons. The “Zenit” troops were forced to lie on the floor and find cover in order not to fall victim 

from their own soldiers. Tracer bullets piercing the walls of the rooms glowed like red fireflies, creating an inimitable 

sight. Maj. Rozin began to shout at the division commander that he needed to take some measures to cease fire. Gen. 

Ryabchenko gave a mission to one of his officers to quickly get in touch with the company commander. After some 

time signalmen with an R-105 radio arrived in the building and the division commander assumed control himself. The 

paratroopers quickly put down the remaining hotbeds of resistance and occupied the third floor. They “cleaned” the 

rooms. 

 

 

The Afghans lost 20 men. Many hundreds of officers and soldiers were taken prisoner. Two men in the 

assault groups were slightly wounded. 

 

 

On conclusion of the battle the General Staff building and the prisoners were put under guard by the 

paratroopers.  Captured equipment was also handed over to them – automatic weapons, machine guns, grenade 

launchers, ammunition, and silent weapons.  Rozin gave documents, valuables, and money from the safe to Gen. 

Vlasov and he handed them over to Gen. Kostenko the adviser to the Chief of the General Staff for storage. Two days 

later Gen.Vlasov handed over everything taken from Yakub’s safe to the Embassy for Gen. Ivanov. 

 

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