Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

 Klimov 

recalled 

that 

“Immediately before the operation some drank vodka, others valerian, but all the same 

it didn’t help. The excitement and stress was great. For many this was the end of their biographies; everyone 

understood the danger. 

 

 

I was put in a group of 14 men who were first to carry out their mission. We had two from the “Grom” group 

(myself and Dima Volkov), two guys from “Zenit”, and two crews of five men each from the “Muslim” battalion. 

 

 

About 20 minutes before the start of the operation we drove in a truck in the direction of one of the security 

battalions’ barracks, not far from where the tanks were dug in. We had the mission of seizing these tanks and not 

giving them the opportunity of opening fire on the assault groups. In addition, we were to make the Palace defenders 

who had been fooled by the situation think that the brigade’s servicemen had mutinied and attacked the Palace. We 

needed to create the appearance that the first salvos were coming from the barracks itself. 

 

 

 

The snow was waist-high, which hindered our advance. I didn’t start to put on my bulletproof vest because 

neither the soldiers of the “Muslim” battalion nor the guys from “Zenit” had them. I could not be in a bulletproof vest 

when the rest were without them and, yes, we then needed to run through deep snow and I was afraid that I could fall 

behind. I was like everyone else. Therefore I left my bulletproof vest with my friends from the “Zenit” group who had 

none. The truth is, they then cursed me for this”. 

 

 

At the command post Col. Grigoriy Boyarinov was visibly nervous. He had arrived in Kabul only the day 

before and had still not yet sized up the situation but it’s possible that a foreboding suggested trouble to an experienced 

soldier. In view of this, Ehval’d Kozlov asked General Drozdov permit him to take part in the assault on the Palace, 

saying that he would go with Boyarinov and help him. Drozdov thought for some time and then said, “Good, go, but 

be careful”. Having checked his Stechkin pistol and not finding that anyone had bulletproof vest Kozlov quickly ran to 

the BMPs in which there “Grom” troops were already sitting. V. Kolesnik had barely managed to issue him his helmet. 

Neither Ehval’d Kozlov nor Grigoriy Boyarinov then yet knew that they would become Heroes of the Soviet Union 

after the assault and, it is true, the latter was not fated to return from this battle. Ehval’d Kozlov said that he “felt that it 

would be very difficult for Boyarinov to coordinate the operations of the s but I knew the soldiers of both groups and 

therefore it was easier for me. I should have been in the battle”. 

 

“Shtorm-333” 

 

 

When the vehicle of Makhmud Sakhatov’s group was approaching the location of the third battalion suddenly 

shooting was heard, which unexpectedly intensified. Col. Kolesnik immediately gave the order for the soldiers and 

officers of the “Muslim” battalion and the KGB special forces groups: “Fire!” and “Forward!” Red flares flew through 

the air. It was 1915 by the clock. The signal “Shtorm-333” had been given on the radio nets. 

 

 

Two self-propelled anti-aircraft ZSU-23-4 (“Shilka”) guns were the first to open fire on the Palace in a direct 

line of sight on command of Senior Lieutenant Vasiliy Praut, raining down a sea of shells. Two other guns hit the 

infantry battalion, thus supporting the paratrooper company. AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers began to open fire 

on the tank battalion without letting the crews get to their machines. 

 

 

Subunits of the “Muslim” battalion began to advance to designated areas. The company of Senior Lieutenant 

V. Sharipov was to have been first to advance; it had five BMPs as an assault force of several special forces subgroups 

consisting of “Grom” headed by Oleg Balashov  (Aleksey Bayev, Nikolay Shvachko, and Vladimir Fedoseyev); 

Valeriy Yemyshev (Sergey Kuvylin, Gennadiy Kuznetsov, Andrey Yakushev, and Grigoriy Boyarinov); Sergey Golov 

(Viktor Anisimov, Leonid Gumennyy, Gennadiy Zudin, Mikhail Sobolev, and Vladimir Filimonov); and Viktor 

Karpukhin (Nikolay Berlev, Aleksandr Plyusnin, Vladimir Grishin, and Sergey Kolomiyets). Major Mikhail Romanov 

had overall command. Aleksandr Repin, Gleb Tolstikov, and Yevgeniy Mayev were also with him in a BMP together 

with Ehval’d Kozlov and Asadullah Sarwari. 

 

 

Major Yakov Semenov with a “Zenit” subgroup of four armored personnel carriers of Rustam Tursunkulov’s 

platoon were to advance toward the western part of the hill. Then they were to climb up to the side part of Taj-Bek on 

a ladder and both groups were to join up on the façade of the building and operate jointly. 

 

 

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But everything became confused at the last moment. The platoon of the three armored personnel carriers of 

Senior Lieutenant Tursunkulov began to advance first. In the BTRs were also “Zenit” subgroups, the commanders of 

which were Aleksandr Karelin (A. Agafonov, V. Antonov, N. Kurbanov, S. Chernukhin, and N. Kimyayev); Boris 

Suvorov (V. Poddubnyy, V. Drozdov, V. Ryazantsev, A. Kolmakov, A. Novikov, and T. Gulov); and Vladimir 

Fateyev (S. Chizhov, Yu. Lysochenko, F. Il’inskiy, M. Tsybenko, and V. Makarov) with Yakov Semenov having 

overall command. They were to seize the first floor of the building. The fourth “Zenit” subgroup headed by Vladimir 

Shchigolev (V. Bykovskiy, A. Ivashchenko, B. Ponomarev, U. Charyyev, V. Kurilov, and V. Zakharov) ended up in 

the “Grom” column. 

 

 Yemyshev 

recalled: 

“On command we began to take our places in the combat vehicles. At the very last 

moment Grigoriy Ivanovich Boyarinov jumped in right next to me and asked me to move. I said that we were 

completely full but he sat down all the same. Besides us the crew contained the BMP commander, the driver-mechanic, 

and the gunner-operator from the “Muslim” battalion. Interpreter Andrey Yakushev from the KGB First Main 

Directorate was sitting next to me. The vehicles advanced on signal”. 

 

 

The first combat vehicle passed the traffic barrier successfully, crushing the Afghan soldier rushing to close 

it; shot up the remaining external security posts, and hurried along the only road which snaked upward into a mountain 

ending in an area in front of the Palace. The road was strongly defended and had a good field of fire [khorosho 

pristrelyana], but other approaches to the Palace were mined. The first APC had just passed a turn when large-caliber 

machine guns struck it from the building. Rustam Tursunkulov, leading the operations of the platoon leaning out a port 

from his waist suddenly heard how bullets were starting to “click” on the armor. He understood right away that games 

were over - a real battle had started. The APC containing Boris Suvorov’s group was suddenly knocked out and started 

to burn. The personnel quickly began to get out and several were wounded. The subgroup commander himself 

received a wound in the groin just below his bulletproof vest. They could not save him because of the loss of blood. 

Having jumped out of the APCs the “Zenit” troops were forced to lie down and shoot at the windows of the Palace. 

They began to climb up the mountain with the aid of the scaling ladders. At this time the “Grom” subgroups were also 

climbing the winding road toward Taj-Bek. 

 

 

A BMP, having passed the gate on the approach to the Palace building, got caught on the brickwork and died. 

Company commander Sharipov gave the order to hurry. The soldiers were forced to get out quickly. There were still 

20 meters to the Palace. At this moment the signalman was killed and radio communications with Colonel Kolesnikov 

were lost. Sharipov could not stop the fire of the “Shilka”’s. Romanov recalled that he “ had created several 

subgroups, each of which had a BMP. Ehval’d Kozlov joined us; he was in my crew. The vehicles were to support us 

with machine gun and automatic weapons fire. They also had scaling ladders. 

 

 

The approach to the Palace area was supposed to be from two directions. I and my “Grom” team were to 

twist along the winding road and Yasha was to assault the side of the Palace with a ladder. Then, joining up at the 

façade, we were to break into the Palace together. But, as always, the situation made its own corrections. Semenov’s 

break-in group was hindered. The APC had been put out of action and the crew had gotten out. Several soldiers had 

approached the designated area but the rest were scattered, pinned to the ground by fire. 

 

 

 

But we were approaching the side part, climbing along the winding road. I gave two snipers to the group that 

was to seize the tanks. Thus I had 22 men left with me. The assault groups were formed. They broke into the Palace in 

one breath. There was a delay only when one of our BMPs was put out of action. They rushed in from the second 

approach. 

 

 

The barrage was such that you couldn’t move….A “Rafik” bus was parked at the Palace so it was turned into 

a sieve. You could see right through it. It’s a pity they didn’t save it for a museum. 

 

 

Bulletproof vest didn’t save anyone. A bulletproof vest is symbolic, not a serious device. The pistol, 

antipersonnel version as well, and an automatic weapon penetrates it easily. The West German helmets were not 

bad…” 

 

 

At 7:30 P.M. strong explosions thundered through Kabul. The KGB subgroup had blown up the so-called 

communications “conduit”, cutting off the Afghan capital from the outside world.  And Polyakov recalls that: “Having 

 

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