An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of

745

Adam Smith

jects, and whose universal bankruptcy, if it should happen the day

after the farm is expired, would not much affect their interest. In

the greatest exigencies of the state, when the anxiety of the sover-

eign for the exact payment of his revenue is necessarily the great-

est, they seldom fail to complain, that without laws more rigorous

than those which actually took place, it will be impossible for

them to pay even the usual rent. In those moments of public dis-

tress, their commands cannot be disputed. The revenue laws, there-

fore, become gradually more and more severe. The most sangui-

nary are always to be found in countries where the greater part of

the public revenue is in farm; the mildest, in countries where it is

levied under the immediate inspection of the sovereign. Even a

bad sovereign feels more compassion for his people than can ever

be expected from the farmers of his revenue. He knows that the

permanent grandeur of his family depends upon the prosperity of

his people, and he will never knowingly ruin that prosperity for

the sake of any momentary interest of his own. It is otherwise

with the farmers of his revenue, whose grandeur may frequently

be the effect of the ruin, and not of the prosperity, of his people.

A tax is sometimes not only farmed for a certain rent, but the

farmer has, besides, the monopoly of the commodity taxed. In

France, the duties upon tobacco and salt are levied in this manner.

In such cases, the farmer, instead of one, levies two exorbitant

profits upon the people; the profit of the farmer, and the still more

exorbitant one of the monopolist. Tobacco being a luxury, every

man is allowed to buy or not to buy as he chuses; but salt being a

necessary, every man is obliged to buy of the farmer a certain quan-

tity of it; because, if he did not buy this quantity of the farmer, he

would, it is presumed, buy it of some smuggler. The taxes upon

both commodities are exorbitant. The temptation to smuggle,

consequently, is to many people irresistible; while, at the same

time, the rigour of the law, and the vigilance of the farmer’s offic-

ers, render the yielding to the temptation almost certainly ruin-

ous. The smuggling of salt and tobacco sends every year several

hundred people to the galleys, besides a very considerable number

whom it sends to the gibbet. Those taxes, levied in this manner,

yield a very considerable revenue to government. In 1767, the

farm of tobacco was let for twenty-two millions five hundred and

forty-one thousand two hundred and seventy-eight livres a-year;

that of salt for thirty-six millions four hundred and ninety-two

thousand four hundred and four livres. The farm, in both cases,

was to commence in 1768, and to last for six years. Those who

consider the blood of the people as nothing, in comparison with

the revenue of the prince, may, perhaps, approve of this method

of levying taxes. Similar taxes and monopolies of salt and tobacco

have been established in many other countries, particularly in the

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746

The Wealth of Nations

Austrian and Prussian dominions, and in the greater part of the

states of Italy.

In France, the greater part of the actual revenue of the crown is

derived from eight different sources; the taille, the capitation, the

two vingtiemes, the gabelles, the aides, the traites, the domaine,

and the farm of tobacco. The live last are, in the greater part of the

provinces, under farm. The three first are everywhere levied by an

administration, under the immediate inspection and direction of

government; and it is universally acknowledged, that in propor-

tion to what they take out of the pockets of the people, they bring

more into the treasury of the prince than the other five, of which

the administration is much more wasteful and expensive.

The finances of France seem, in their present state, to admit of

three very obvious reformations. First, by abolishing the taille and

the capitation, and by increasing the number of the vingtiemes, so

as to produce an additional revenue equal to the amount of those

other taxes, the revenue of the crown might be preserved; the ex-

pense of collection might be much diminished; the vexation of

the inferior ranks of people, which the taille and capitation occa-

sion, might be entirely prevented; and the superior ranks might

not be more burdened than the greater part of them are at present.

The vingtieme, I have already observed, is a tax very nearly of the

same kind with what is called the land tax of England. The bur-

den of the taille, it is acknowledged, falls finally upon the propri-

etors of land; and as the greater part of the capitation is assessed

upon those who are subject to the taille, at so much a-pound of

that other tax, the final payment of the greater part of it must

likewise fall upon the same order of people. Though the number

of the vingtiemes, therefore, was increased, so as to produce an

additional revenue equal to the amount of both those taxes, the

superior ranks of people might not be more burdened than they

are at present; many individuals, no doubt, would, on account of

the great inequalities with which the taille is commonly assessed

upon the estates and tenants of different individuals. The interest

and opposition of such favoured subjects, are the obstacles most

likely to prevent this, or any other reformation of the same kind.

Secondly, by rendering the gabelle, the aides, the traites, the taxes

upon tobacco, all the different customs and excises, uniform in all

the different parts of the kingdom, those taxes might be levied at

much less expense, and the interior commerce of the kingdom

might be rendered as free as that of England. Thirdly, and lastly,

by subjecting all those taxes to an administration under the im-

mediate inspection and direction or government, the exorbitant

profits of the farmers-general might be added to the revenue of

the state. The opposition arising from the private interest of indi-

viduals, is likely to be as effectual for preventing the two last as the

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