68
The Economist
April 22nd 2023
Finance & economics
The last technocrat
W
hen china’s
leaders reappointed Yi Gang as governor of the
country’s central bank in March, it was a pleasant surprise.
With an economics
p
h
d
from America, where he also taught, Mr Yi
is the kind of reformminded, welltravelled technocrat that is
disappearing from China’s policymaking establishment.
The impression of him as a welcome anachronism was rein
forced on April 15th when he spoke on the record, in English, at the
Peterson Institute for International Economics, a thinktank in
Washington, before accepting unscripted questions from the au
dience. In the talk, he expressed respect for market forces and eco
nomic liberties. “You have to believe that market adjustment is by
and large rational,” he said. As a policymaker, he has pushed to
give households and private firms “the maximum amount of free
dom” to buy foreign exchange, without entirely abandoning capi
tal controls. One reason for his stance is personal. As a student and
professor abroad, he remembered, he found it difficult to convert
yuan into dollars, even for small sums. “I hate that,” he said.
The Chinese official even argued—only halfjokingly—that he
was reluctant to intervene in currency markets, partly because
traders at hedge funds, securities firms and commercial banks are
much better paid, and presumably therefore smarter, than him
and his hardworking team at the central bank. Asked if he felt
China’s foreignexchange reserves were still safe after the West’s
financial sanctions on Russia, he expressed an almost touching
faith in the global economic “architecture” (remember that?).
This was music to the ears of the crowd in Washington. But a
few of Mr Yi’s arguments raised eyebrows. He contrasted the sta
bility of China’s interest rates with the activism of America’s Fed
eral Reserve. After covid19 struck, for example, the Fed slashed in
terest rates by 1.5 percentage points to near zero. The People’s Bank
of China (
pboc
) cut them by only 0.2 percentage points. Converse
ly, since the start of 2022, as the Fed has raised rates by 4.75 points,
the
pboc
has nudged down rates another 0.2 points.
Mr Yi also explained that he tries to keep real interest rates a lit
tle below China’s “potential” growth rate, the pace at which the
economy can grow without increasing inflation. One of the charts
he showed suggested that real rates have averaged almost two per
centage points below potential since 2018, when his tenure began.
Such a guideline raises a number of awkward issues. Start with
the theory behind it. In 1961 Edmund Phelps, who would go on to
win a Nobel prize, spelled out a “golden rule” of saving and invest
ment. An economy obeying this rule would accumulate capital up
to the point where its marginal product (the gain from adding
more) equalled the economy’s underlying growth rate. In these
circumstances, the interest rate (which is closely related to the
marginal product of capital) would also fall into line.
This theoretical precept is, however, a rather strange guide to
monetary policymaking. Central bankers do not, after all, control
the marginal product of capital, exerting only very distant influ
ence on it through their sway over the pace of investment. More
over, why would a central bank aim to keep interest rates below
the potential growth rate, rather than in line with it? In Mr Phelps’s
model, interest rates settle below growth only when the economy
has overaccumulated capital, driving its marginal product down
too far. Such an economy has sacrificed consumption for the sake
of excessive saving and investment, which will not generate any
offsetting gratification in the future.
China is, of course, routinely accused of exactly this kind of
overinvestment. It was a little odd, then, to hear a Chinese central
banker describe one of its symptoms as a policy goal. However, in
an earlier speech in Beijing this month, Mr Yi made clear that he is
trying to follow the golden rule. When deciding policy, he aims a
little below the glistering rate only because potential growth is so
difficult to calculate precisely (and, presumably, because he
would rather undershoot than overshoot it).
Uncertainty also explains the inactivism of Mr Yi’s interest
rate setting. To justify this approach, he cited the “attenuation”
principle formalised by William Brainard of Yale University in
1967, which states that if policymakers are uncertain about the ef
fects of their own policies, they should do less than they otherwise
would. In other words, if you are not sure of the potency of your
medicine, administer less than you would if you were. This
sounds reasonable. “A little stodginess at the central bank is en
tirely appropriate,” as a former Fed official once put it.
But in monetary policymaking the principle can end up being
counterproductive. As Stéphane Dupraz, Sophie GuillouxNefussi
and Adrian Penalver of the Bank of France argued in a paper pub
lished in 2020, those smart, wellpaid traders in the financial mar
kets, as well as wage and pricesetters in the broader economy,
will come to expect this stodginess and adjust their actions ac
cordingly. If inflation gets out of whack, they will expect an inhib
ited response and, as a consequence, a more persistent misalign
ment of inflation. They might then act on this expectation, setting
prices or wages in ways that aggravate the problem.
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