Attention readers

_During the present Obama presidency in USA,lot of din has been created about the relation of unresolved Kashmir issue to the growing radicalisation
and militarisation within Pakistan. Efforts are on to link the success of war on terror in Afghanistan with the final settlement of Kashmir issue. In the post
26/11 situation the abetment of the sections of Pakistani state in the terrorist activities in India has received lot of international attention, Pakistan's growing isolation has however forced both USA and Great Britain to interieve and arrest the trend. The visit of the UK’s secretary on foreign affairs J. Milliband to India became controversial because of his brazen comments not only to absolve Pakistani state of its involvement in promoting terrorist activities in India but also linking the success of war on terror in the region to the resolution of Kashmir issue. The strategic perspective in United Kingdom and United States of America about Pakistan needs to be understood with more clearity. This cannot be done without understanding the strategic perspective of the Great game for which Pakistan was created out of India.

We reproduce here the excerpts of the assessment of the Post Hostilities Planning Staff of the war cabinet of Churchill, the views which the British Viceroy Lord Archibald Wavel as well as the assessment of Chiefs of staff. about the imperative of creating Pakistan. --Editor

_On the orders of Church
ill the Post-Hostilities
Planning Staff of the War Cabinet prepared a report named as, 'the security of India and the Indian Ocean'. Following excerpts of the report are relevant in the context already referred to here:-

"The USSR is the only major power which would be capable of seriously threatening our interests in India and the Indian Ocea area by 1955-1960".

It is of paramount importance that India should not secede from the empire or remain neutral in war".

“Its (India's) value (is) as a base from where forces would be suitably placed for deployment within the Indian ocean area and in the Middle East and the far east.”

"Its position in relation to our air and sea communications; from the UK and the Middle East to Australia and the far east," and

"The contribution which India is capable of making to the war effort to the British Empire in consequence of its large reserve manpower".

"Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus would be vulnerable to attacks from airfields in (north-west) India and since the sea communications in the Persian Gulf and in the Arabian Sea carry a major portion of the oil produced in the Middle East and are therefore of great strategic value."

"We must ensure that whatever constitutional changes occur, we retain the right to station military strategic reserves in India..There might be political objections to stationing the strategic reserves in India proper after she has been granted Dominion Status.. Central Headquarters India have suggested that Baluchistan as an alternative to India proper, on the ground that it may be relatively easy to exclude this territory from the Dominion of India."

The above excerpts of the evolving strategic perspective of Great Britain, carried the first deffinitive hints of detaching a part of India and hence the seeds of the nation of Pakistan.

Lord Archiballd Wavell, in February 1946, produced the blueprint detailing the areas of British India that should go to Pakistan. This blueprint was implemented in 1947. However it was kept secret to avoid any impression of a British initiative or hand in the division of India.

The years after leaving India, in June 1949, Lord Wavell addressed the Royal Central Asiatic Society in London thus: “There are two main material factors in the revolutionary change that has come over the strategic face of Asia. One is air power, the other is oil. Oil, which is the source of air power, concerns very deeply with that part of Asia with which this society deals, since the principal known oil reserves of the world lie in the Persian Gulf. The next great struggle for world power, if it takes place, may well be for the control of these oil reserves. It may centre on Western Asia, the Persian Gulf, the approaches to India...This may be the battleground both of the material struggle for oil and air bases, and of the spiritual struggle of at least three great creeds—Christianity, Islam, Communsim....and of the political theories of democracy and totalitarianian. In such a struggle the base of the western powers must surely be in the Middle East...".

Another strategic aspect of the creation of Pakistan including the urgency to do so was underlined by Lord Wavel in his letter to Clement Atlee the Prime Minister of India. He wrote thus, “the first and foremost important is Pakistan issue. It is essential that HMG should have a policy on this...They may decide that the unity of India is of such importance that they will in no circumstances allow a complete partition of India and discount the adverse effect this will have on Muslims not only in India but in other parts of the world and are prepared to face the consequence (that might include) civil war in India and enmity in other Muslims countryues".

On 6/7 February Lord Wavel had for the first time forwarded the blueprint of the future Pakistan to HMG which was implemented almost to the letter when India attained independence eighteen months latter. As per N.S. Sarilla this was one of the most important communications sent by any Viceroy of India ever since the inception of that office, though ignored by most historians. Wavel unfolded his blueprint for Pakistan as follows:

“If compelled to indicate the demarcation of genuinely Moslem areas I recommend that we should include:-

a) Sind, North-West Frontier Province, British Baluchistan, and Rawalpindi Multan and Lahore Divisions of Punjab, less Amirtsar and Gurdaspur districts.

b) In Bengal, the Chittagoing and Dacca Divisions, the Rajshahi division (less Jalpaigiri and Darjeeling) the Noida, Murshidabad and Jessore districts of Presidency divisions; and in Assam the Sylhet district.

2. In the Punjab the only Moselm-majority district that would not go into Pakistan under this demcraction is Gurudaspur (51 percent Moslem). Gurudaspur must go with Amritsar for geographical reasons and Amritsar being sacred city of Sikhs must stay out of Pakistan.

5. We should make it clear in any announcement that this is only an indication of areas to which in HMG’s view the Moslems can advance a reasonable claims, modifications in boundary might be negotiated and no doubt the interests of Sikhs in particular would be carefully considered in such negotiations. Some such saving clause is indicated by importance of preventing immediate violence by Sikhs,.

6. In Bengal the three Moslem-majority districts of Presidency divisions must I think be included in Pakistan, though this brings frontier across the Ganges. The demarcation includes in Pakistan all Moslem-majority districts and no Hindu majority districts.

7. There is no case, consistent with the principle suggested in the breakdown plan, for including Calcutta in Pakistan. The Moslems will probably try to negotiate for its being made a free port. If negotiations fail Eastern Bengal’s prospects as a separate autonomous state will be seriously affected. But Moslems, if they insist on Pakistan, must face up to this problem”.

This breakdown plan eventually became the scheme B. The then Prime Minister of Britain Clement Atlee wrote to the cripps Cabinet Mission on 13 April, 1946 as:-

“You may work for an agreement on the basis of Scheme B (Pakistan) if it seems to be the only chance of agreed settlement. I send you in paragraphs 2 to 7 the views of the Chiefs of Staff for your information and for the use at discussions.”

The views of the chief of the staff further elucidated the strategic vision for creation of Pakistan. The views of the chiefs of staff were as follows:

(2) An agreement involving a loose all-India federation is far better than scheme B. We recognise however that this may be impossible of achievement. The alternative Scheme B (Pakistan) inspite of the disadvantages listed below is better than no agreement at all as this would lead to widespread chaos.

3) The disadvantage of Scheme B (partitions are as follows):-

Pakistan lies across the two entrances to India from Peshawar to sea in west and from the Himalays to the sea to the east.

In her hands would lie the responsibility to bar or open the road into Hindustan. Air bases from which India can be attacked lie in Soviet Central Asia and in Western China. The easiest and quickest routes to the large cities of India from these bases lie over the territories of Pakistan, both in the West and East of India. Similarly the air bases from which counter measures can be taken lie mainly in Pakistan. It can therefore be said that the territory of Pakistan is vital to the defence of India as a whole.

4) Scheme B would destroy the homogeneity of the India Army, which is now strong and well equipped and in charged with the defence of all India. There would evolve the forces of Pakistan, the forces of Hindustan and the forces of many Indian states; each weak, each with its own standards of training, it own scale of equipment and its own tactical ideas. Even if all were acting in common for the defense of India, cooperation would be far from easy unless all acknowledged a central directing authority.

5) To operate effectively the communication of Hindustan and Pakistan must supplement each other as they were designed to do. Again Central Control is essential.

6) In Pakistan there is almost no industrial development, Karachi is at the end of a long and vulnerable railway, and Chittagong is in a similarly exposed position. The fight a war Pakistan must rely on Hindustan for producing a part of the warlike stores required and for importing and transporting the rest, without a Central authority this would not be possible.

7) In the case of Pakistan (west) it seems likely that she would tend to identify for her interests more with the Moslem lands of Central Asia, weak, unstable and exposed though they may be than (sic) with Hindustan. This might well lead to Pakistan being involved in wars not properly of vital importance to Hindustan, not to India as a whole. Or she might through fear engendered by her own weakness uncover the vitals of India by not resisting on the natural battleground of the hills of the Indian frontier?"