Chapter Two from

7                                                                                                                         Festinger (1954) A Theory of Social Comparison Processes                     

exist, and pressures toward uniformity arise, these pressures are• manifested in an influence process. 

Members attempt to influence one another, existing opinions become less stable and change occurs. This 

process of social influence, as we have mentioned before, ceases if and when uniformity of opinion 

exists in the group. 

 

When pressures toward uniformity exist with respect to abilities, these pressures are manifested 

less in a social process and more in action against the environment which restrains movement. Thus, a 

person who runs more slowly than others with whom he compares himself, and for whom this ability is 

important, many spend considerable time practising running. In a similar situation where the ability in 

question is intelligence, the person may study harder. But, needless to say, movement toward uniformity 

may or may not occur. Even if it occurs, it will take much, much longer than in the case of opinions. 

 

This process would, of course, not be competitive if it were not for the simultaneous operation of 

the unidirectional push upward which is stated in Hypothesis IV. Because of this unidirectional push and 

the pressure toward uniformity, the individual is oriented toward some point on the ability continuum 

slightly better than his own performance or the performance of those with whom he is comparing 

himself. If uniformity concerning an ability were reached this would not lead to a cessation of 

competition as long as the unidirectional push upward is operating. 

 

There are data which corroborate the two derivations with regard to both abilities and opinions. 

Back (3), Festinger and Thibaut (9), Festinger, Gerard, et al. (10) and Gerard (14) have shown clearly 

that the presence of disagreement in a group concerning some opinion leads to attempts to influence 

others who disagree with them and also to tendencies to change own opinion to agree more with the 

others in the group. The effect of this process is to have the group move closer and closer to agreement. 

In groups where uniformity concerning some issue is reached the influence process on that issue ceases. 

 

In the case of abilities the evidence is less direct for a number of reasons. First, there have been 

fewer studies conducted relevant to this point. Second, since the process resulting from pressure to 

reduce discrepancies concerning abilities is not clearly shown in a social process, and since it is 

complicated by the drive to do better and better, it is harder to identify. Some evidence is available from 

the literature on level of aspiration (21). It has been shown that in most situations, an individual’s level 

of aspiration is placed slightly above his performance. When told the average performance of others like 

himself the level of aspiration is generally set slightly above this reported group average. These results 

are what we would expect if the resolution of the simultaneous unidirectional drive upward and the 

pressure towards uniformity is indeed a drive to be slightly better than the others with whom one 

compares oneself. These data can then be viewed as an indication of the desire to change one’s position 

relative to others. 

 

An experiment by Hoffman, Festinger, and Lawrence (19) specifically designed to test parts of 

the present theory, shows this competitive process clearly. In a performance situation where one of three 

persons is scoring considerably above the other two, these two can and do act so as to prevent the high 

scorer from getting additional points. Thus, when the situation is arranged such that the performance of 

each person is controllable by the others in the group, action is taken to change the position of the 

members to reduce the discrepancies which exist. 

 

Let us also examine what we would expect of the behavior of someone whose performance is 

considerably higher than the other members of the group and who has no other possible comparison 

group to turn to for his evaluation of this ability. Since the others are considerably poorer, they will not 

effectively serve as a comparison for his own evaluation. The pressure acting on him toward 

comparability can manifest itself in two ways. It is possible that under these conditions his performance 

will actually deteriorate slightly over a period of time. It is also possible that he will devote considerable 

time and effort to trying to improve the performance of the others in the group to a point where at least 

some of them are close to, but not equal to, him. This could take the form of helping them practice, 

coaching them, motivating them to improve and the like. Once comparability has been achieved, 

however, the process should change to the familiar competitive one. 

---

A Theory of Social Comparison Processes 

   

              8

 

 

There is some indirect corroboration of this from experimental evidence. Greenberg (16) reports 

a study in competition in which pairs of children, seated together at a table, were to construct things out 

of “stones” (blocks) which were initially all in one common pile. Grabbing blocks from the pile was one 

of the indications of competition while giving blocks to the others was taken as one indication of lack of 

competition. The author reports the case of two friends, E. K. and H. At a time when E. K.’s 

construction was clearly superior to that of H., H. asked for “stones” and was freely given such by E. K. 

Subsequently B. K. asked H. whether or not she wanted more “stones”. At the end of the session, 

although privately the experimenter judged both constructions to be nearly equal, when the children 

were asked “whose is better?” F. K. said “mine” and H., after a moment, agreed. 

From many such pairs the author summarizes as follows: “Sometimes when a child gave another a 

‘stone’, it was not at all an act of disinterested generosity, but a display of friendly competition and 

superior skill.” 

Derivation D

3

: When a discrepancy exists with respect to opinions or abilities there will be tendencies to cease 

comparing oneself with those in the group who are very different from oneself: 

 

Just as comparability can be achieved by changing the position of the members with respect to 

one another, so can it also be achieved by changing the composition of the comparison group. Thus, for 

example, if pressures toward uniformity exist in a group concerning some opinion on which there is a 

relatively wide discrepancy, there is a tendency to redefine the comparison group so as to exclude those 

members whose opinions are most divergent from one’s own. In other words, one merely ceases to 

compare oneself with those persons. 

 

Here again we would expect the behavioral manifestation of the tendency to stop comparing 

oneself with those who are very divergent to be different for opinions and for abilities. This difference 

arises because of the nature of the evaluation of opinions and abilities and because of the asymmetry 

introduced by the unidirectional push upward for abilities. We will consider these in order. 

 

It will be recalled that opinions are evaluated in terms of whether or not subjectively they are 

correct while abilities are evaluated in terms of how good they seem. In other words, the existence of 

someone whose ability is’ very divergent from one’s own, while it does not help to evaluate one’s 

ability, does not make, in itself, for discomfort or unpleasantness. In the case of opinions, however, the 

existence of a discrepant opinion threatens one’s own opinion since it implies the possibility that one’s 

own opinion may not be correct. Hypothesis VI, which we will state below, leads us then to expect that 

the process of making others incomparable (ceasing to compare oneself with others) will be 

accompanied by hostility or derogation in the case of opinions but will not, generally, in the case of 

abilities. 

Hypothesis VI: The cessation of comparison with others is accompanied by hostility or derogation to the extent that 

continued comparison with those persons implies unpleasant consequences. 

 

Thus, in the case of opinions we expect the process of making others incomparable to be 

associated with rejection from the group. In the case of abilities, this may or may not be the case. It 

would be plausible to expect that there would rarely be derogation in making those below oneself 

incomparable. When making those above oneself incomparable, the presence of unidirectional push 

upward might lead to derogation in some instances. 

 

The asymmetry introduced in the case of abilities is another difference we may expect to find. 

While in the case of opinions, deviation on either side of one’s own opinion would lead to the same 

consequences, in the case of abilities there is a difference. The process of making others incomparable 

results in a “status stratification” where some are clearly inferior and others are clearly superior. 

Corollary VI A: Cessation of comparison with others will be accompanied by hostility or derogation in the case of 

opinions. In the case of abilities this will not generally be true. 

 

Festinger, Schachter, and Back (8) and Schachter (22) have shown that when there is a range of 

---