Chapter1: Introduction: Sociological Theory

MAX WEBER AND CONFLICT THEORY

Max Weber was implicity critical of Marx's theory of conflict, arguing that the unfolding of history is contingent on specific empirical conditions. Conflicts of interests do not, Weber believed, inexorably cause the revolutionary crescendo described by Marx. Yet, like Marx, Weber developed a theory of conflict, and despite a convergence in their theories, Weber saw conflict as highly contingent on the emergence of"charismatic leaders" who could mobilize subordinates. Unlike Marx, Weber saw the emergence of such leaders as far from inevitable, and hence, revolutionary conflict would not always be produced in systems of inequality Nonetheless, when Weber's implicit propositions shown in Table 10.2 are compared with those of Mare in Table 10.1,considerable overlap is evident.

Most of the principles in Table 10.2 can be found in Weber's discussion of the transition from societies based on traditional authority to those organized around rational-legal authority. In societies where the sanctity of tradition legitimates political and social activity, the withdrawal of legitimacy from these traditions is a crucial condition of conflict, as is emphasized in Proposition I of Table10.2. What, then, causes subordinates to withdraw legitimacy? As indicated in Proposition Ⅱ-A, one cause is a high degree of correlation among power, wealth, and prestige or, in Weber's terms, among positions of political power (party), occupancy in advantaged economic positions (class), and membership in high-ranking social circles (status groups). When economic elites, for example, are also social and political elites, and vice versa, then those who are excluded from power, wealth, and political become resentful and receptive to conflict alternatives. Another condition (Proposition Ⅱ-B) is dramatic discontinuity in the distribution of rewards, or the existence of large gaps in social hierarchies that give great privilege to some and very little to other. When only a few hold power, wealth, and prestige and the rest are denied these rewards, tensions and resentments exist. Such resentments become a further inducement for those without power, prestige, and wealth to withdraw legitimacy from those who hoard these resources. A final condition (Proposition ⅡC) is low rates of social mobility. When those of low rank have little chance to move up social hierarchies or to enter a new class, party, or status group, then resentments accumulate. Those denied opportunities to increase their access to resources become restive and unwilling to accept the system of traditional authority.

Table 10.2 Weber's Abstracted Propositions on Conflict Processes

Ⅰ. Subordinates are more likely to pursue conflict with superordinates when they withdraw legitimacy from political authority.

Ⅱ. Subordinates are more likely to withdraw legitimacy from political authority when

A. The correlation among memberships in class, status group, and political hierarchies is high.

B. The discontinuity or degrees of inequality in t he resource distributions within social hierarchies is high.

C. Rates of social mobility up social hierarchies of power, prestige, and wealth are low.

Ⅲ. Conflict between superordinates and subordinates~ becomes~ more likely when charismatic leaders can mobilize resentments of subordinates.

Ⅳ. When charismatic leaders are successful in conflict, pressures mount to routinize authority through new systems of rules and administration.

Ⅴ. As a system of rules and administrative authority is imposed, the more likely are conditionsⅡ-A,Ⅱ-B, andⅡ-C to be met, and hence, the more likely are new subordinates to withdraw legitimacy from political authority and to pursue conflict with the new subordinates, especially when new traditional and ascriptive forms of political domination are imposed by elites.

As stressed in Proposition Ⅲ in Table 10.2, the critical force that galvanizes the resentments inhering in these three conditions is charisma. Weber felt that whether or not charismatic leaders emerge is, to a great extent, a matter of historical chance, but if such leaders do emerge to challenge traditional authority and to mobilize resentments caused by the hoarding of resources by elites and the lack of opportunities to gain access to wealth, power, or prestige, then conflict and structural change can occur.

When successful, however, such leaders confront organizational problems of consolidating their gains. As stated in Proposition IV, one result is that charisma becomes routinized as leaders create formal rules, procedures, and structures for organizing followers after their successful mobilization to pursue conflict. And, as is emphasized in Proposition V, if routinization creates new patterns of ascription-based inequalities, thus emoting a new system of traditional authority, renewed conflict can be expected as membership in class, status, and party becomes highly correlated, as the new elites hoard resources, and as social mobility up hierarchies is blocked. Yet, if rational-legal routidization occurs, authority is based on equally applied laws and rules, and performance and ability become the basis for recruitment and promotion in bureaucratic structures. Under these conditions, conflict potential will be mitigated.

Unlike Marx, who tended to overemphasize the economic basis of inequality and to argue for a simple polarization of societies into propertied and nonpropertied (exploited) classes, Weber's Propositions I and II show more theoretical options. Weber believed that variations in the distribution of power, wealth, and prestige arid the extent to which holders of one resource control the other resources become critical. Unlike Marx, who saw this correlation as inevitable, Weber saw more diverse relations among class, status, and party. Moreover, the degree of discontinuity in the distribution of these resources--in other words, the extent to which there are clear gaps and lines demarking privilege and nonprivilege-can also vary. Unlike Max,Weber did not see the complete polarization of superordinates and subordinates as inexorable. Finally, the degree of mobility--the chance to gain access to power, wealth, and prestige-becomes a crucial variable in generating the resentments and tensions that make people prone to conflict; unlike Marx, Weber did not see a drop in mobility rates as always accompanying inequality

In addition to the propositions in Table 10-2, which pertain primarily to intra-societal conflict processes, Weber developed theoretical ideas on inter-societal processes. Because conflict between societies is. as Herbert Spencer recognized early in his work, a basic condition of human societies that have settled in territories and developed political leadership, it is not surprising that Weber also analyzed intersocietal conflict, or the "geopolitics" between societies. This emphasis has been a prominent theme in the dramatic revival of historical sociology in both its neo-Marxian and neo-Weberian forms and will be explored in later chapter. Weber believed the degree of legitimacy accorded political authority within a system very much depends on that authority's capacity to generate prestige in the wider geopolitical system, or what today we might term "world system'Thus, withdrawal of legitimacy is not just the result of conditionsⅡ-A, B. and C in Table 10.2; legitimacy also depends on the "success" and "prestige" of a state in relation to other states.

Political legitimacy is a precarious situation because it relies on the capacity of political authority to meet the needs among system members for defense and attack against external enemies, even during periods of relative peace. Without this sense of "threat" and a corresponding "success" in dealing with this threat, legitimacy lessens. Weber did not argue that legitimacy is always necessary for superordinates to dorminate; indeed, there are periods of apathy among members of a population, supported by tradition and routine. There can also be periods of coercive force by superordinates to quell potential rebellion, Nor did Weber argue that "external enemies" must always be present to keep legitimacy revved up; rather, internal conflicts that pose threats can also give legitimacy to political authority. Thus, the very processes that might lead some to withdraw legitimacy and initiate conflict under charismatic leadership can sometimes bolster the legitimacy of political authority, if enough other groupings in a society feel threatened. Indeed, Weber argued, political authorities often stir up internal or external "enemies" as a ploy for increasing their legitimacy and power to control the distribution of resources.

But the attention of those with political authority to the external system is not always political. Prestige, per se, can motivate some groupings to encourage military and other forms of contact with other societies. More important, however, are economic interests. Those economic interests colonial and booty capitalists, privileged traders, financial dealers, arms exporters, and the like--who rely on the state to sustain their viability encourage foreign military expansion, whereas those economic interests that rely on market dynamics and free trade will usually resist military expansionism because it can hurt domestic productivity, or profits in external markets. Instead, these interests will encourage co-optive efforts through trade relations and market dependencies of external populations on commodities and services provided by these interests.

Table 10.3 Weber's Abstracted Propositions on Geopolitics and Conflict
Ⅰ. The capacity of political authority to dominate a society depends on its legitimacy.

Ⅱ The more those with power can sustain a sense of prestige and success in relations with external societies, the greater will be the capacity of leaders to be viewed as legitimate.

Ⅲ. When productive sectors of a society depend on political authority for their viability, they encourage political authority to engage in military expansion to augment their interests. When successful, such expansion increases the prestige and, hence, the legitimacy of political authority.

Ⅳ. When productive sectors do not depend on the state for their viability, they encourage political authority to rely on co-optation rather than on military expansion, and when successful, such co-optation increases prestige and, hence, the legitimacy of political authority.

Ⅴ. The more those with power can create a sense of threat from external forces, the greater is their capacity to be viewed as legitimate.

Ⅵ. The more those with power ran create a sense of threat among the majority by internal conflict with a minority, the greater is their capacity to be viewed as legitimate,

Ⅶ, When political authority cannot sustain a sense of legitimacy, it becomes vulnerable to outbreaks of internal conflict, and when political authority loses prestige n the external system, it loses legitimacy and becomes more vulnerable to internal conflict.

Table10,3 presents Weber's argument in mote abstract terms; these propositions supplement those in Table 10.2 where Weber sees the loss of legitimacy as increasing the likelihood of conflict. The essential point is not so much that Weber developed a mature theory but, rather, that he stimulated a conflict approach that examined tile relationship between internal and external conflict processes.