Cjss second Issue: cjss second Issue qxd

energo usafrTxoebis sakiTxebi rusul-qarTuli
omis Semdeg da misi mniSvneloba samxreT kavkasiis 
regionaluri stabilurobisTvis
korneli kakaCia 
politikis mecnierenaTa doqtori
abWoTa kavSiris daSlis Semdeg kaspiis zRva da samxreT
kavkasia saerTaSoriso sazogadoebis yuradRebis centrSi
moeqca. am yuradRebis erT-erTi ZiriTadi mizezi ki isaa,
rom regioni globaluri masStabebiT umdidresi navTobisa
da gazis mopovebis wyaroa. 2008 wels ruseTis agresiam
saqarTveloSi da afxazeTisa da samxreT oseTis damoukide-
blobis calmxrivad aRarebam regionis mdgomareoba Zirfes-
vianad Secvala uaresobisken. omma Seqmna axali
strategiuli situacia, romelic moiTxovs droul
gadawyvetas. saqarTvelos dasustebiT (im SemTxvevaSi Tuki
ruseTi miaRwevs zemoTxsenebul miznebs) ruseTi faqtobri-
vad SeZlebs centraluri aziisa da kaspiis resursebis
monipolizirebas. es ki TavisTavad imis niSania, rom  ruseTi
izolaciaSi moaqcevs azerbaijansa da centraluri aziis
qveynebs da amiT SeZlebs evropaSi Tavisi energo monopoliis
mniSvnelovan gaZlierebas. 2008 wlis agvistos omma
saqarTveloSi gamoaaSkarava is safrTxeebi, romlebic
samxreT kavkasiaSi tranzituli energo koridoris arse-
bobas ukavSirdeba. omma aseve cxadyo ufro Zlieri us-
afrTxoebis garantiebis aucilebloba regionisaTvis,
romelic sasicocxlo mniSvnelobisaa evropisa da glob-
aluri energo usafrTxoebisaTvis. naSromSi aseve ganxilu-
lia is ekonomikuri ziani, romelic ruseT-saqarTvelos
omma samxreT kavkasias miayena da gaanalizirebulia am omis
Sedegad gamowveuli regionuli usafrTxoebis problemebi.
s
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Caucasus Journal of Social Sciences

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Since the industrial revolution the geopolitics of energy – who supplies
it, and securing reliable access to those supplies – have been a driving factor
in global prosperity and security. Over the coming decades, energy politics
will determine the survival of the planet.   The political nature of energy,
linked to the sources of supply and demand, comes to public attention at mo-
ments of crisis, particularly when unstable oil markets drive up prices and
politicians hear constituent protests (Pascual, 2008).
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea and South Cauca-
sus region has become the focus of considerable international attention, pri-
marily because it is one of the oldest and potentially richest oil and gas
producing areas in the world.  Surrounded by the three regional powers -
Iran, Russia, and Turkey - and located on the crossroads of Europe and Asia,
the South Caucasus has also been at the center of post-cold war geopolitical
rivalries. 
To a considerable extent, the significant oil and gas reserves in the
Caspian Sea, specifically in the Azerbaijani sector, have also amplified regional
rivalries for political and economic influence in the region. Despite physical
isolation, the region sits at the very heart of one of the world’s geopolitically
most significant and sensitive areas. Thus, a large number of world powers
see the resources as important, making the South Caucasus the subject of a
second “great game.
The August 2008 Russian invasion of the Georgia and the unilateral
recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia fundamen-
tally changed the situation in the region. The war has created a new strategic
situation. By sending forces over its borders for the first time since the 1979–
89 Soviet–Afghan War and forcibly redefining the border with Georgia,
Moscow has aroused concern among other newly independent countries
about its future intentions. 
Whereas invasion of Georgia was justly seen as part of Moscow’s plan to
reassemble its former empire or at least exert enough control of its border to
deny Western access to critical energy supplies without the Kremlin’s ap-
proval, the invasion was in part a reaction to the expansion of NATO to the
borders of Russia proper along with consideration for membership of both
Georgia and Ukraine. One of the Russian targets in Georgia was the pipeline
carrying oil from the Caspian Sea to the West 
Economic Damage of Russo- Georgian War
The five-day clash between Russian and Georgian forces in August in-
flicted serious damage on Georgia’s economy both in causalities and in wors-
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Caucasus Journal of Social Sciences

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ening the prospects for development and investment. The material damage
has initially been estimated at some 1 billion dollars or about 8% of forecast
2008 GDP. The damage was mainly confined to military targets — bases, mil-
itary airfields, anti-aircraft systems. There was no great damage to civilian
targets, including industrial or agricultural assets, with the factory producing
military aircraft in Tbilisi a rare exception. 
Major communications routes have remained mostly intact. The only ex-
ception here was the blowing up by Russian soldiers of a railway bridge 40
kilometers east of Tbilisi on August 16, after the ceasefire. This disrupted rail
communication between eastern and western parts of the country, causing
problems not only for Georgia, but also for Azerbaijan and Armenia, for which
this railway is an important route.  Georgia suffered lost revenue from the
confrontation: In 2007 Baku-Tbilici-Cheihan fees generated $25.4 million in
transit revenues, and before hostilities erupted Saakashvili’s government had
estimated BTC transit payments for 2008 at about $45 million.
In addition seeking an alternative route, British Petroleum switched to
the recently reopened 550-mile, 140,000-bpd Western Route Export Pipeline,
better known as the Baku-Supsa line, which opened in 1999 and was running
at about 90,000 british pound. Because of the worsening military conflict, on
August 12 BP announced that it was suspending shipments through Baku-
Supsa, as well as the South Caucasus Pipeline, which transports natural gas
from Baku to Turkey via Tbilisi. 
Completing the lock-in of Azeri oil exports, the fighting caused authori-
ties to suspend seaborne shipments from Georgia’s Black Sea ports of Batumi
(200,000 bpd) and Poti (100,000 bpd), both supplied by rail. Poti was closed
Aug. 8 following reported Russian airstrikes. Adding to the grim picture, au-
thorities also ceased exports from Kulevi, Georgia’s third Black Sea oil termi-
nus, which opened in 2007 and is capable of shipping 200,000 bpd.
But probably the most painful loss for Georgia was the damage to its rep-
utation as a safe venue for investment and a secure corridor for fuel trans-
portation. As early as May,2008 Standard and Poor’s lowered its outlook for
the sovereign credit rating of the government of Georgia from ‘positive’ to
‘stable’, explaining it by the deterioration in relations with Russia and the re-
inforcement of Russian forces in the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia (“S&p revises georgia’s,” 2008). During the August war, the agency ex-
pressed concern that investors may become even more cautious in making
investment decisions in Georgia (“Georgia: war costs,” 2008). In particular,
the future of the EU’s  Nabucco gas pipeline project for supplying EU member
states with gas from Azerbaijan and Central Asia may have been endangered. 
Added to these concerns is the growing risk associated to with infra-
structure investments in Southern Caucasus in the aftermath of the war. Al-
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Caucasus Journal of Social Sciences

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