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problem derived from international markets that failed
to absorb Brazilian exports. This way, the interests of
foreign capital invested in Brazil were not to be taken
as an excuse for the imposition of directives concerning
the negotiation of trade agreements. To sum up, in his
words: “Our problem results from the impossibility of
transferring abroad any remuneration or income, given
the form which national economic evolution took.”
(
SIMONSEN
, 1935, pp. 17-18).
The solution for this problem did not consist
for Simonsen in defaulting on foreign debt. Brazil
had defaulted on its foreign debt in 1931, when the
global economic crisis affected coffee exports and
the new government of President Vargas decided for
nonpayment. In 1934 Oswaldo Aranha, then Finance
Minister, negotiated a scheme with international
creditors, envisaging the partial resumption of payments:
Simonsen was overtly in favor of this amortization
system. Moreover, he proposed in the 1935 speech a
strategy to tackle the Brazilian difficulties to remunerate
foreign investment. It involved the creation of a “National
Institute of Exportation”, which would organize payments
to international creditors, based on the magnitude
of surpluses in the balance of trade. The idea was to
guarantee the continuous generation of foreign currency
to reimburse commitments, even though the amount
generated could oscillate.
The general intention was to keep the benefits to
Brazilian economic development derived from foreign
capital, by means of an institute associated to the
Ministries of Agriculture and of Labor, which would
regulate foreign payments. In this scheme, imports
would flow into the country only if the corresponding
amount of foreign currency were previously available. A
ranking of priorities for imports should be introduced,
the first items being: inputs for industry, wheat, fuels,
pharmaceuticals and “the elements necessary for our
economic machinery” (
SIMONSEN
, 1935, p. 22).Policies
envisaging the increase in exports should also be adopted,
but not the approval of a Free Trade Agreement such as
the one in question: the measures should be directed to
the organization of production and its protection.
Agriculture and industry were seen as
complementary: “having put our agricultural production
on a rational basis, we should, so far as concerns industry,
follow a frankly protective policy” (
SIMONSEN
, 1935,
p. 33). The justification for protectionism was given by
the structural necessity of industrialization, which,
according to Simonsen, characterized the Brazilian
economy at the moment.
Exchange had to fall, independently of
errors of policy, because the supplying of the
necessities of a people whose civilization was
progressing demanded commodities which
our exportation of agricultural products could
not pay for. The lack of exchange equilibrium
gave impulse to the industrialization of the
country, which could have been anticipated
by the adoption of an open and frankly
protective commercial policy, such as had the
United States and Germany and such also had
Great Britain, when she needed such a policy
for the consolidation of her economic position.
(SIMONSEN,
1935
, p.
28
-
29
)
The general aim was to tackle problems related to the
international flows of commodities and goods not
necessarily by means of liberalization, but through
regulations framed by the State. If the free market
prevailed with no hindrance, Brazil would, according
Roberto Simonsen and the Brazil-U.S. Trade Agreement of 1935
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to Simonsen, remain economically vulnerable, subject
to persistent exchange rate devaluations, derived from
the impossibility to domestically satisfy the demands
created by the expansion of civilization. The main affinity
of the speech with Rodbertus ideas is in this topic: the
State is an important entity, whose role is to regulate the
economic system.
For Simonsen, however, the main role of the State
was not to redistribute wealth, which points to the
selective character of his appropriation of Rodbertus,
associated with the legitimization of a protectionist
argument. Basically Simonsen was no complete adherent
of Rodbertus’ theory, but the reference to his idea that
the State should play an important role in the regulation
of the economy certainly was functional in a political
dispute in which Simonsen was challenging the liberal
stance to trade and economic policymaking in general.
In the final part of his speech Simonsen provided
a historical description of trade policies carried out by
France, England and the United States, so as to show that
these countries adopted protectionist measures whenever
it was necessary to defend their national economies. In
the contemporary international economic scenario, the
critical 1930s, marked by a severe deceleration of global
economic growth and by the dismantlement of the
monetary system based on the gold standard, many
countries were actually carrying out a protectionist
exchange rate policy: the so-called competitive or
“beggar-thy-neighbor” devaluations.
18
The focus of these historical descriptions was
the American case, which for Simonsen represented
a clear example of policies adopted in order to defend
national interests. He saw nothing wrong with American
policymaking: ultimately the national point of view
should prevail over the cosmopolitan one, as implied by
Adolph Wagner. The misguided strategy was the Brazilian
one, which in contrast to the North American was
based on the free trade principle, to the disadvantage of
national industry.
At the beginning of the speech, Simonsen had
praised Wagner’s idea of national economy as the best
approach to economics available and presented in the
course of the talk arguments in conformity with this
reference. Even though Simonsen did not explicitly
quote theoretical passages by Wagner, which by the
way would have sounded awkward in a parliamentary
address, he clearly challenged the notion that free trade is
necessarily beneficial to all nations in the globe. Likewise,
when Wagner defined the concept of national economy
in his book, he presented important objections to the
free trade principle.
Now concentrating on the Brazilian case, Simonsen
revisited the history of the tariff policies adopted by
the country. He mentioned the agreements of 1808 and
1810
, when the Portuguese court fled to Brazil, breaking
the colonial pact and opening the Brazilian economy to
international trade, particularly to English products; the
Alves Branco tariff of 1844, considered to be relatively
protective; and the gold tariff (1900) which established
that duties on imports should be paid in specie.
According to him, in spite of some mostly unintentional
protection resulting from tariffs adopted for fiscal
reasons, Brazil had never implemented a coherent policy,
rationally aimed at protecting the national economy.
Having cancelled the first commercial
treaties, we did not know how to maintain
a convenient and continuous orientation
in tariff matters. In the political agitations
in which we lived, subject to the influences