Counterplans General Stuff

Coast Guard tradeoff

1nc

New icebreaking funding trades off with Coast Guard cutters – collapses port security

NDM 12

National Defense Magazine, “High-End Ships, Ice-Breakers Compete for Precious Coast Guard Dollars,” http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=671

The Coast Guard is down to one operational icebreaker, a less than favorable situation given the increased role the service is being asked to take in the Arctic. The service used to have eight icebreakers, but all but one have been decommissioned or are in disrepair, commandant Adm. Robert J. Papp Jr. told a Feb. 13 Center for Strategic and International Studies conference. A second icebreaker will be ready to return to action next year, he said, speaking just hours before the release of President Obama’s fiscal year 2013 budget proposal. That document contains $8 million to “initiate acquisition of a new polar icebreaker to ensure that the nation is able to maintain a surface presence in the Arctic well into the future.” Washington insiders are suggesting that the Coast Guard also take money from a program for new large cutters and spend it on icebreakers and less expensive ships. But the future of the nation’s maritime security depends upon ships such as the National Security Cutter that are effective away from the shore, Papp said. The service is in good shape with a substantial fleet of patrol boats to deal with threats close to the shore, he said. He also feels comfortable with the assets the service has in the nation’s ports. But there is a security layer he worries about. “So if you’re inspecting overseas and you have good resources in the ports, you want some sort of middle layer to be able to intercept any threats before they get into your ports,” Papp said. “Unfortunately for us, that is the most expensive layer that we deal with, because in order to do that you have to have stout capable ships that have high-endurance and speed.” This “middle layer” of maritime security is hard for the Coast Guard, he said. “How do you provide persistent sovereign presence in the offshore waters? You can’t do it with patrol boats. It takes ships and ships are expensive,” he said. Coast Guard officials have been fighting for funding to get eight National Security Cutters to replace the 378-foot high-endurance cutters that have been in service since the 1960s. The third NSC was delivered to the Coast Guard last fall. A $482 million contract for the fifth has been awarded to Huntington Ingalls Industries. And Obama’s budget includes funding for a sixth. The funding for the rest is far from certain. During a January speech at the Surface Navy Association’s annual symposium, the commandant said the NSC will remain in competition for dollars with smaller, less expensive Offshore Patrol Cutters that can be built quicker.

Port attack is most likely- security is key to prev

Konkel 5 – Professor @ U of St. Thomas

Container Security: Preventing a Nuclear Catastrophe Todd Konkel Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University Leslie Comstock Editor http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5372.pdf

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. government passed a significant number of measures to improve aviation security – an area with a high level of public visibility. This nation faces a potentially greater threat, however, from a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) making its way into the U.S. in one of the thousands of cargo containers that enter this country every day. In June 2004, the House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation issued a memo reflecting this view: “Despite the importance of seaport security, perhaps no other mode of transportation is currently more vulnerable to future attacks than our Nation’s Marine Transportation System.” 1 Although a future attack involving a chemical or biological WMD could have tragic consequences, a nuclear weapon, which could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths in an instant, presents the most concerning threat. In Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, Harvard professor Graham Allison shares a brief but revealing excerpt from a private conversation that took place with former Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge in February 2004. When asked what worried him most, Secretary Ridge replied with a single word: “nuclear.” 2 Later in his book, Allison states that a nuclear weapon used by terrorists in an attack on the United States “is far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile.” 3

Nuclear terrorism sparks global nuclear war

Hellman 8 – Professor @ Stanford

Martin Hellman, Stanford Professor Emeritus, 2008, “Why worry about nuclear weapons now? Isn’t the Cold War over?”, http://nuclearrisk.org/1why_now.php,

One of the possible triggers for a full-scale nuclear war is an act of nuclear terrorism. Particularly if directed against an American or Russian city, the resultant chaos has the potential to push the world over the nuclear cliff, much as a terrorist act in Sarajevo in 1914 was the spark that set off the First World War. Conversely, the danger of nuclear terrorism is increased by the large number of nuclear weapons. With over 25,000 still in existence and thousands of people involved in their maintenance, storage and security, the chance for error, theft or illicit sale is much too high. More than fifteen years after the bipartisan Nunn-Lugar Act initiated funding for dismantling and protecting "loose nukes" in the former Soviet Union, that effort is only about half complete [NTI 2007]. Loose nukes are not just a problem in Russia. On August 29, 2007, six American cruise missiles with dummy warheads were to be transported from North Dakota to Louisiana. After a day and a half it was discovered that missiles with real nuclear warheads had inadvertently been transferred instead [Washington Post 2007]. Until that mistake was uncovered, these six nuclear weapons were inadequately protected from theft by terrorists and others intent on obtaining such a prize. Society is paying some attention to the possibility of nuclear terrorism, but section 3 of this primer provides strong evidence that such a disaster is still far too likely. This high risk and slow progress shows that significantly more public concern and attention is warranted for the threat of nuclear terrorism. While nuclear terrorism gets much less respect that it deserves, the threat of nuclear war has been almost entirely absent as a societal concern since the end of the Cold War. That is unfortunate since Russian-American relations are again becoming very chilly. Over Russian objections, NATO admitted the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999, and added Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004. While the West saw NATO's expansion differently, Russia feels threatened by it. One of the new NATO members, Estonia, is involved in a deeply emotional conflict with Russia. Having been horribly subjugated when it was part of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Estonia has treated its large Russian-speaking minority (one third of the population) so poorly that Amnesty International issued a report entitled "Estonia: Every third person a potential victim of discrimination." [Amnesty International 2006]. Tensions reached a new high in April 2007 when Estonia removed a memorial to the Russian troops who died defeating Hitler. Seen as a memorial to fallen soldier-liberators by Russia and many Russian-speaking residents of Estonia, the monument was a symbol of past Russian subjugation to the majority of ethnic Estonians. Soon after the memorial was removed, a cyber-attack caused a major disruption of Estonia's Internet access. This attack was believed to have emanated from within Russia, with many people believing the Russian government to be responsible. With Estonia a NATO member, this raised a very serious question: "If a member state's communications centre is attacked with a missile, you call it an act of war. So what do you call it if the same installation is disabled with a cyber-attack?” asks a senior [NATO] official in Brussels. Estonia's defense ministry goes further: a spokesman compares the attacks to those launched against America on September 11th 2001. [The Economist, May 10, 2007] If these tensions between Russia and Estonia escalate into a major crisis, we could face the prospect of having to either renege on our NATO obligations or threaten actions that would expose the entire United States to a nuclear attack. No one wants such a confrontation, but nuclear weapons lose all utility if we admit we can never use them. The U.S., Russia, and all other nuclear weapons states therefore behave as if these weapons have military utility, which is a very dangerous game in times of crisis. NOTE ADDED AUGUST 2008: Recent developments have made the former Soviet Republic of Georgia an even more dangerous flashpoint than Estonia. For details see email #5 sent to participants in this project. Another irritant to relations is the differing Russian and American views of our deployment of a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. The U.S. says that the system is intended solely to protect against the possibility of an Iranian attack, so Russia has nothing to fear. Russia sees the deployment as a major new threat, and questions whether the missiles might really be offensive in nature [Moscow News Weekly, October 25, 2007]. Even former President Mikhail Gorbachev, hardly a Cold Warrior, has voiced concern: Milos Zeman, the former Czech prime minister, said, 'What kind of Iran threat do you see? This is a system that is being created against Russia,' ... I don't think Zeman is alone in seeing this. We see this as well as he sees it [targeting Russia, not Iran]. [Moscow News Weekly, November 29, 2007] I have been concerned for some time that these differing views could lead to a repeat of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In one scenario, despairing of getting us to understand why they see this deployment as threatening, the Russians ask how we would feel if they deployed a similar missile defense in Cuba. While these Cuban missiles would be only hypothetical and defensive in nature, our nation might well see just the suggestion as intolerable. We might therefore respond in a forceful manner so that, to maintain face, Russia felt it had to deploy at least a token missile defense system. If that happened, the resultant crisis could well end with us reimposing a naval blockade of Cuba, at which point there would be a high risk of further escalation. While such a scenario may at first sound improbable, as detailed in section 3 of this primer it is very similar to the progression of events that resulted in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Somewhat ominously, several months after I first voiced the above concern, Russian President Vladimir Putin likened the current American deployment to the Cuban Missile Crisis: I recall how things went in a similar situation in the mid 1960s. Similar actions by the Soviet Union, when it put rockets in Cuba, precipitated the Cuban Missile Crisis. For us the technological aspects of the situation are very similar. We have removed the remnants of our bases from Vietnam and dismantled them in Cuba, yet such threats for our country are today being created on our own borders. [Putin, October 26, 2007] Putin disclaimed that such a crisis could occur in the friendlier climate that currently exists, but those good relations are clearly fraying. Further evidence of the decline in Russian-American relations came in November 2007 when, partly in response to this missile defense system, Russia unilaterally "suspended" implementation of its commitments under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe or CFE [Pravda, November 30, 2007]. In December 2007, events deteriorated further when Russia noted that it might target the system should it be deployed [Reuters, December 17, 2007]. NOTE ADDED AUGUST 2008: Recent developments have realized some of my worst fears and point to a rapidly increasing risk on our present course. For details see email #4 sent to participants in this project. On January 30, 2008, at the Russia Forum in Moscow, former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov stated: Russia's military doctrine, in conditions in which its armed forces are being reduced, is known to envisage the possibility of using nuclear weapons. But this is only on condition of an attack on it and its allies, and only against countries that also possess nuclear weapons. ... In this (Russia's) military doctrine is no different from the military doctrines of other nuclear states. [Primakov is probably referring to the fact that the U.S. has always rejected calls for a policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons.] ... This policy – anti-Russian – increases the chances of "a fatal accident." The world may be made to face the threat of a global conflict without anyone whatsover wanting it. [Interfax, January 30, 2008] In the U.S., presidential candidate Barak Obama had to back pedal after initially saying in an interview that he would not use nuclear weapons against terrorists in Afghanistan or Pakistan. His opponent for the Democratic nomination, Hillary Rodham Clinton, attacked that position, saying,“I think that presidents should be very careful at all times in discussing the use or non-use of nuclear weapons. Presidents, since the Cold War, have used nuclear deterrence to keep the peace. And I don’t believe that any president should make any blanket statements with respect to the use or non-use of nuclear weapons.” [New York Times, August 3, 2007] Turning to the question raised in the title of this section "Why worry about nuclear weapons now? Isn’t the Cold War over?", an ominous chill is descendeding once more on Russian-American relations. The nuclear threat didn't die with the fall of the Berlin Wall. At best, it merely went into hibernation. There are two primary failure modes of deterrence: a partial one that results in either a nuclear terrorist incident or a limited nuclear war, and a complete failure that results in full-scale nuclear war. Even a small partial failure would be horrific: A 10-kiloton bomb [less than one-tenth the power of many of today's warheads] detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever. [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix] A complete failure of deterrence is almost beyond imagination and conjures up mythic analogies. In a 1961 speech to a Joint Session of the Philippine Congress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, "Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide." In 1986, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara expressed a similar view: "If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed” [McNamara 1986, page 6]. In January 2007, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagan’s belief that nuclear weapons were "totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization." [Shultz 2007] DoD and related studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that a full-scale nuclear war would exact: "The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., from 79 million to 160 million dead) … a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side ... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care … millions of people might starve or freeze during the following winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. … further millions … might eventually die of latent radiation effects." [OTA 1979, page 8] The same 1979 OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that assumed a new potentiality when the "TTAPS Report" [TTAPS 1983] noted that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant firestorms might usher in a "nuclear winter" that could erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe the dinosaurs were wiped out by an "impact winter" caused by ash and dust from an asteroid impacting the Earth 65 million years ago. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even a limited nuclear exchange, or one between newer nuclear weapons states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. In a full-scale nuclear war civilization would almost surely be destroyed, and there a reasonable possibility that no human beings would survive. As in the last section, we need to deal with the two failure modes of deterrence: a partial one that results in either a nuclear terrorist incident or a limited nuclear war, and a complete failure that results in full-scale nuclear war. With respect to terrorism, Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of such a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50-50 [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, puts those odds at less than 1%, but notes, "We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1 percent ... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can't live in a world where it's anything but 'extremely low-probability.' " [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found an average estimate of 29% for the “probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar 2005, pages 14-15]. While even the most optimistic of these estimates is alarming, their wide range emphasizes the need for our proposed in-depth studies to reduce the uncertainty. There is significant evidence [Bunn 2007] supporting the need for greater attention to this issue: Al Qaeda has ... explicitly set inflicting the maximum possible level of damage on the United States and its allies as one of their organizational goals. Intercepted al Qaeda communications reportedly have referred to inflicting a "Hiroshima" on the United States. Al Qaeda's spokesman, Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, has argued that the group "has the right to kill 4 million Americans -- 2 million of them children," in retaliation for the deaths the group believes the United States and Israel have inflicted on Muslims. Bin Laden sought and received a religious ruling (fatwa) from an extreme Saudi cleric in May 2003 authorizing the use of weapons of mass destruction to kill American civilians [page 38] The al Qaeda terrorist network and elements of the global network it has spawned have made repeated attempts to get nuclear bombs or weapons-usable nuclear materials to make them, and they have repeatedly tried to recruit nuclear weapons scientists to help them [page 15] Osama bin Laden has made his desire for nuclear weapons clear in public statements. Al Qaeda launched a focused effort to get such weapons ... long before the 9/11 attacks, and this effort has continued [page 20] terrorist teams [have been] carrying out reconnaissance at nuclear weapon storage sites and on nuclear weapons transport trains in Russia, whose locations and schedules are [supposed to be] state secrets; [There have also been] reports that the 41 heavily armed terrorists who seized hundreds of hostages at a theater in Moscow in October 2002 considered seizing the Kurchatov Institute, a site with enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for dozens of nuclear weapons ... Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese doomsday cult [responsible for the 1995 poison gas attack on the Tokyo subways which killed 12 and injured over 1,000] ... reportedly recruited staff members at the Kurchatov Institute [page 36 and 44-45] It is small comfort that terrorist nuclear ambitions have been thwarted thus far. Al Qaeda failed to destroy the World Trade Center with its 1993 truck bomb but, to almost everyone's great surprise, succeeded eight years later. The bipartisan National Threat Initiative is dedicated to preventing another, even more catastrophic shock, but needs greater public awareness and support to combat the current complacency. Society is even less concerned about the risk of a full-scale nuclear war, largely seeing it as a relic of the past. Many people believe that the arms reductions of the last twenty years have made the world safe. But, reducing from roughly 75,000 nuclear weapons to 25,000 today made the world only relatively safer, not truly safe. Others believe that because World War III would be so destructive, no one in his right mind would start such a devastating conflict, and there is therefore no need to worry. But in times of crisis we are often not in our right minds. Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara [McNamara 1986, page 13] sums up what he learned from participating in three world crises – Berlin in 1961, Cuba in 1962, and the Mideast war of 1967 – each of which had the potential to go nuclear: “In no one of the three incidents did either … [the United States or the Soviet Union] intend to act in a way that would lead to military conflict, but on each of the occasions lack of information, misinformation, and misjudgments led to confrontation. And in each of them, as the crisis evolved, tensions heightened, emotions rose, and the danger of irrational decisions increased." Because the Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest the world has come to nuclear war, studying its evolution can help us avoid making the same mistakes twice. In 1962, over Soviet objections, America deployed nuclear-armed Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM’s) in Turkey. From our perspective, installing these weapons secured NATO’s southern flank, helped cement relations with Turkey, and enhanced our nuclear deterrent. The Russians viewed these missiles very differently. While the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and other factors contributed to Khrushchev deploying similar IRBM's in Cuba, this disastrous decision started with a nuclear version of tit-for-tat as noted by Khrushchev's advisor Fyodor Burlatsky: “Khrushchev and [Soviet Defense Minister] R. Malinovsky … were strolling along the Black Sea coast. Malinovsky pointed out to sea and said that on the other shore in Turkey there was an American nuclear missile base. In a matter of six or seven minutes missiles launched from that base could devastate major centres in the Ukraine and southern Russia. … Khrushchev asked Malinovsky why the Soviet Union should not have the right to do the same as America. Why, for example, should it not deploy missiles in Cuba?” [Burlatsky 1991, page 171] Once the crisis started, it developed a life of its own. George Ball, a member of the White House ExComm which advised Kennedy during the crisis, stated that when a group of Kennedy’s advisors met years later "Much to our own surprise, we reached the unanimous conclusion that, had we determined our course of action within the first forty-eight hours after the missiles were discovered, we would almost certainly have made the wrong decision, responding to the missiles in such a way as to require a forceful Soviet response and thus setting in train a series of reactions and counter-reactions with horrendous consequences." [Ury 1985, page 37] Douglas Dillon, another member of Kennedy’s ExComm, was less concerned and, at a 1987 conference commemorating the crisis’ 25th anniversary stated: "My impression was that military operations looked like they were becoming increasingly necessary. … The pressure was getting too great. … Personally, I disliked the idea of an invasion [of Cuba] … Nevertheless, the stakes were so high that we thought we might just have to go ahead. Not all of us had detailed information about what would have followed, but we didn’t think there was any real risk of a nuclear exchange." [Blight & Welch 1989, page 72] In contrast to Dillon’s belief that some other ExComm members had detailed information about what would have followed an invasion of Cuba, facts that later became available showed that none of them had the least idea of what would likely have transpired. Unknown to Kennedy and his ExComm, the Russians had battlefield nuclear weapons in Cuba and came close to giving permission for their use against an American invasion, without further approval from Moscow [Chang & Kornbluh 1998; Blair 1993, page 109; Fursenko & Naftali 1997, pages 212, 242-243, 276]. Not knowing of these weapons, there was strong pressure within the ExComm and from Congress [Fursenko & Naftali 1997, pages 243-245] to invade Cuba and remove Castro once and for all. Another ominous aspect of the crisis was uncovered when key players from both sides met on the 40th anniversary of the 1962 crisis. A Soviet submarine near the quarantine line had been subjected to signaling depth charges, commanding it to surface, which it eventually did. But not until forty years later did Americans learn that this submarine carried a nuclear torpedo and that the Soviet submarine captain, believing he was under attack, had given orders to arm it. Fortunately, the submarine brigade commander was on board, over-ruled the captain, and defused the threat of a nuclear attack on the American fleet [Blanton 2002]. The world held its breath as Soviet ships approached the American blockade. If neither side backed down, war seemed inevitable. Finally, Khrushchev stopped the Soviet ships just short of the blockade. While Kennedy won that round of the Cold War, nuclear chicken does not always have a winner. It is a dangerous game to begin with, and even more so when, as in the Cuban Missile Crisis, winning depends on your opponent having less concern than you for maintaining political power. (As part of the resolution of the crisis, Kennedy agreed to remove the American missiles in Turkey, but he insisted that part of the agreement be kept secret. The 1962 midterm elections occurred soon after the crisis ended. With the secret protocol unknown, Kennedy was seen as winning the standoff and the Democratic Party fared significantly better than anticipated prior to the crisis. In contrast, Khrushchev fell from power two years later, partly due to Russia’s humiliation in the Cuban Missile Crisis [Dobrynin 1995, page 93].) It might be hoped that humanity, after staring World War III in the face, had learned its lesson and that a similar crisis was inconceivable post-1962. Unfortunately, at least two events that could initiate a similar crisis have since occurred. As noted in an earlier section, the current deployment of an American missile defense in Eastern Europe has the potential to produce a second Cuban Missile Crisis, and has been likened to that standoff by Putin [Putin 2007]. (See also my recent update for ominous new warning signs.) And, in the 1980’s, Ronald Reagan threatened to reimpose a naval blockade of Cuba to stop it from aiding a leftist insurgency in El Salvador [LeoGrande 1981]. Such an action would have violated one of our key concessions (lifting the blockade) in return for which the Russians removed their Cuban missiles. Had Reagan reimposed the blockade, the Russians might well have threatened to redeploy missiles unless the blockade was immediately lifted. Such a reaction was made more likely by the fact that, at that time, Reagan was in the process of deploying Pershing IRBM’s (the "Euromissiles") in Western Europe. While not as close to the Soviet border as the Turkish Jupiters, the only way the Soviets could match such weapons was with missiles based in Cuba. Nuclear proliferation and the specter of nuclear terrorism are creating additional possibilities for triggering a nuclear war. If an American (or Russian) city were devastated by an act of nuclear terrorism, the public outcry for immediate, decisive action would be even stronger than Kennedy had to deal with when the Cuban missiles first became known to the American public. While the action would likely not be directed against Russia, it might be threatening to Russia (e.g., on its borders) or one of its allies and precipitate a crisis that resulted in a full-scale nuclear war. Terrorists with an apocalyptic mindset might even attempt to catalyze a full-scale nuclear war by disguising their act to look like an attack by the U.S. or Russia.

Collapses the global economy

Flynn 3 - Ph.D. Commander, U.S. Coast Guard (ret.) Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies and Director, Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Homeland Security Imperatives

Stephen, Written Testimony before a hearing of the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, March 20, 2003 http://www.cfr.org/defensehomeland-security/fragile-state-container-security/p5730

On October 12, 2001, I had the opportunity to testify before this committee at its first post 9-11 hearing on homeland security. At that time, I asserted that “the economic and societal disruption created by the September 11 attacks has opened Pandora’s box. Future terrorists bent on challenging U.S. power will draw inspiration from the seeming ease at which America could be attacked and they will be encouraged by the mounting costs to the U.S. economy and the public psyche associated with the ad-hoc efforts to restore security following that attack.” A year later I joined with former senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart in preparing our report, “America: Still Unprepared—Still In Danger.” We observed that “nineteen men wielding box-cutters forced the United States to do to itself what no adversary could ever accomplish: a successful blockade of the U.S. economy. If a surprise terrorist attack were to happen tomorrow involving the sea, rail, or truck transportation systems that carry millions of tons of trade to the United States each day, the response would likely be the same—a self-imposed global embargo.” Based on that analysis, we identified as second of the six critical mandates that deserve the nation’s immediate attention: “Make trade security a global priority; the system for moving goods affordably and reliably around the world is ripe for exploitation and vulnerable to mass disruption by terrorists.” This is why the topic of today’s hearing is so important. The stakes are enormous. U.S. prosperity—and much of its power—relies on its ready access to global markets. Both the scale and pace at which goods move between markets has exploded in recent years thanks in no small part to the invention and proliferation of the intermodal container. These ubiquitous boxes—most come in the 40’x8’x8’ size—have transformed the transfer of cargo from a truck, train, and ship into the transportation equivalent of connecting Lego blocks. The result has been to increasingly diminish the role of distance for a supplier or a consumer as a constraint in the world marketplace. Ninety percent of the world’s freight now moves in a container. Companies like Wal-Mart and General Motors move up to 30 tons of merchandise or parts across the vast Pacific Ocean from Asia to the West Coast for about $1600. The transatlantic trip runs just over a $1000—which makes the postage stamp seem a bit overpriced. But the system that underpins the incredibly efficient, reliable, and affordable movement of global freight has one glaring shortcoming in the post-9-11 world—it was built without credible safeguards to prevent it from being exploited or targeted by terrorists and criminals. Prior to September 11, 2001, virtually anyone in the world could arrange with an international shipper or carrier to have an empty intermodal container delivered to their home or workplace. They then could load it with tons of material, declare in only the most general terms what the contents were, “seal” it with a 50-cent lead tag, and send it on its way to any city and town in the United States. The job of transportation providers was to move the box as expeditiously as possible. Exercising any care to ensure that the integrity of a container’s contents was not compromised may have been a commercial practice, but it was not a requirement. The responsibility for making sure that goods loaded in a box were legitimate and authorized was shouldered almost exclusively by the importing jurisdiction. But as the volume of containerized cargo grew exponentially, the number of agents assigned to police that cargo stayed flat or even declined among most trading nations. The rule of thumb in the inspection business is that it takes five agents three hours to conduct a thorough physical examination of a single full intermodal container. Last year nearly 20 million containers washed across America’s borders via a ship, train, and truck. Frontline agencies had only enough inspectors and equipment to examine between 1-2 percent of that cargo. Thus, for would-be terrorists, the global intermodal container system that is responsible for moving the overwhelming majority of the world’s freight satisfies the age-old criteria of opportunity and motive. “Opportunity” flows from (1) the almost complete absence of any security oversight in the loading and transporting of a box from its point of origin to its final destination, and (2) the fact that growing volume and velocity at which containers move around the planet create a daunting “needle-in-the-haystack” problem for inspectors. “Motive” is derived from the role that the container now plays in underpinning global supply chains and the likely response by the U.S. government to an attack involving a container. Based on statements by the key officials at U.S. Customs, the Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of Transportation, should a container be used as a “poor man’s missile,” the shipment of all containerized cargo into our ports and across our borders would be halted. As a consequence, a modest investment by a terrorist could yield billions of dollars in losses to the U.S. economy by shutting down—even temporarily—the system that moves “just-in-time” shipments of parts and goods. Given the current state of container security, it is hard to imagine how a post-event lock-down on container shipments could be either prevented or short-lived. One thing we should have learned from the 9-11 attacks involving passenger airliners, the follow-on anthrax attacks, and even last fall Washington sniper spree is that terrorist incidents pose a special challenge for public officials. In the case of most disasters, the reaction by the general public is almost always to assume the event is an isolated one. Even if the post-mortem provides evidence of a systemic vulnerability, it often takes a good deal of effort to mobilize a public policy response to redress it. But just the opposite happens in the event of a terrorist attack—especially one involving catastrophic consequences. When these attacks take place, the assumption by the general public is almost always to presume a general vulnerability unless there is proof to the contrary. Government officials have to confront head-on this loss of public confidence by marshalling evidence that they have a credible means to manage the risk highlighted by the terrorist incident. In the interim as recent events have shown, people will refuse to fly, open their mail, or even leave their homes. If a terrorist were to use a container as a weapon-delivery devise, the easiest choice would be high-explosives such as those used in the attack on the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Some form of chemical weapon, perhaps even involving hazardous materials, is another likely scenario. A bio-weapon is a less attractive choice for a terrorist because of the challenge of dispersing the agent in a sufficiently concentrated form beyond the area where the explosive devise goes off. A “dirty bomb” is the more likely threat vs. a nuclear weapon, but all these scenarios are conceivable since the choice of a weapon would not be constrained by any security measures currently in place in our seaports or within the intermodal transportation industry. This is why a terrorist attack involving a cargo container could cause such profound economic disruption. An incident triggered by even a conventional weapon going off in a box could result in a substantial loss of life. In the immediate aftermath, the general public will want reassurance that one of the many other thousands of containers arriving on any given day will not pose a similar risk. The President of the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other keys officials responsible for the security of the nation would have to stand before a traumatized and likely skeptical American people and outline the measures they have in place to prevent another such attack. In the absence of a convincing security framework to manage the risk of another incident, the public would likely insist that all containerized cargo be stopped until adequate safeguards are in place. Even with the most focused effort, constructing that framework from scratch could take months—even years. Yet, within three weeks, the entire worldwide intermodal transportation industry would effectively be brought to its knees—as would much of the freight movements that make up international trade.

Tradeoff links

The plan wrecks the Offshore Patrol Cutter acquisition program

Perera, 14 (David, “Papp: Coast Guard can't afford new icebreaker” 3/31, Fierce Homeland Security, 3/31, proquest)//DH

[Image omitted] - Disagreement among administration officials over the priority a new U.S. icebreaker should assume within the Coast Guard acquisition budget is one reason why the service has yet to submit a five year capital investment plan.

Given the likelihood of Coast Guard acquisition spending hovering around $1 billion annually in the foreseeable future, the service cannot afford a new heavy icebreaker without making cuts to other programs, such as the Offshore Patrol Cutter acquisition, said Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Robert Papp.

A new icebreaker, estimated to cost around $1 billion to build, "would displace other things that I have a higher priority for," he said while testifying March 26 before a House Transportation and Infrastructure subcommittee.

"There are other people who have the opinion with an opening Arctic and other things that perhaps an icebreaker ought to be a higher priority," he said.

New icebreaker funding would crowd out all other budget options – specifically prevents the new cutter fleet from being funded

Beidel ’12 (Eric, “High-End Ships, Ice-Breakers Compete for Precious Coast Guard Dollars”, February 13^th, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=671) //J.N.E

The Coast Guard is down to one operational icebreaker, a less than favorable situation given the increased role the service is being asked to take in the Arctic.

The service used to have eight icebreakers, but all but one have been decommissioned or are in disrepair, commandant Adm. Robert J. Papp Jr. told a Feb. 13 Center for Strategic and International Studies conference.

A second icebreaker will be ready to return to action next year, he said, speaking just hours before the release of President Obama’s fiscal year 2013 budget proposal.

That document contains $8 million to “initiate acquisition of a new polar icebreaker to ensure that the nation is able to maintain a surface presence in the Arctic well into the future.”

Washington insiders are suggesting that the Coast Guard also take money from a program for new large cutters and spend it on icebreakers and less expensive ships.

But the future of the nation’s maritime security depends upon ships such as the National Security Cutter that are effective away from the shore, Papp said.

The service is in good shape with a substantial fleet of patrol boats to deal with threats close to the shore, he said. He also feels comfortable with the assets the service has in the nation’s ports. But there is a security layer he worries about.

“So if you’re inspecting overseas and you have good resources in the ports, you want some sort of middle layer to be able to intercept any threats before they get into your ports,” Papp said. “Unfortunately for us, that is the most expensive layer that we deal with, because in order to do that you have to have stout capable ships that have high-endurance and speed.”

This “middle layer” of maritime security is hard for the Coast Guard, he said.

“How do you provide persistent sovereign presence in the offshore waters? You can’t do it with patrol boats. It takes ships and ships are expensive,” he said.

Coast Guard officials have been fighting for funding to get eight National Security Cutters to replace the 378-foot high-endurance cutters that have been in service since the 1960s. The third NSC was delivered to the Coast Guard last fall. A $482 million contract for the fifth has been awarded to Huntington Ingalls Industries. And Obama’s budget includes funding for a sixth.

The funding for the rest is far from certain. During a January speech at the Surface Navy Association’s annual symposium, the commandant said the NSC will remain in competition for dollars with smaller, less expensive Offshore Patrol Cutters that can be built quicker.

The Coast Guard wants eight NSCs to replace 12 high-endurance cutters that have an average age of 43 years. The OPCs would replace medium-endurance cutters, some of which are even older.

Even if the Coast Guard was able to secure funding for all eight NSCs, the service’s total fleet of high-endurance ships eventually will be reduced by 11, Papp said.

“I just don’t get it — why we’re not building more ships in this country,” he said.

The Coast Guard would like to send one of the new cutters to Alaska to deal with increasing activity in the Bering Strait. Obama’s 2013 budget also provides $6.1 million to the Coast Guard to recapitalize and expand helicopter hangars and aviation refueling facilities in Alaska.

“These investments will sustain the Coast Guard’s ability to establish effective presence in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Chain — the ‘gateway’ to the Arctic,” the budget document says.

Icebreakers more like bank breakers- newest evidence shows the aff destroys funding towards the Offshore Patrol Cutter

O’Rourke 14 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 7/1/14, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, http://www.scribd.com/doc/233529641/37/Procurement-vs-Leasing, JHR)

I can't afford to pay for an icebreaker in a 1-billion-dollar [per year] SIP [sic: CIP] because it would just displace other things that I have a higher priority for. So we're looking at other alternatives, perhaps one of those alternatives, the Congress came up with a requirement for a business base analysis on the remaining Polar Seal [sic: Sea]icebreaker, Polar Sea and potentially, we might be able to overhaul Polar Sea and fit that into the SIP [sic: CIP] as an affordable means for providing an additional icebreaker as we await a time that we can build a new icebreaker. If we are going to build a new icebreaker, if that is a priority, we just can't fit it within our acquisition account and I would look across the inter-agency [for the funding].Later in the hearing, he stated: The Offshore Patrol Cutter is my highest priority for the Coast Guard. I need to fit that in the budget and I fear that if we try to fit the cost of an icebreaker in there, it would displace the Offshore Patrol Cutter or some other very important things. So my number one option is to get support across the inter-agency, those agencies that benefit from the support of a nice breaker to contribute towards the construction of it that would be my first choice. My second choice however, when I start looking at what can I fit within our acquisition budget refurbishment of the Polar Sea maybe a viable option for that. I would say what you would want to do is overlap and so as Polar Star is coming towards the end of that decade of service after refurbishment, we have polar—I think I said Polar Star.

Plan forces Coast Guard tradeoffs

David, 13 - Mihaela David worked as a part-time research associate in the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (“Pragmatic Thinking: How the U.S. Coast Guard Is Making Do with Less in the Arctic” 6/6, http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2013/06/pragmatic-thinking-how-us-coast-guard_6.html)//DH

Breaking the (Budgetary) Ice

The U.S. is in dire need of more icebreakers for assured access to the ice-covered Arctic waters: it currently relies on only one medium icebreaker, Healy, and one heavy icebreaker, the recently reactivated Polar Star. The strategy document does not discuss at length the Coast Guard’s plans to increase its icebreaking capability. The only mention of icebreakers is buried within a paragraph entitled “Science and Technology” in a final chapter on concepts to ensure long-term success. The document merely states that the U.S. “must have adequate icebreaking capability to support research,” and “must also make a strategic investment in icebreaking capability to enable access to the high latitudes over the long-term.”[13]

However, like all government entities, the Coast Guard is operating within a severely austere fiscal climate, and is forced to make tough decisions regarding the use of its limited financial resources. The U.S. Coast Guard is slated for a 13 percent budgetary cut in FY 2014, which will make its acquisition budget fall far short of what the service needs to modernize and maintain its infrastructure.[14] These fiscal constraints have already impacted the Coast Guard’s plan to upgrade its icebreaker fleet, forcing the service to push back its incremental funding timeline for the construction of a new heavy-duty polar icebreaker, which is projected to cost between $900 million and $1 billion.

Tradeoff inevitable – Congress won’t increase the total Coast Guard budget

David, 13 - Mihaela David worked as a part-time research associate in the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (“Pragmatic Thinking: How the U.S. Coast Guard Is Making Do with Less in the Arctic” 6/6, http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2013/06/pragmatic-thinking-how-us-coast-guard_6.html)//DH

Acknowledging its institutional and resource limitations, the Coast Guard is looking to forge domestic and international partnerships that it can leverage to more effectively fulfill its responsibilities in the Arctic. This is a cooperative and cost-effective approach to governance that, if implemented successfully, can be a blueprint for other departments’ and agencies’ engagement in the region. Burden-sharing within and among multiple levels of government is not just strategically wise, but also necessary given the fiscal austerity climate.

The Coast Guard is also aware of its capabilities gaps and the necessity for both assured access and sustained presence in Arctic waters. The budget requests and operational decisions it has made thus far reflect the difficult choices the Coast Guard leaders had to make under the constraint of finite financial resources. The Coast Guard would ideally want to expand and modernize its icebreaker fleet to multiple heavy and medium vessels, but the costs are much too high and any budget request beyond the current plans for one new icebreaker would be deemed unrealistic and promptly rejected by the Administration and Congress. The pragmatic Coast Guard leadership sees success where others see failure: it has been able, at least, to argue in favor of acquisition instead of leasing of icebreakers and, if budgets are approved, having a new icebreaker a decade from now is better than none at all.

Cuts have put the Coast Guard budget on the brink- new icebreakers collapse funding for key priorities

Laster 11 (Jill, reporter for The Navy Times in Washington, D.C., covering the Coast Guard, 9/15/11, “CG must balance cuts with Arctic mission,” Navy Times, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2011/10/coast-guard-arctic-mission-balance-cuts-101511w, JHR)

Congress is ramping up demands for the U.S. to build its icebreaker fleet — although how the Coast Guard will acquire icebreakers while maintaining frontline operations under a tight budget remains in question. Sen. Mark Begich, D-Alaska, proposed an $8.7-billion discretionary budget earlier this month for fiscal 2012, in line with the service's request and about $115 million below fiscal 2011 levels. The Senate version of the authorization bill sets similar funding levels as the House bill, which authorizes $8.5 billion. "Senator Begich strongly supports the Coast Guard and thinks its budget needs to be plussed up to account for increased missions in the Arctic," Begich spokeswoman Julie Hasquet said. "But we also have to respond to demand from the administration and the public to cut spending." The Senate's Coast Guard authorization bill, S 1665, requires the service to operate at least two heavy polar icebreakers at any one time and authorizes it to study building a deep-water sea port in the Arctic. "With increased energy development and maritime activity, our nation must ensure that the Coast Guard has the capabilities to operate in the Arctic waters," Begich said during a Senate subcommittee hearing this summer on the Arctic. "That includes icebreakers, which we are sorely lacking." The Coast Guard estimates it will need at least three heavy and three medium icebreakers to meet minimum mission requirements as the polar ice cap melts. The service has three polar icebreakers — one is inactive, and another isn't expected to return to operations until 2013. The Senate authorization bill cuts $200 million from acquisitions, to about $1.4 billion. Hasquet said cutting acquisitions is "not ideal as the Coast Guard has major needs for vessels and aircraft."

1 ship is the entire Coast Guard budget- the cutter program would have to get slashed

Perera 14 (David, executive editor of the FierceMarkets Government Group, including FierceGovernment, FierceGovernmentIT, FierceHomelandSecurity, and FierceMobileGovernment, 3/31/14, “Papp: Coast Guard can't afford new icebreaker,” Fierce Homeland Security, http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/papp-coast-guard-cant-afford-new-icebreaker/2014-03-31, JHR)

Disagreement among administration officials over the priority a new U.S. icebreaker should assume within the Coast Guard acquisition budget is one reason why the service has yet to submit a five year capital investment plan. Given the likelihood of Coast Guard acquisition spending hovering around $1 billion annually in the foreseeable future, the service cannot afford a new heavy icebreaker without making cuts to other programs, such as the Offshore Patrol Cutter acquisition, said Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Robert Papp. A new icebreaker, estimated to cost around $1 billion to build, "would displace other things that I have a higher priority for," he said while testifying March 26 before a House Transportation and Infrastructure subcommittee.

Icebreakers would take up the entire Coast Guard budget- that trades off with cutters

Caldwell 11 (Stephen, Director of Homeland Security and Justice, December 1, “Coast Guard: Observations on Arctic Requirements, Icebreakers, and Coordination with Stakeholders” Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives,” http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyCGMT/2011-12-1-Caldwell.pdf, JHR)

The U.S. Coast Guard’s recapitalization (acquisition) budget compared to the U.S.

Navy’s Shipbuilding and Construction Naval (SCN) budget does not provide the ability to recapitalize the nation’s polar icebreakers. The cost to design and build a polar icebreaker is significant and would consume virtually all of the U.S. Coast Guard’s annual acquisition budget (e.g. $800M of $1,200M) at a time when the U.S. Coast Guard must recapitalize its extremely old ocean-going fleet of cutters and surveillance aircraft (an effort formerly called the Deepwater Program). The impact on the U.S. Coast Guard to acquire a new polar icebreaker is essentially the equivalent of the U.S. Navy acquiring a new aircraft carrier. Despite the dire outlook, efforts to prepare for

the recapitalization of the U.S. polar icebreaker fleet have been ongoing. Over the last decade the U.S. Congress has repeatedly expressed reservations as to the lack of national polar icebreaking capability, and today those concerns appear to be mounting. In the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010, Congress required the U.S. Coast Guard to begin survey and design and conduct a business case analysis for either a new heavy icebreaker class or a major service life extension project for existing heavy icebreakers.

The aff displaces key Coast Guard priorities- the head of the Coast Guard proves

O’Rourke 14 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 7/1/14, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, http://www.scribd.com/doc/233529641/37/Procurement-vs-Leasing, JHR)

At a March 12, 2014, hearing on the Coast Guard’s proposed FY2015 budget before the Homeland Security subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, the Commandant of the Coast at the time, Admiral Robert Papp stated: What concerns me, however, is—particularly as I'm being constrained closer to the billion-dollar range in my acquisition projects [i.e., the Coast Guard’s Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements, or AC&I, account], I don't—I don't know how you fit in a billion-dollar icebreaker. Because at some point, you're going to have to take—even if you do it with a multi-year strategy [i.e., incremental funding], you're going to have go $300 billion [sic:million] or $400 billion [sic: million] in a couple of years, which would displace other very important things. So, we're having to take a hard look at this. One way of doing it is to say, OK, this icebreaker serves the interagency. The Department of Defense could call on us. NSF certainly does, and other agencies. Why should that not be a shared expense? And, oh, by the way, if all these companies are going to be making that much money off oil exploration and the arctic, maybe they can share in the cost of this icebreaker.

The budget is zero sum- funding is capped

O’Rourke 14 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 7/1/14, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, http://www.scribd.com/doc/233529641/37/Procurement-vs-Leasing, JHR)

Another potential issue for Congress concerns the timeline for acquiring a new polar icebreaker, which appears to have become less certain in the FY2015 budget submission. In the FY2013 budget submission—the submission that initiated the project to acquire the ship—DHS stated that it anticipated awarding a construction contract for the ship “within the next five years” and taking delivery on the ship “within a decade.” In the FY2014 budget submission, DHS stated that it anticipated awarding a construction contract for the ship “within the next four years.” In the Coast Guard’s FY2015 budget-justification book, the entry for the polar icebreaker program does not make a statement as to when a construction contract for the ship might be awarded. Coast Guard testimony about the icebreaker in 2014 suggests that if the Coast Guard’s Acquisition, Construction and Improvement (AC&I) appropriation account remains at about $1 billion per year in coming years (as opposed to some higher figure, such as $1.5 billion per year or $2 billion per year), the icebreaker could become something like an unfunded requirement. For example, at a March 26, 2014, hearing on the proposed FY2015 budgets for the Coast Guard and maritime transportation programs before the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Admiral Robert Papp ,the Commandant of the Coast Guard at the time, testified that “It’s going to be tough to fit a billion dollar icebreaker in our five-year plan without displacing other things,” that “I can’t afford to pay for an icebreaker in a $1 billion [per year capital investment plan] because it would just displace other things that I have a higher priority for,” and that “I still believe firmly, we need to build a new one but we don’t have [the] wherewithal right now, but doing the preliminary work should inform decisions that are made three, four, five, maybe 10 years from now.”

2nc --- at: icebreakers are cheap

Icebreakers destroy the budget nearly $1 billion a ship

O’Rourke 14 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 7/1/14, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, http://www.scribd.com/doc/233529641/37/Procurement-vs-Leasing, JHR)

The High Latitude Study provided to Congress in July 2011 states that the above figure of $800million to $925 million in 2008 dollars equates to $900 million to $1,041 million in 2012 dollars. The study provides the following estimates, in 2012 dollars, of the acquisition costs for new polar icebreakers: •$856 million for 1 ship; •$1,663 million for 2 ships—an average of about $832 million each; •$2,439 million for 3 ships—an average of $813 million each; •$3,207 million for 4 ships—an average of about $802 million each; Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service 18 •$3,961 million for 5 ships—an average of about $792 million each; and •$4,704 million for 6 ships—an average of $784 million each. The study refers to the above estimates as “rough order-of-magnitude costs” that “were developed as part of the Coast Guard’s independent Polar Platform Business Case Analysis.”

Plan costs 4 billion

Tyler 12 – (David, Reporter for the Professional Mariner, “U.S. struggles to create icebreaking fleet to maintain Arctic presence,” Professional Mariner, http://www.professionalmariner.com/February-2012/US-struggles-to-create-icebreaking-fleet-needed-to-maintain-strong-Arctic-presence/, JHR)
In July, the Coast Guard presented its High Latitude Region Mission Analysis report to Congress. In order to meet the Coast Guard's statutory requirements in the Arctic and the Antarctic, it would need a minimum of three medium polar icebreakers and three heavy icebreakers at a cost of about $4.1 billion, the report said. It is unlikely that the Coast Guard could pay for new icebreakers through its budget, according to Caldwell. Other options could be to use money from the Department of Defense or the National Science Foundation.

Tradeoff turns the case

The aff’s investment disrupts other key polar missions

O’Rourke 14 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 7/1/14, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, http://www.scribd.com/doc/233529641/37/Procurement-vs-Leasing, JHR)

This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the sustainment and modernization of the Coast Guard’s polar icebreaker fleet, which performs a variety of missions supporting U.S. interests in polar regions. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2015 budget requests$6 million to continue initial acquisition activities for a new polar icebreaker. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify Coast Guard plans for sustaining and modernizing its polar icebreaking fleet. Congressional decisions on this issue could affect Coast Guard funding requirements, the Coast Guard’s ability to perform its polar missions, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.

drug smuggling/drift net fishing impact

New cutters are key to check drug smuggling and drift net fishing

Perera ’12 – executive editor of the FierceMarkets Government Group, which includes FierceGovernment, FierceGovernmentIT, FierceHomelandSecurity, and FierceMobileGovernment (David, “Coast Guard could cut back operations without NSCs, says Papp”, March 7^th, http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/coast-guard-could-cut-back-operations-without-nscs-says-papp/2012-03-07) //J.N.E

The Coast Guard could be forced to cut back its anti-drug smuggling operations in the Pacific and Caribbean and curtail actions against illegal high seas drift net fishing boats if it does not receive funding for a seventh and eight National Security Cutter, service Commandant Adm. Robert Papp told a March 7 Senate panel.

The service is in the midst of an ongoing fleet recapitalization effort and steadfastly maintains that it needs at least eight NSCs. The Coast Guard fiscal 2013 budget request includes a $683 million proposal to build the sixth NSC, but subsequent-year procurement funding for the 4,550 long-ton displacement ships are listed as zero dollars.

Due to strictures of the Budget Control Act, "we're getting less money each year," Papp said. "Our acquisition budget was reduced by nearly 20 percent." He testified before the Senate Commerce, Science & Transportation subcommittee on oceans, atmosphere, fisheries and the Coast Guard.

Eight NSCs continue to be the official target of the recapitalization program, but if the seventh and eighth NSCs don't soon receive funding, the service would first try to find money to extend the lifespan of some of the 12 legacy High Endurance Cutters the NSCs are meant to replace. That option is not ideal, Papp, said, since High Endurance Cutters are expensive to maintain; the last such cutter entered service in 1972. If there were no money for life extension, then operations would have to be cut back, Papp added.

Cutbacks would likely not affect the Coast Guard's presence in the Bearing Sea and Gulf of Alaska, he added, since "now we're down to almost the bare minimum in terms of our presence" there.

The Government Accountability Office is correct in stating that recapitalization costs are adding up to more than the $24.2 billion the service estimated in 2007 it would need to complete the effort, Papp also said. One reason for the increase, he said, is that annual funding falls short of what would be necessary to ensure that the service doesn't incur unnecessary additional costs by stretching the acquisition timeframe out.

"It's a Catch-22 situation. We come up with what we believe to be a baseline of the project, and while we're doing that...the project gets extended out over time, which increases the cost," he said.