Counterplans General Stuff

Bioterror

Defense

No risk of bioterror

Keller 13 (Rebecca, 7 March 2013, Analyst at Stratfor, “Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential,” Stratfor, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)

The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal. The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact.

No impact - mitigation efforts

Enemark 11 (Christian, PhD from Australian National University and Associate Professor of National Security Policy in the Crawford School of Public Policy at ANU, “Farewell to WMD: The Language and Science of Mass Destruction,” Contemporary Security Policy, 32:2, pgs. 382-400, http://www.contemporarysecuritypolicy.org/assets/CSP-32-2-Enemark.pdf)

The third category of non-nuclear WMD, chemical weapons, have destructive power more readily comparable to conventional weapons. A chemical weapon is a toxic chemical compound directed against the tissue of a living target to cause injury, incapacitation or death. The critical requirements for turning a chemical agent into an effective weapon are that it be toxic enough to produce the desired level of casualties and stable enough to survive dissemination either through explosion of the delivery munition or passage through a spray device. However, even if delivered successfully, a number of atmospheric or ground conditions can influence the action of a chemical agent. These include air and ground temperature, exposure to sunlight, humidity, precipitation, wind speed and direction, soil conditions and terrain.26 For example, high ground temperature could cause the agent to decompose, high wind velocity could cause its dilution, and heavy precipitation could wash the agent away.27 Towards the end of the Second World War, British officials reportedly considered attacking Tokyo with phosgene and mustard. A government-employed academic, Professor D. Brunt, investigated the advantages and disadvantages of attacking the city in the winter or the summer, and how to maximize casualties by attacking a crowded neighbourhood rather than a more open area. In advice dated 8 May 1944, he wrote: ‘The winter is on the average cold, and may be so cold that the danger from mustard gas would be negligible.’28 The hot summer would have been a better time to attack, ‘provided that the attack took place during a gap in the heavy rain that typically occurred’.29 Brunt also noted that ‘In the densely built areas of Japanese-type buildings, where the streets are narrow, the flow of a gas cloud would be hindered by the narrowness of the streets.’30 The empirical record for chemical weapons is greater than that for biological weapons, although it still suggests strongly that the former cannot plausibly be categorized as WMD. During the First World War, only two to three per cent of those soldiers gassed on the Western Front died, whereas battle wounds caused by conventional weapons were up to 12 times more likely to result in death.31On average it took over a ton of gas to produce a single fatality,32 and gas accounted for less than one per cent of battle deaths.33 The 1988 Iraqi attack on the Kurdish town of Halabja using a combination of chemical and conventional munitions resulted in up to 5,000 deaths,34and the 1995 attack on the Tokyo subway by members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult using the nerve agent sarin resulted ultimately in 13 deaths.35 There is no empirical data on the effects of chemical weapons used in large numbers against cities, although Thomas McNaugher has suggested that the likely slow dissipation of chemical agents would cause greater damage when used against cities than when used tactically.36 Nevertheless, compared to a nuclear blast, against which there can be no defence, a state could mitigate a chemical attack on a population centre by issuing protective gear, and the slow spread of chemicals would allow some time for evacuation.37 According to a 1993 report by the US Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) entitled Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, ‘chemical weapons must be delivered in great quantities to approach the potential lethality of nuclear and biological weapons’.38 However, the same can be said for conventional weapons. Two days of firebombing raids on Dresden in 1945 killed an estimated 25,000 German people,39 one week of conventional bombing in July and August 1943 killed around 50,000 German citizens in Hamburg, and a single night of firebombing killed an estimated 100,000 Japanese people in Tokyo in March 1945.40 The OTA assessment of chemical weapons thus hardly merited their inclusion in a report on weapons of mass destruction from which conventional weapons were deliberately excluded.