methodological convenience, for it refers to a more encompassing structure not necessarily
involved in meaning-making. Let us follow the unfolding of this pattern.
The “subject” is a unified concept and therefore the result of “interpretation.” Nietzsche often
stresses that it is a specifically linguistic figurative habit of immemorial standing: “that when
it is thought [wenn gedacht wird] there must be something ‘that thinks’ is simply a
formulation of our grammatical custom that adds a doer to every deed.” (WM II. 13, WP 268)
The “insertion of a subject” is “fictitious.” (WM II. no, WP 337) The will to power as the
subject’s metaphorizing or figurating, or intro-
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duction of meaning, must therefore be questioned. And
Nietzsche accordingly asks, pondering
on the “making equal” of proximate sensations, a propos of how “images . . . then words, . . .
finally concepts arise in the spirit”: “Thus confusion of two sensations that are close
neighbors, as we take note of these sensations; but who is taking note?” (WM II. 23, WP 275)
Nietzsche accordingly entertains the notion of the will to power as an abstract and unlocalized
figurative (interpretative) process: “One may not ask: ‘who then interprets?’ for the
interpretation itself is a form of the will to power, exists (but not as a ‘being’ but as a process,
a be-coming) as an affect.” (WM II. 61, WP 302)
Sometimes Nietzsche places this abstract will to power, an incessant figuration, not under the
control of any knowing subject, but rather under-ground, in the unconscious. The Nietzschean
unconscious is that vast arena of the mind of which the so-called “subject” knows nothing. As
Derrida remarks: “both [Freud and Nietzsche] . . . often in a very similar way, questioned the
self-assured certitude of consciousness. . . . For Nietzsche ‘the important main activity is
unconscious.’ “ (MP 18, SP 148)
If, however, we want to hold onto “the important main activity” we have to go further than the
unconscious, we have to reach the body, the organism. If the “unconscious” is unknown to us,
how much more so the body! Already in the early essay “On Truth and Falsity in their
Ultramoral Sense,” the connections are being established:
What indeed does man know about himself? . . . Does not nature keep secret from him most
things, even about his body, e.g., the convolutions of the intestines, the quick flow of the
blood-currents, the intricate vibration of the fibres, so as to banish and lock him up in proud,
delusive knowledge? Nature threw away the keys and woe to the fateful curiosity which
might be able for a moment to look out and down through a crevice in the chamber of
consciousness, and discover that man indifferent to his own ignorance, is resting on the
pitiless, the greedy, the insatiable, the murderous, and, as it were, hanging in dreams on the
back of a tiger. Whence, in the wide world, with this state of affairs, arise the impulse of
truth? (NW III. ii, 371, TF 175–76)
Here is the early signal for a sweeping question like this one in The Gay Science: “The
unconscious disguise of physiological needs under the cloaks of the objective, ideal, purely
spiritual goes to frightening lengths—and often I have asked myself whether, taking a large
view philosophy has not been merely an interpretation of the body and a misunderstanding of
the body.” (NW V. ii. 16, GS 34–35) A yet more sweeping declarative frag-ment: “Our most
sacred convictions, the unchanging elements in our supreme values, are judgments of our
muscles.” (WM I. 370, WP 173) It is as if that controlling figurative practice that constitutes
all our cognition is being handed over to the body. And indeed Nietzsche’s speculation goes
further. “Making equal” is seen as a symptom of being animate, rather
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than the “privilege” of being human; the will to power “appropriates” in the organism, before
the “name of man” may be broached: “All thought, judgment, perception, as comparison
[Gleichnis] has as its precondition a ‘positing of equality’ [Gleichsetzen], and earlier still a
‘making equal’ [Gleich-machen]. The process of making equal is the same as the incorpo-
ration of appropriated material in the amoeba . . . [and] corresponds exactly to that external,
mechanical process (which is its symbol) by which protoplasm continually makes what it
appropriates equal to itself and arranges it into its own forms and ranks [in seine Reihen and
Formen einordnet].” (WM II. 21, 25; WP
273–74, 276) Appropriation and its symbol, making
equal, positing as equal—the process operates in the organic universe for its own preservation
and constitution before the human consciousness appropriates it and declares it the process of
the discovery of truth, the establishment of knowledge. The process differentiates itself into
the mapping of the moral universe: “Is it virtuous when a cell transforms itself into a function
of a stronger cell? It has to do so [Sie muss es]. And is it evil when the stronger cell
assimilates the weaker? . . . Joy and desire appear together in the stronger that wants to
transform something into its function, joy and the wish to be desired appear together in the
weaker that wants to become a function.” (NW V. ii. 154, GS 175–76) Here the relationship
between figuration on the one hand, and appropriation, the play of forces, on the other, comes
clear. Speaking of the human will to truth, linguistic figuration is the figure Nietzsche must
employ. Moving “back” into the organism in general, differentiations among goodness,
strength, truth begin to blur; appropriation comes to be a more embracing term than
interpretation. Admittedly, this neutralizing rigor is not often explicit in Nietzsche. But when
it is operative, the irreducible description of the will to power as a search for what is resistant
to itself emerges. “The will to power can manifest itself only against resistances; therefore it
seeks that which resists it. . . .” (WM II 123, WP 346) Consider also that curious series of
notes, made between November 1887 and March 1888, where Nietzsche tries to bypass
language to express what we can crudely call the will to power as the play of will and no-will.
It is worth mediating upon the entire passage. Here I quote selectively to give a sense of the
problem:
There are no durable ultimate units, no atoms, no monads; here, too, beings are only
introduced by us.... “Value” is essentially the standpoint for the increase or decrease of these
dominating centers (“multiplicities” in any case, but “units” are nowhere present in the nature
of becoming) . Linguistic means of expression are useless for expressing “becoming”; it
accords with our inevitable need to preserve ourselves to posit a crude world of stability, of
“things,” etc. We may venture to speak of atoms and monads in a relative sense; and it is
certain that the smallest world is most durable—There is no will: there are
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punctuations of will [Willens-Punktationen] that are constantly increasing or losing their
power. (WM II. 171–72, WP 38o–81)
Nietzsche uses the time-honored figure of the point (stigmè) 27 only as the relatively safest
image of a unit, and even then not as a sign for durability or continuity, but rather as the
participant in a disjunctive periodicity of (positive or negative) energizing, a punctuation