Discourse Ks – Gonzaga Debate Institute 14

No Link – Meanings Change

The words we use are in a constant state of change—it is impossible to pin down the meaning of a word—they mean different things for different people

Price, Monash University Language and Learning Service support provider, 99

(Steve, Autumn 1999, TESOL Quarterly, “Critical Discourse Analysis: Discourse Acquisition and Discourse Practices”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3587683, accessed 7-4-14, CLF)

I have questioned the idea that discourse is an objective entity over which one can attain mastery. Rather than viewing discourse and the subjects engaged in it as social products (as attaining fixed, social characteristics), one might see both as constantly open to new forma- tions, that is, in states of transformation and instability. Any attributed form or stability is an objectifying retrospective construction, as are the perceived realities in which discourses are embedded. Thus I suggest that discourse acquisition is a matter of engagement in a productive process rather than of mastery over and reproduction of constitutive discourse properties. This production is performative in that subject, discourse, and its reality are produced in the moment of instantiation. The practice here is not a reproduction and perfecting of independently existing ideal forms by an autonomous subject. The social, then, does not simply produce discourse types over which subjects obtain mastery. Rather, the social permeates the productive process itself. The represen- tation of discourse and subject as objects of understanding privileges and idealises certain elements over others and fails to capture the contingent convergence of many elements at a unique moment in time and space in which meaning is enacted. The objective view of discourse subordinates discourse practice to discourse representation. I suggest here, by contrast, that discourse practice (which is what discourse acquisition entails) cannot be so subordinated. In acquiring a discourse, one is engaged precisely in taking up a new subject position, entering a new reality, occupying a new discursive position as subject, and making new representations.4 The subject does not simply mirror the social (or simply act out social roles; Widdowson; 1996, p. 58); rather, individual actions are given a meaning in a social context that is independent of individual intentions5 and irreducible to individual consciousness. Discourse acquisition can be seen as a matter of engagement in the social production of such a discourse and its apparent rules instead of as a matter of conforming to and reproducing the defining features of a discourse object. The contingency of each instantiation of discourse demands that the differences, as well as any discernible regularities between such instantiations, be accorded value. Discourse reality and subject are enacted only at the moment of instantiation. Thus perhaps, as Brandt (1990) suggests, literacy (and discourse) "is not a matter of learning how statements stick together but rather of how people stick together through literate (or discursive) means" (p. 6). The descriptions of discourse, which in critical approaches provide the key for interven- tion, and the rules and conventions often seen as defining a discourse and therefore as elements to be taught are in turn a metadiscursive construction.6 The force of discourse, then, may lie in what is performed by it, and this is not determined by what can be said about it or by subject intentions.7 It is not mediated as such by the individual even though the agency of the subject is crucial to discursive instantiation.

Discourse Doesn’t Shape Reality

Discourse can’t shape reality – 4 warrants

Roskoski and Peabody, Assistant General Counsel, AP, 94

(Matthew, Joe, 10-26-94, Florida State University, “A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language ‘Arguments’”, http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques, date accessed 7-4-14, CLF)

Initially, it is important to note that the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis does not intrinsically deserve presumption, although many authors assume its validity without empirical support. The reason it does not deserve presumption is that "on a priori grounds one can contest it by asking how, if we are unable to organize our thinking beyond the limits set by our native language, we could ever become aware of those limits" (Robins 101). Au explains that "because it has received so little convincing support, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has stimulated little research" (Au 1984 156). However, many critical scholars take the hypothesis for granted because it is a necessary but uninteresting precondition for the claims they really want to defend. Khosroshahi explains: However, the empirical tests of the hypothesis of linguistic relativity have yielded more equivocal results. But independently of its empirical status, Whorf's view is quite widely held. In fact, many social movements have attempted reforms of language and have thus taken Whorf's thesis for granted. (Khosroshahi 505). One reason for the hypothesis being taken for granted is that on first glance it seems intuitively valid to some. However, after research is conducted it becomes clear that this intuition is no longer true. Rosch notes that the hypothesis "not only does not appear to be empirically true in any major respect, but it no longer even seems profoundly and ineffably true" (Rosch 276). The implication for language "arguments" is clear: a debater must do more than simply read cards from feminist or critical scholars that say language creates reality. Instead, the debater must support this claim with empirical studies or other forms of scientifically valid research. Mere intuition is not enough, and it is our belief that valid empirical studies do not support the hypothesis. After assessing the studies up to and including 1989, Takano claimed that the hypothesis "has no empirical support" (Takano 142). Further, Miller & McNeill claim that "nearly all" of the studies performed on the Whorfian hypothesis "are best regarded as efforts to substantiate the weak version of the hypothesis" (Miller & McNeill 734). We additionally will offer four reasons the hypothesis is not valid. The first reason is that it is impossible to generate empirical validation for the hypothesis. Because the hypothesis is so metaphysical and because it relies so heavily on intuition it is difficult if not impossible to operationalize. Rosch asserts that "profound and ineffable truths are not, in that form, subject to scientific investigation" (Rosch 259). We concur for two reasons. The first is that the hypothesis is phrased as a philosophical first principle and hence would not have an objective referent. The second is there would be intrinsic problems in any such test. The independent variable would be the language used by the subject. The dependent variable would be the subject's subjective reality. The problem is that the dependent variable can only be measured through self- reporting, which - naturally - entails the use of language. Hence, it is impossible to separate the dependent and independent variables. In other words, we have no way of knowing if the effects on "reality" are actual or merely artifacts of the language being used as a measuring tool. The second reason that the hypothesis is flawed is that there are problems with the causal relationship it describes. Simply put, it is just as plausible (in fact infinitely more so) that reality shapes language. Again we echo the words of Dr. Rosch, who says: {C}ovariation does not determine the direction of causality. On the simplest level, cultures are very likely to have names for physical objects which exist in their culture and not to have names for objects outside of their experience. Where television sets exists, there are words to refer to them. However, it would be difficult to argue that the objects are caused by the words. The same reasoning probably holds in the case of institutions and other, more abstract, entities and their names. (Rosch 264). The color studies reported by Cole & Means tend to support this claim (Cole & Means 75). Even in the best case scenario for the Whorfians, one could only claim that there are causal operations working both ways - i.e. reality shapes language and language shapes reality. If that was found to be true, which at this point it still has not, the hypothesis would still be scientifically problematic because "we would have difficulty calculating the extent to which the language we use determines our thought" (Schultz 134). The third objection is that the hypothesis self- implodes. If language creates reality, then different cultures with different languages would have different realities. Were that the case, then meaningful cross- cultural communication would be difficult if not impossible. In Au's words: "it is never the case that something expressed in Zuni or Hopi or Latin cannot be expressed at all in English. Were it the case, Whorf could not have written his articles as he did entirely in English" (Au 156). The fourth and final objection is that the hypothesis cannot account for single words with multiple meanings. For example, as Takano notes, the word "bank" has multiple meanings (Takano 149). If language truly created reality then this would not be possible. Further, most if not all language "arguments" in debate are accompanied by the claim that intent is irrelevant because the actual rhetoric exists apart from the rhetor's intent. If this is so, then the Whorfian advocate cannot claim that the intent of the speaker distinguishes what reality the rhetoric creates. The prevalence of such multiple meanings in a debate context is demonstrated with every new topicality debate, where debaters spend entire rounds quibbling over multiple interpretations of a few words.1

Language and discourse don’t shape reality—All evidence that says so is flawed

Lund, Manchester Metropolitan University Psychology Senior Lecturer, 03

(Nick, Language and Thought, pg 12-13, (google books), CLF)

The strong version of the LRH has been criticised on a number of grounds. Lenneberg and Roberts (1956) pointed out that Whorf had put forward a circular argument. He argued that because languages differ, thinking must differ. However, he did not study thought, and any evidence of differences in thought came from an examination of language. In other words he proposed that there must be differences in thought because he had found differences between languages. Another consistent criticism of Whorf has been of the evidence he used. For example, Garnham and Oakhill (1994) describe how Whorf translated Native American languages into English in a 'simpIistic, word-by-word’ fashion (p.-48). This results in apparently unusual combinations of words which Whorf uses as evidence of differences in thinking. However, anyone who has studied another language soon realises that word-for-word translations do not work since they usually result in nonsense sentences. One of the difficult aspects of learning another language is to understand the meaning of idiomatic phrases since Literal translations seem meaningless. Imagine, for example, translating the English sentence ‘lt’s raining cats and dogs’. Any Literal translation would seem to be very strange. The fact that we can translate the intended meaning from one language to another despite the linguistic differences suggests a universality of thought. Greene (1975) also criticises the way Whorf' translated Native American languages into English. She points out that if we were to do a similar translation from English into Hopi there would be a number of anomalies. For example, English does not use gender terms for objects except for animals and people yet there is a tendency to refer to boats as female (‘she’s a fast ship’]. Should the Hopi conclude that English speakers have a strange belief that boats are female or should they regard it as a figure of speech? Garnham and Oakhill (1994) also believe that Whorf’ s use of' ‘evidence’ about the different number of words for snow used in Inuit and English is invalid. They argue that differing numbers of words are needed because of the needs of the environment not because of any fundamental differences in thought. They note that one group of English speakers, skiers, do have a number of' different words for snow, but these are not equivalent to the Inuit terms because of the differing needs. There is little or no evidence that language determines thought and any evidence that has been presented is seriously flawed. The strong version of the LRH does not seem to be a plausible theory.

Discourse doesn’t shape reality – reality is more complex than the words we use

Kocher, Author and Philosopher, 2000

[Robert L., November 13, 2000, The Laissez Faire City Times, “Discourse on Reality and Sanity,” 4 (46), http://members.citynet.net/theanalyticpapers/reality1.htm, accessed 7-6-14, J.J.]

While it is not possible to establish many proofs in the verbal world, and it is simultaneously possible to make many uninhibited assertions or word equations in the verbal world, it should be considered that reality is more rigid and does not abide by the artificial flexibility and latitude of the verbal world. The world of words and the world of human experience are very imperfectly correlated. That is, saying something doesn't make it true. A verbal statement in the world of words doesn't mean it will occur as such in the world of consistent human experience I call reality. In the event verbal statements or assertions disagree with consistent human experience, what proof is there that the concoctions created in the world of words should take precedence or be assumed a greater truth than the world of human physical experience that I define as reality? In the event following a verbal assertion in the verbal world produces pain or catastrophe in the world of human physical reality or experience, which of the two can and should be changed? Is it wiser to live with the pain and catastrophe, or to change the arbitrary collection of words whose direction produced that pain and catastrophe? Which do you want to live with? What proven reason is there to assume that when doubtfulness that can be constructed in verbal equations conflicts with human physical experience, human physical experience should be considered doubtful? It becomes a matter of choice and pride in intellectual argument. My personal advice is that when verbal contortions lead to chronic confusion and difficulty, better you should stop the verbal contortions rather than continuing to expect the difficulty to change. Again, it's a matter of choice. Does the outcome of the philosophical question of whether reality or proof exists decide whether we should plant crops or wear clothes in cold weather to protect us from freezing? Har! Are you crazy? How many committed deconstructionist philosophers walk about naked in subzero temperatures or don't eat? Try creating and living in an alternative subjective reality where food is not needed and where you can sit naked on icebergs, and find out what happens. I emphatically encourage people to try it with the stipulation that they don't do it around me, that they don't force me to do it with them, or that they don't come to me complaining about the consequences and demanding to conscript me into paying for the cost of treating frostbite or other consequences. (sounds like there is a parallel to irresponsibility and socialism somewhere in here, doesn't it?). I encourage people to live subjective reality. I also ask them to go off far away from me to try it, where I won't be bothered by them or the consequences. For those who haven't guessed, this encouragement is a clever attempt to bait them into going off to some distant place where they will kill themselves off through the process of social Darwinism — because, let's face it, a society of deconstructionists and counterculturalists filled with people debating what, if any, reality exists would have the productive functionality of a field of diseased rutabagas and would never survive the first frost. The attempt to convince people to create and move to such a society never works, however, because they are not as committed or sincere as they claim to be. Consequently, they stay here to work for left wing causes and promote left wing political candidates where there are people who live productive reality who can be fed upon while they continue their arguments. They ain't going to practice what they profess, and they are smart enough not to leave the availability of people to victimize and steal from while they profess what they pretend to believe in.