presents less a succession of distinct orders than a cumulative accretion of
distinct moments, from 1492, via 1555/1648, to 1713 and beyond – each
contributing to and redefining the
ius publicum.
16
The
ius publicum
and early modern warfare
If the central plank of Schmitt’s golden age of the
ius publicum – the
absolutist state – was unable to generate an absolute, de-personalized,
rationalized, and secular form of sovereignty, what are its implications for
Schmitt’s thesis that
ancien re´gime warfare became limited, rationalized,
and humanized? For Schmitt
post-medieval European international law from the 16th to the 20th
century sought to repress the
justa causa. The formal reference point
for determining just war no longer was the church’s authority in inter-
national law, but rather the
equal sovereignty of states. Instead of
justa causa, international law among states was based on iustus hostis.
Any war between states, between equal sovereigns, was legitimate.
Given this juridical formalization, a rationalization and humanization –
a bracketing – of war was achieved for 200 years (Schmitt 2003,
120–21).
This thesis was encapsulated in his notion of a non-discriminatory
concept of war among
iusti hostes – a claim that ties the rise of ‘total war’
to the liberal universalism of the French Revolution and, more decisively,
to the Anglo-American age of liberal international law (Schmitt 2003,
140–51). What was the nature of early modern warfare?
Although the demise of medieval feuding through the arrogation of
sovereignty and the
ius belli ac pacis by multiple dynasties had decisively
transformed the subjects and nature of warfare, it simultaneously aug-
mented its magnitude, frequency, duration, intensity, and costs. In addition,
absolutist sovereignty gave military conflict an unlimited, irrational, and
de-humanized character that could not be controlled by the amorphous
collection of texts (treaties, diplomatic protocols, juridical treatises) that
constituted the
ius publicum (Gross 1948, 38). These developments have
prompted scholars of early modern Europe to characterize the age of
absolutism as the age of the ‘military revolution’, the ‘permanent-war
state’ and the ‘fiscal-military state’ – an age organized for warfare (Tilly
1975; Brewer 1988; Parker 1988; Downing 1992; Bonney 1995, 1999;
16
Schmitt, throughout the course of the book, progressively shortens the duration of the
ius
publicum lasting ‘for 400 years’, for ‘300 years’, and finally ‘for more than two centuries’
(Schmitt 2003, 49, 140, and 181).
Fatal attraction: Schmitt’s international theory 203
Contamine, 2000a, 2000b).
17
But in contradistinction to what the neo-
Weberian literature tends to argue – war made states and states made
wars – the mismatch between public resources and military expenses
changed in the
longue dure´e the sociopolitical complexion of anciens
re´gimes and ultimately destroyed the very financial-fiscal foundations
of the absolutist interstate system. Its dynamics did not lead to a self-
reinforcing dialectic between war and modern state-making, but to a
destructive downward spiral driven by military overstretch, financial
bankruptcies, and social revolt – the unmaking of the absolutist state
(Teschke 2003). This was linked to the superior military-fiscal and eco-
nomic capacities of the capitalist constitutional monarchy of balancing
Britain. It finally prepared, in conjunction with the Britain-monitored and
balanced ‘Concert of Europe’, the 19th Century Hundred Years’ Peace –
an empirical result un-noted by Schmitt, which also counters his thesis
that this century belongs to the liberal era of ‘total war’.
The scale of fighting units grew rapidly in the transition from the age of
feudal hosts to the age of standing armies and navies. Whereas late-
medieval armies fielded rarely more than a few thousand combatants, the
size of early modern armies and navies escalated, if in non-linear ways
and with important regional variations, from the mid-16th to the late
18th century (Lindegren 2000, 131). Inflation in numbers, in conjunction
with innovations in weapons technology, translated into a new quality of
military intensity. While it may be otiose to compare absolute casualty-
figures to the age of ‘total warfare’ in WWI and WWII, a relative measure
provides a better understanding of post-1648 lethal warfare. For example,
at the end of the Seven Years’ War, casualty figures in the Prussian Army
stood at 180,000 soldiers, which was the equivalent of two-thirds of
the Prussian army, and one-ninth of the Prussian population (Anderson
1988, 180).
Scale and intensity, in turn, were radicalized by the frequency of war.
Quincy Wright noted an uninterrupted rise in the incidence of major
battles during this period, before we see a significant reduction in the 19th
century (Wright 1964, 641–44). This was compounded by their prolonged
duration. If post-1648 wars were no longer ‘perennial’, like the Eighty Years
War of Dutch Independence or the Thirty Years War (these wars were, of
course, composite conflicts that consisted of a series of separate, but inter-
connected smaller wars), the Nine Years War (1689–97), the War of the
Spanish Succession (1701–14), the Great Northern War (1700–21), the War
17
Scheuerman’s suggestion that ‘much of what Schmitt claims for this period has been
corroborated by historians of international relations who by no means share Schmitt’s
profound hostility to modern universalism’ cannot be supported (Scheuerman 2004, 538).
204
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