be conceived as an encounter between the liberal project and a series of foes
outside its sphere seems to rely on a denial of their antecedent histories as
geopolitically and socially contested state-building projects in pro-Western
fashion, deeply co-determined by long histories of Western anti-liberal
colonial and post-colonial legacies. If these states (or social forces within
them) turn against their imperial masters, the conventional policy expression
is ‘blowback’. And as the Schmittian analytical vocabulary does not
include a conception of human agency and social forces – only friend/
enemy groupings and collective political entities governed by executive
decision – it also lacks the categories of analysis to comprehend the social
dynamics that drive the struggles around sovereign power and the even-
tual overcoming, for example, of Tunisian and Egyptian states of emer-
gency without US-led wars for humanity. Similarly, it seems unlikely that
the generic idea of liberal world-ordering and the production of liberal
subjectivities can actually explain why Western intervention seems
improbable in some cases (e.g. Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen or Syria) and more
likely in others (e.g. Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya).
Liberal world-ordering consists of differential strategies of building,
coordinating, and drawing liberal and anti-liberal states into the Western
orbit, and overtly or covertly intervening and refashioning them once they
step out of line. These are conflicts within a world, which seem to push
the term liberalism beyond its original meaning. The generic Schmittian
idea of a liberal ‘spaceless universalism’ sits uncomfortably with the
realities of maintaining an America-supervised ‘informal empire’, which
has to manage a persisting interstate system in diverse and case-specific
ways. But it is this persistence of a worldwide system of states, which
encase national particularities, which renders challenges to American
supremacy possible in the first place.
This raises the final question of how the specificity of the War on Terror
can be aligned with the generality of liberal world-ordering and inter-
national law since WWI? For Schmitt diagnosed the turn towards a
multilateral, if US-directed, liberal institutionalization of world politics
during the interwar years as the key mechanism for the realization of his
age of neutralizations. However, 21st century United States unilateralism
seems to negate this diagnosis frontally, activating Schmitt’s politics of the
exception. If Schmitt’s original position was articulated as a critique of the
Kantian–Kelsian project, neo-Schmittians now have to resolve the ques-
tion of whether the War on Terror grafts a World-Leviathan onto the
liberal project, superseding an incipient world state of law, or whether
United States unilateralism can be squared with the Kantian project of
liberal international law. For the suggestion that the War against Terror
presents a fundamental continuity in American foreign policy, inscribed in
Fatal attraction: Schmitt’s international theory 219
its generic liberal cosmopolitanism, is saddled with a number of para-
doxes. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the literature is internally divided
over whether the War on Terror presents a continuity (Mouffe 2005,
2007; Odysseos 2007) or a discontinuity (Zolo 2002, 2007) in American
foreign policy and a sharp break with liberal international law.
The Bush Doctrine and its ideological underpinning, Neo-Conservatism
and the ‘Project for a New American Century’, were articulated against a
liberal Kelsenite legalization and institutionalization of interstate rela-
tions, embracing the distinctly Schmittian idea of the selective transcen-
dence of the liberal rule of domestic and international law – states of
exception (Drolet 2010). This was expressed in the abrupt decline of the
post-Cold War notion of global governance and its re-politicization even
prior to 9/11 in a neo-authoritarian direction, captured in the discourse
of empire and imperialism – full-spectrum dominance. At the horizon
of this vision – derided by left Schmittians as a political apocalypse and
embraced by right Schmittians as the heroic self-assertion of an American
or Western community of values – looms a world without a political
exterior: a militarized
Pax Americana. In the Neo-Conservative project,
Schmitt and Kelsen combine to form a paradoxical (mis-)alliance, as the
political use of Schmitt is reserved for the US state, supervising a Kelsenite
international institutional arrangement for the lesser partners within the
liberal zone of peace. Liberalism is, by definition, a broad concept, but it
cannot be indefinitely expanded beyond breaking point without loosing
some sense of terminological coherence.
Whereas Schmitt articulated his concepts against capitalist crisis to
defend German state autonomy domestically and internationally, the neo-
Conservative ideology sought to defend the domestic autonomy and
international primacy of the United States state in the context of its own
capitalist crisis (Colas and Saull 2005). The basic concept of the political
plus decisionism, which Schmitt constructed to defend Germany against
American imperialism was mobilized by neo-Conservatives to cultivate an
existentialist ethics for a post-welfare, patriotic, and heroic community
of American values. But neo-Conservatism was not originally articulated
as a response to international terror and foreign policy considerations. It
was conceived in the 1970s as an alternative state strategy for the man-
agement of domestic disorder – analogous to the original function of
Schmitt’s decisionism in Weimar Germany – as the long economic
downturn in the United States, the fiscal crisis of the US state, and the rise
of the post-welfare state precipitated the turn towards Schmittian pre-
scriptions (Drolet 2010). This entailed the re-assertion of public order
through the national identity-galvanizing effects of a community of
values, sustained by binary friend/foe declarations and the re-validation of
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