revolved around the political reassertion of domestic and international
order. The former was encapsulated in the definition of sovereignty as an
unmediated and subjective decision on the state of exception (and, later,
the full embrace of the
Fu¨hrer-principle and the ‘total state’), and in
the concept of the political, which redefined democracy in identitarian–
existentialist terms through the mediation of agonistic friend/enemy
declarations by the state executive. The latter was captured in his defence
of the sanctity of the legality of Imperial Germany’s war against the Allies
as the highest expression of the state’s
ius belli ac pacis of the ius publicum
europaeum and, later, the idea of land-appropriations as the historical
norm. This legitimized Nazi-Germany’s war of conquests and the idea of
coexisting imperial greater regions as the new nomos of the earth. Schmitt
remorselessly dissected the crisis of the legal form, the relation between
constitutionalism, democracy and emergency powers, and the pathologies
of liberal international law in order to fend off the potential of a revo-
lutionary German
pouvoir constituant and to deconstruct the practice and
ideology of the legal–political expansion of the liberal-capitalist ‘zone of
peace’ – the incipient legalization and de-politicization of interstate
relations. But rather than developing categories of analysis
for the crisis,
he provided normative legal-political categories against
the crisis. Schmitt
developed a legal–political–spatial counter-vocabulary – concepts for a
New Order – to stem the tide of the advancing liberal-capitalist ‘spaceless
universalism’ and the threat of socialist revolution.
The ideological purpose, theoretical limitations, and historical defi-
ciencies of Schmitt’s legal–political–spatial register do not
per se invali-
date all Schmittian insights. But they do cast doubt on the standing of his
international thought as a plausible and coherent
international theory,
and raise a large question mark behind attempts to elevate him to a
hitherto under-appreciated classic of IR, and
The Nomos to the status of a
founding text of the discipline (Odysseos and Petito 2007, 8). How can
neo-Schmittians escape these liabilities? Furthermore, its undigested
problems manifest themselves in a number of questions and challenges to
contemporary attempts to mobilize Schmitt as a critic of the liberal
project of modernity.
For at the centre of the heterodox – partly post-structuralist, partly realist –
neo-Schmittian analysis stands the conclusion of
The Nomos: the thesis of
a structural and continuous relation between liberalism and violence
(Mouffe 2005, 2007; Odysseos 2007). It suggests that, in sharp contrast to
the liberal-cosmopolitan programme of ‘perpetual peace’, the geographical
expansion of liberal modernity was accompanied by the intensification
and de-formalization of war in the international construction of liberal-
constitutional states of law and the production of liberal subjectivities as
Fatal attraction: Schmitt’s international theory 217
rights-bearing individuals. Liberal world-ordering proceeds via the conduit of
wars for humanity, leading to Schmitt’s ‘spaceless universalism’. In this per-
spective, a straight line is drawn from WWI to the War on Terror to verify
Schmitt’s long-term prognostic of the 20th century as the age of ‘neu-
tralizations and de-politicizations’ (Schmitt 1993).
But this attempt to read the history of 20th century international
relations in terms of a succession of confrontations between the carrier-
nations of liberal modernity and the criminalized foes at its outer margins
seems unable to comprehend the complexities and specificities of ‘liberal’
world-ordering, then and now. For in the cases of Wilhelmine, Weimar
and fascist Germany, the assumption that their conflicts with the Anglo-
American liberal-capitalist heartland were grounded in an antagonism
between liberal modernity and a recalcitrant Germany outside its geo-
graphical and conceptual lines runs counter to the historical evidence. For
this reading presupposes that late-Wilhelmine Germany was not already
substantially penetrated by capitalism and fully incorporated into the
capitalist world economy, posing the question of whether the causes of
WWI lay in the capitalist dynamics of inter-imperial rivalry (Blackbourn
and Eley 1984), or in processes of belated and incomplete liberal-
capitalist development, due to the survival of ‘re-feudalized’ elites in the
German state classes and the marriage between ‘rye and iron’ (Wehler
1997). It also assumes that the late-Weimar and early Nazi turn towards
the construction of an autarchic German regionalism –
Mitteleuropa or
Großraum – was not deeply influenced by the international ramifications
of the 1929 Great Depression, but premised on a purely political–
existentialist assertion of German national identity. Against a reading of
the early 20th century conflicts between ‘the liberal West’ and Germany as
‘wars for humanity’ between an expanding liberal modernity and its
political exterior, there is more evidence to suggest that these confronta-
tions were interstate conflicts
within the crisis-ridden and nationally
uneven capitalist project of modernity.
Similar objections and caveats to the binary opposition between the
Western discourse of liberal humanity against non-liberal foes apply to the
more recent period. For how can this optic explain that the ‘liberal West’
coexisted (and keeps coexisting) with a large number of pliant authoritarian
client-regimes (Mubarak’s Egypt, Suharto’s Indonesia, Pahlavi’s Iran, Fahd’s
Saudi-Arabia, even Gaddafi’s pre-intervention Libya, to name but a few),
which were and are actively managed and supported by the West as anti-
liberal Schmittian states of emergency, with concerns for liberal subjectivities
and Human Rights secondary to the strategic interests of political and geo-
political stability and economic access? Even in the more obvious cases of
Afghanistan, Iraq, and, now, Libya, the idea that Western intervention has to
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