Versailles and beyond did not simply constitute a passage, however chaotic
and disorderly, from the
ius publicum to a universal international law or,
alternatively, from interstate geopolitics to a space-cancelling economic
universalism, auto-generated by the subterranean march of capitalism. It
rather experienced first the intense geopolitical rivalries among the capitalist
European empires and their associated re-territorializations of the world
(Schmitt remains silent on
belle e´poque inter-imperial conflict), before the
settlement of WWI launched a supremely power-political project of the
American state. This involved the territorial, military, political, and con-
stitutional re-configuration of Europe as an ongoing grand strategy of
American power-projection. The result was not a depoliticized ‘spaceless
universalism’, but an attempt to reconstitute and align European political
geography with American economic
and security concerns.
This American grand strategy aimed to tie the postwar promotion of
liberal-constitutional
Kleinstaaten (small states) on the European Con-
tinent – Europe’s Balkanization – and beyond to their capitalist penetra-
tion by private economic forces and integration into the world-market.
This implied a twofold strategic calculation – territorial-geopolitical and
constitutional-economic. On the one hand, the new principle of national
self-determination was the wedge that dismembered the empires of the
axis-powers – the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires.
This lead to a strategically manageable proliferation of mini-states on
the Continent and, in Central-Eastern Europe, to a buffer security zone
(
le cordon sanitaire) against the key remaining out-law state, the Soviet
Union. On the other hand, their simultaneous constitutional transfor-
mation into liberal law-states, as a precondition for their incorporation
into the League of Nations, aligned them with Anglo-American con-
stitutional and economic norms. This enabled their full incorporation into
the system of liberal capitalism. Both moves, as Schmitt rightly observed,
obliterated their political essence – the right to define an enemy and to
wage war.
But although liberal international institutionalism and a capitalist
world market were clearly designed to restructure the Continent, this did
not and could not precipitate a turn towards a non-political ‘spaceless
universalism’ as it did not erase the European interstate system. Schmitt
overlooked the qualitative difference between an America-centric uni-
versal empire and an America-supervised European interstate system.
Although borders became more permeable and porous and territorial
sovereignty geographically trimmed and more conditional, the combina-
tion of United States ‘political absence’ and ‘economic presence’ was
never powerful enough to fully absorb plural territorial sovereignties into
a universal empire. In fact, Mussolini’s turn towards a
mare nostrum
Fatal attraction: Schmitt’s international theory 211
conception and Nazi Germany’s progressive construction of an autarchic
economic
Lebensraum and security zone are the clearest examples of the
limits of the apolitical ‘spaceless universalism’ ascribed to the American
project. Although the abstraction of capitalism had dispensed with a
spatial-order constituting act of American ‘land-appropriation’, the
capitalist powers of Italy and Germany could re-embark on a strategy of
concrete-space-ordering – a re-territorialization within an alleged spatial
vacuum of interwar global capitalism.
How was that possible? As Weimar Germany was already fully integrated
into the world economy when
Großraum-thinking started to preoccupy
Schmitt in the 1930s, he was forced into yet another theoretical
volte-face.
He turned away from IPE and re-embraced a spatial-legalistic register that
capitalist imperialism, by Schmitt’s own reasoning, had either long dissolved
or – but this could not feature in Schmitt’s theory – regenerated through the
general capitalist crisis of the 1929 Great Depression, sweeping fascism to
power. But as the precepts of IPE were reserved by Schmitt to Anglo-
American imperialism and never applied to German imperialism, his
normatively highly charged legal–political argument about the desirability of
a universalism-blocking concept of German
Großraum remained strictly
beyond the confines of IPE. Although Schmitt gestured inconclusively
towards the transcendence of the classical concept of the territorial state
driven by the economic imperatives of a
Grobraumwirtschaft (economic
greater space) as a sphere of economic performance (
Leistungsraum) (Schmitt
1995c, 271), he was theoretically unable to ground the turn towards German
continental autarchy in a series of successive German strategic policy choices
within the wider context of the post-1929 crisis of the world economy.
24
Consequently, the legal concept of the
Grobraum had to be de-economized
and anchored in a reassertion of ‘the political’ in the abstract, the friend/enemy
distinction, arising like a
deus ex machina from an identitarian notion of
vo¨lkisch democracy.
25
What Schmitt, contrary to his own diagnosis, was witnessing in the
interwar years was the making of an inter-spatial European regionalism,
territorially re-configured at Versailles, transnationally better integrated,
constitutionally assimilated and internationally codified in the League,
24
For the economic calculations behind successive German strategic policy decisions, see
Tooze (2006, 385–425). For the wide circulation of the notion
Großraum in pre-WWII
German industrial and policy circles, see Opitz (1977, parts III and IV).
25
Cf. Schmitt’s cryptic statement: ‘The United States believed it could turn the political into
an external fac¸ade of territorial borders, that it could transcend territorial borders with the
essential content of the economic. But, in a decisive moment, it was unable to prevent the
political grouping of friend and enemy from becoming critical’ (Schmitt 2003, 258).
212
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