entrepreneurs. How, then, is it possible that the bourgeoisie has
not conquered political
power, that it behaves in so cowardly a manner toward the government?
It is the misfortune of the German bourgeoisie to have come too late – quite in
accordance with the beloved German tradition. The period of its ascendancy coincides with
the time when the bourgeoisie of the other western European countries is politically on the
downward path. In England, the bourgeoisie could place its real representative, Bright, into
the government only by extending the franchise which in the long run is bound to put an
end to its very domination. In France, the bourgeoisie, which for two years only, 1849–50,
had held power as a class under the republican régime, was able to continue its social
existence only by transferring its power to Louis Bonaparte and the army.
Under present
conditions of enormously increased interdependence of the three most progressive
European countries, it is no more possible for the German bourgeoisie extensively to utilize
its political power while the same class has outlived itself in England and France. It is a
peculiarity of the bourgeoisie, distinguishing it from all other classes, that a point is being
reached in its development after which every increase in its power, that is, every
enlargement of its capital, only tends to make it more and more incapable of retaining
political dominance.
“Behind the big bourgeoisie stand the proletarians.” In the degree as
the bourgeoisie develops its industry, its commerce, and its means of communication, it
also produces the proletariat. At a certain point, which must not necessarily appear
simultaneously and on the same stage of development everywhere, it begins to note that
this, its second self, has outgrown it. From then on, it loses the power for exclusive
political dominance. It looks for allies with
whom to share its authority, or to whom to cede
all power, as circumstances may demand.
In Germany, this turning point came for the bourgeoisie as early as 1848. The
bourgeoisie became frightened, not so much by the German, as by the French proletariat.
The battle of June, 1848, in Paris, showed the bourgeoisie what could be expected. The
German proletariat was restless enough to prove to the bourgeoisie that the seed of
revolution had been sown also in German soil. From that day, the edge of bourgeois
political action was broken. The bourgeoisie looked around for allies. It sold itself to them
regardless
of price, and there it remains.
These allies are all of a reactionary turn. It is the king’s power, with his army and his
bureaucracy; it is the big feudal nobility; it is the smaller junker; it is even the clergy. The
bourgeoisie has made so many compacts and unions with all of them to save its dear skin,
that now it has nothing more to barter. And the more the proletariat developed, the more it
began to feel as a class and to act as one, the feebler became the bourgeoisie. When the
astonishingly bad strategy of the Prussians triumphed over the astonishingly worse strategy
The Peasant War in Germany
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of the Austrians at Sadowa, it was difficult to say who gave
a deeper sigh of relief, the
Prussian bourgeois, who was a partner to the defeat at Sadowa, or his Austrian colleague.
Our upper middle-class of 1870 acted in the same fashion as did the moderate middle-
class of 1525. As to the small bourgeoisie, the master artisans and merchants, they remain
unchanged. They hope to climb up to the big bourgeoisie, and they are fearful lest they be
pushed down into the ranks of the proletariat. Between fear and hope, they will in times of
struggle seek to save their precious skin and to join the victors when the struggle is over.
Such is their nature.
The social and political activities of the proletariat have
kept pace with the rapid
growth of industry since 1848. The role of the German workers, as expressed in their trade
unions, their associations, political organisations and public meetings, at elections, and in
the so-called Reichstag, is alone a sufficient indication of the transformation which came
over Germany in the last twenty years. It is to the credit of the German workers that
they
alone have managed to send workers and workers’ representatives into the Parliament – a
feat which neither the French nor the English had hitherto accomplished.
Still, even the proletariat shows some resemblance to 1525. The class of the population
which entirely and permanently depends on wages is now, as then,
a minority of the
German people. This class is also compelled to seek allies. The latter can be found only
among the petty bourgeoisie, the low grade proletariat of the cities, the small peasants, and
the wage-workers of the land.
The petty bourgeoisie has been mentioned above. This class is entirely unreliable
except when a victory has been won. Then its noise in the beer saloons is without limit.
Nevertheless, there are good elements among it, who, of their own accord, follow the
workers.
The
lumpenproletariat, this scum of the decaying elements of all classes, which
establishes headquarters in all the big cities, is the worst of all possible allies. It is an
absolutely venal, an absolutely brazen crew.
If the French workers, in the course of the
Revolution, inscribed on the houses:
Mort aux voleurs! (Death to the thieves!) and even
shot down many, they did it, not out of enthusiasm for property, but because they rightly
considered it necessary to hold that band at arm’s length. Every leader of the workers who
utilises these gutter-proletarians as guards or supports, proves himself by this action alone a
traitor to the movement.
The small peasants (bigger peasants belong to the bourgeoisie) are not homogeneous.
They are either in serfdom bound to their lords and masters, and inasmuch as the
bourgeoisie has failed to do its duty in freeing
those people from serfdom, it will not be
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