Principles of Morals and

138/Jeremy Bentham
ishment is unprofitable on this ground, can by no other means be dis-
covered, than by an examination of each particular offense; which is
what will be the business of the body of the work.
XVI. 2. Where, although in the ordinary state of things, the evil
resulting from the punishment is not greater than the benefit which is
likely to result from the force with which it operates, during the same
space of time, towards the excluding the evil of the offenses, yet it may
have been rendered so by the influence of some occasional circum-
stances. In the number of these circumstances may be, 1. The multitude
of delinquents at a particular juncture; being such as would increase,
beyond the ordinary measure, the quantum of the second and third lots,
and thereby also of a part of the fourth lot, in the evil of the punishment.
2. The extraordinary value of the services of some one delinquent; in the
case where the effect of the punishment would be to deprive the commu-
nity of the benefit of those services. 3. The displeasure of the people;
that is, of an indefinite number of the members of the same community,
in cases where (owing to of the influence of some occasional incident)
they happen to conceive, that the offense or the offender ought not to be
punished at all, or at least ought not to be punished in the way in ques-
tion. 4. The displeasure of foreign powers; that is, of the governing
body, or a considerable number of the members of some foreign com-
munity or communities, with which the community in question is con-
nected.
§ 5. 
Cases where punishment is needless.
These are,
XVII. 1. Where the purpose of putting an end to the practice may be
attained as effectually at a cheaper rate: by instruction, is for instance,
as well as by terror: by informing the understanding, as well as by exer-
cising an immediate influence on the will. This seems to be the case with
respect to all those offenses which consist in the disseminating perni-
cious principles in matters of duty; of whatever kind the duty be; whether
political, or moral, or religious. And this, whether such principles be
disseminated under, or even without; a sincere persuasion of their being
beneficial. I say, even without: for though in such a case it is not in-
struction that can prevent the writer from endeavouring to inculcate his
principles, yet it may the readers from adopting them: without which,
his endeavouring to inculcate them will do no harm. In such a case, the
sovereign will commonly have little need to take an active part: if it be

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/139
the interest of one individual to inculcate principles that are pernicious,
it will as surely be the interest of other individuals to expose them. But
if the sovereign must needs take a part in the controversy, the pen is the
proper weapon to combat error with, not the sword.

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Chapter XIV: Of the Proportion between
Punishments and Offences
I. We have seen that the general object of all laws is to prevent mischief;
that is to say, when it is worth while; but that, where there are no other
means of doing this than punishment, there are four cases in which it is
not worth while.
II. When it is worth while, there are four subordinate designs or
objects, which, in the course of his endeavours to compass, as far as
may be, that one general object, a legislator, whose views are governed
by the principle of utility, comes naturally to propose to himself.
III. 1. His first, most extensive, and most eligible object, is to pre-
vent, in as far as it is possible, and worth while, all sorts of offenses
whatsoever: in other words, so to manage, that no offense whatsoever
may be committed.
IV. 2. But if a man must needs commit an offense of some kind or
other, the next object is to induce him to commit an offense less mischie-
vous, rather than one more mischievous: in other words, to choose al-
ways the least mischievous, of two offenses that will either of them suit
his purpose.
V. 3. When a man has resolved upon a particular offense, the next
object is to dispose him to do no more mischief than is necessary to his
purpose: in other words, to do as little mischief as is consistent with the
benefit he has in view.
VI. 4. The last object is, whatever the mischief be, which it is pro-
posed to prevent, to prevent it at as cheap a rate as possible.
VII. Subservient to these four objects, or purposes, must be the
rules or canons by which the proportion of punishments to offenses is to

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/141
be governed.
VIII. Rule 1. The first object, it has been seen, is to prevent, in as
far as it is worth while, all sorts of offenses; therefore,
The value of the punishment must not less in any case than what is
sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offense.
If it be, the offence (unless some other considerations, independent
of the punishment should intervene and operate efficaciously in the char-
acter of tutelary motives) will be sure to be to committed notwithstand-
ing: the whole lot of punishment will be thrown away: it will be alto-
gether inefficacious.
IX. The above rule has been often objected to, on account of its
seeming harshness: but this can only have happened for want of its
being properly understood. The strength of the temptation, cæteris
paribas, is as the profit of the offense: the quantum of the punishment
must rise with the profit of the offense: cæteris paribas, it must there-
fore rise with the strength of the temptation. This there is no disputing.
True it is, that the stronger the temptation, the less conclusive is the
indication which the act of delinquency affords of the depravity of the
offender’s disposition. So far then as the absence of any aggravation,
arising from extraordinary depravity of disposition, may operate, or at
the utmost, so far as the presence of a ground of extenuation, resulting
from the innocence or beneficence of the offender’s disposition, can
operate, the strength of the temptation may operate in abatement of the
demand for punishment. But it can never operate so far as to indicate
the propriety of making the punishment ineffectual, which it is sure to
be when brought below the level of the apparent profit of the offense.
The partial benevolence which should prevail for the reduction of it
below this level, would counteract as well those purposes which such a
motive would actually have in view, as those more extensive purposes
which benevolence ought to have in view: it would be cruelty not only to
the public, but to the very persons in whose behalf it pleads: in its ef-
fects, I mean, however opposite in its intention. Cruelty to the public,
that is cruelty to the innocent, by suffering them, for want of an ad-
equate protection, to lie exposed to the mischief of the offense: cruelty
even to the offender himself, by punishing him to no purpose, and with-
out the chance of compassing that beneficial end, by which alone the
introduction of the evil of punishment is to be justified.
X. Rule 2. But whether a given offence shall be prevented in a given
degree by a given quantity of punishment, is never any thing better than

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