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132/Jeremy Bentham
that mischief, to wit, as respects the future behaviour of the same per-
son.
XXIX. It is not from the worst kind of motive, however, that the
secondary mischief of an act receives its greatest aggravation.
XXX. The aggravation which the secondary mischief of an act, in
as far as it respects the future behaviour of the same person, receives
from the nature of a motive in an individual case, is as the tendency of
the motive to produce, on the part of the same person, acts of the like
bad tendency with that of the act in question.
XXXI. The tendency of a motive to produce acts of the like kind, on
the part of any given person, is as the strength and constancy of its
influence on that person, as applied to the production of such effects.
XXXII. The tendency of a species of motive to give birth to acts of
any kind, among persons in general, is as the strength, constancy, and
extensiveness of its influence, as applied to the production of such ef-
fects.
XXXIII. Now the motives, whereof the influence is at once most
powerful, most constant, and most extensive, are the motives of physi-
cal desire, the love of wealth, the love of ease, the love of life, and the
fear of pain: all of them self-regarding motives. The motive of displea-
sure, whatever it may be in point of strength and extensiveness, is not
near so constant in its influence (the case of mere antipathy excepted) as
any of the other three. A pernicious act, therefore, when committed
through vengeance. or otherwise through displeasure, is not near so
mischievous as the same pernicious act, when committed by force of
any one of those other motives.
XXXIV. As to the motive of religion, whatever it may sometimes
prove to be in point of strength and constancy, it is not in point of extent
so universal, especially in its application to acts of a mischievous na-
ture, as any of the three preceding motives. It may, however, be as uni-
versal in a particular state, or in a particular district of a particular
state. It is liable indeed to be very irregular in its operations. It is apt,
however, to be frequently as powerful as the motive of vengeance, or
indeed any other motive whatsoever. It will sometimes even be more
powerful than any other motive. It is, at any rate, much more constant.
A pernicious act, therefore, when committed through the motive of reli-
gion, is more mischievous than when committed through the motive of
ill-will.
XXXV. Lastly, The secondary mischief, to wit, so much of it as

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hath respect to the future behaviour of the same person, is aggravated or
lessened by the apparent depravity or beneficence of his disposition:
and that in the proportion of such apparent depravity or beneficence.
XXXVI. The consequences we have hitherto been speaking of, are
the  natural consequences, of which the act, and the other articles we
have been considering, are the causes: consequences that result from the
behaviour of the individual, who is the offending agent, without the
interference of political authority. We now come to speak of punish-
ment: which, in the sense in which it is here considered, is an artificial
consequence, annexed by political authority to an offensive act, in one
instance, in the view of putting a stop to the production of events similar
to the obnoxious part of its natural consequences, in other instances.

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Chapter XIII: Cases Unmeet for Punishment
§ 1.
 General view of cases unmeet for punishment.
I. The general object which all laws have, or ought to have, in common,
is to augment the total happiness of the community; and therefore, in the
first place, to exclude, as far as may be, every thing that tends to sub-
tract from that happiness: in other words, to exclude mischief.
II. But all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil.
Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought
only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.
III. It is plain, therefore, that in the following cases punishment
ought not to be inflicted.
7.Where it is groundless: where there is no mischief for it to pre-
vent; the act not being mischievous upon the whole.
8.Where it must be inefficacious: where it cannot act so as to pre-
vent the mischief.
9.Where it is unprofitable, or too expensive: where the mischief it
would produce would be greater than what it prevented.
10.Where it is needless: where the mischief may be prevented, or
cease of itself, without it: that is, at a cheaper rate.
§ 2. 
Cases in which punishment is groundless.
These are,
IV. 1. Where there has never been any mischief: where no mischief
has been produced to any body by the act in question. Of this number
are those in which the act was such as might, on a some occasions, be
mischievous or disagreeable, but the person whose interest it concerns
gave his consent to the performance of it. This consent, provided it be

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/135
free, and fairly obtained, is the best proof that can be produced, that, to
the person who gives it, no mischief, at least no immediate mischief,
upon the whole, is done. For no man can be so good a judge as the man
himself, what it is gives him pleasure or displeasure.
V. 2. Where the mischief was outweighed: although a mischief was
produced by that act, yet the same act was necessary to the production
of a benefit which was of greater value than the mischief. This may be
the case with any thing that is done in the way of precaution against
instant calamity, as also with any thing that is done in the exercise of the
several sorts of powers necessary to be established in every community,
to wit, domestic, judicial, military, and supreme.
VI. 3. Where there is a certainty of an adequate compensation: and
that in all cases where the offense can be committed. This supposes two
things: 1. That the offence is such as admits of an adequate compensa-
tion: 2. That such a compensation is sure to be forthcoming. Of these
suppositions, the latter will be found to be a merely ideal one: a suppo-
sition that cannot, in the universality here given to it, be verified by fact.
It cannot, therefore, in practice, be numbered amongst the grounds of
absolute impunity. It may, however, be admitted as a ground for an
abatement of that punishment, which other considerations, standing by
themselves, would seem to dictate.
§ 3.
 Cases in which punishment must be inefficacious
These are,
VII. 1. Where the penal provision is not established until after the
act is done. Such are the cases, 1. Of an ex-post-facto law; where the
legislator himself appoints not a punishment till after the act is done. 2.
Of a sentence beyond the law; where the judge, of his own authority,
appoints a punishment which the legislator had not appointed.
VIII. 2. Where the penal provision, though established, is not con-
veyed to the notice of the person on whom it seems intended that it
should operate. Such is the case where the law has omitted to employ
any of the expedients which are necessary, to make sure that every per-
son whatsoever, who is within the reach of the law, be apprised of all the
cases whatsoever, in which (being in the station of life he is in) he can be
subjected to the penalties of the law.
IX. 3. Where the penal provision, though it were conveyed to a
man’s notice, could produce no effect on him, with respect to the pre-
venting him from engaging in any act of the sort in question. Such is the

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