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124/Jeremy Bentham
are, 1. The motive of benevolence, which acts as a branch of the physi-
cal sanction 2. The motive of self-preservation, as against the punish-
ment that may stand provided by the political sanction. 3. The fear of
shame; a motive belonging to the moral sanction. 4. The fear of the
divine displeasure; a motive belonging to the religious sanction. On the
first and last of these forces it has, perhaps, no influence worth insisting
on: but it has on the other two.
IX. The way in which a past robbery may weaken the force with
which the political sanction tends to prevent a future robbery, may be
thus conceived. The way in which this sanction tends to prevent a rob-
bery, is by denouncing some particular kind of punishment against any
who shall be guilty of it: the real value of which punishment will of
course be diminished by the real uncertainty: as also, if there be any
difference, the apparent value by the apparent uncertainty. Now this
uncertainty is proportionably increased by every instance in which a
man is known to commit the offense, without undergoing the punish-
ment. This, of course, will be the case with every offense for a certain
time; in short, until the punishment allotted to it takes place. If punish-
ment takes place at last, this branch of the mischief of the offense is then
at last, but not till then, put a stop to.
X. The way in which a past robbery may weaken the force with
which the moral sanction tends to prevent a future robbery, may be thus
conceived. The way in which the moral sanction tends to prevent a rob-
bery, is by holding forth the indignation of mankind as ready to fall
upon him who shall be guilty of it. Now this indignation will be the
more formidable, according to the number of those who join in it: it will
be the less so, the fewer they are who join in it. But there cannot be a
stronger way of showing that a man does not join in whatever indigna-
tion may be entertained against a practice, than the engaging in it him-
self. It shows not only that he himself feels no indignation against it, but
that it seems to him there is no sufficient reason for apprehending what
indignation may be felt against it by others. Accordingly, where robber-
ies are frequent, and unpunished, robberies are committed without shame.
It was thus amongst the Grecians formerly. It is thus among the Arabs
still.
XI. In whichever way then a past offense tends to pave the way for
the commission of a future Hence, whether by suggesting the idea of
committing it, or by adding to the strength of the temptation, in both
cases it may be said to operate by the force or influence of example.

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/125
XII. The two branches of the secondary mischief of an act, the alarm
and the danger, must not be confounded: though intimately connected,
they are perfectly distinct: either may subsist without the other. The
neighbourhood may be alarmed with the report of a robbery, when, in
fact, no robbery either has been committed or is in a way to be commit-
ted: a neighbourhood may be on the point of being disturbed by robber-
ies, without knowing any thing of the matter. Accordingly, we shall
soon perceive, that some acts produce alarm without danger: others,
danger without alarm.
XIII. As well the danger as the alarm may again be divided, each of
them, into two branches: the first, consisting of so much of the alarm or
danger as may be apt to result from the future behaviour of the same
agent: the second, consisting of so much as may be apt to result from the
behaviour of other persons: such others, to wit, as may come to engage
in acts of the same sort and tendency.
XIV. The distinction between the primary and the secondary conse-
quences of an act must be carefully attended to. It is so just, that the
latter may often be of a directly opposite nature to be the former. In
some cases, where the primary consequences of the act are attended
with a mischief, the secondary consequences be may be beneficial, and
that to such a degree, as even greatly to outweigh the mischief of the
primary. This is the case, for instance, with all acts of punishment, when
properly applied. Of these, the primary mischief being never intended to
fall but upon such persons as may happen to have committed some act
which it is expedient to prevent, the secondary mischief, that is, the
alarm and the danger, extends no farther than to such persons as are
under temptation to commit it: in which case, in as far as it tends to
restrain them from committing such acts, it is of a beneficial nature.
XV. Thus much with regard to acts that produce positive pain, and
that immediately. This case, by reason of its simplicity, seemed the fit-
test to take the lead. But acts may produce mischief in various other
ways; which, together with those already specified, may all be com-
prised by the following abridged analysis.
Mischief may admit of a division in any one of three points of view.
1. According to its own nature. 2. According to its cause. 3. According
to the person, or other party, who is the object of it 1. With regard to its
nature, it may be either simple or complex 2: when simple, it may either
be  positive or negative: positive, consisting of actual pain: negative,
consisting of the loss of pleasure. Whether simple or complex, and

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126/Jeremy Bentham
whether positive or negative, it may be either certain or contingent.
When it is negative, it consists of the loss of some benefit or advantage:
this benefit may be material in both or either of two ways: 1. By afford-
ing actual pleasure: or, 2. By averting pain or danger, which is the
chance of pain: that is, by affording security. In as far, then, as the
benefit which a mischief tends to avert, is productive of security, the
tendency of such mischief is to produce insecurity. 2. With regard to its
cause, mischief may be produced either by one single action, or not
without the concurrence of other actions: if not without the concurrence
of other actions, these others may be the actions either of the same per-
son, or of other persons: in either case, they may be either acts of the
same kind as that in question, or of other kinds. 3. Lastly, with regard to
the party who is the object of the mischief, or, in other words, who is in
a way to be affected by it, such party maybe either an assignable indi-
vidual, or assemblage of individuals, or else a multitude of unassign-
able individuals. When the object is an assignable individual, this indi-
vidual may either be the person himself who is the author of the mis-
chief, or some other person. When the individuals who are the objects
of it, are an unassignable multitude, this multitude may be either the
whole political community or state, or some subordinate division of it.
Now when the object of the mischief is the author himself, it may be
styled self-regarding: when any other party is the object, extra-regard-
ing: when such other party is an individual, it may be styled private:
when a subordinate branch of the community, semi-public: when the
whole community, public. Here, for the present, we must stop. To pur-
sue the subject through its inferior distinctions, will be the business of
the chapter which exhibits the division of offenses.
The cases which have been already illustrated, are those in which
the primary mischief is not necessarily otherwise than a simple one, and
that positive: present, and therefore certain: producible by a single ac-
tion, without any necessity of the concurrence of any other action, either
on the part of the same agent, or of others; and having for its object an
assignable individual, or, by accident an assemblage of assignable indi-
viduals: extra-regarding therefore, and private. This primary mischief
is accompanied by a secondary: the first branch of which is sometimes
contingent and sometimes certain, the other never otherwise than con-
tingent: both extra-regarding and semi-public: in other respects, pretty
much upon a par with the primary mischief: except that the first branch,
viz., the alarm, though inferior in magnitude to the primary, is, in point

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