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116/Jeremy Bentham
mischievousness; and therefore, with equal force, in whatsoever cir-
cumstances it may be proposed to be committed. This, therefore, may
also be added to the catalogue of standing tutelary motives.
XXXV. As to the motives which may operate occasionally (in the
character of tutelary motives, these, it has been already intimated, are of
various sorts, and various degrees of strength in various offenses: de-
pending not only upon the nature of the offence, but upon the accidental
circumstances in which the idea of engaging in it may come in contem-
plation. Nor is there any sort of motive which may not come to operate
in this character; as may be easily conceived. A thief, for instance, may
be prevented from engaging in a projected scheme of house-breaking,
by sitting too long over his bottle (love of the pleasures of the palate), by
a visit from his doxy, by the occasion he may have to go elsewhere, in
order to receive his dividend of a former booty (pecuniary interest); and
so on.
XXXVI. There are some motives, however, which seem more apt to
act in this character than others; especially as things are now consti-
tuted, now that the law has every where opposed to the force of the
principal seducing motives, artificial tutelary motives of its own cre-
ation. Of the motives here meant it will be necessary to take a general
view. They seem to be reducible to two heads; viz., 1. The love of ease;
a motive put into action by the prospect of the trouble of the attempt;
that is, the trouble which it may be necessary to bestow, in overcoming
the physical difficulties that may accompany it. 2. Self-preservation, as
opposed to the dangers to which a man may be exposed in the prosecu-
tion of it.
XXXVII. These dangers may be either, 1. Of a purely physical
nature: or, 2. Dangers resulting from moral agency; in other words,
from the conduct of any such persons to whom the act, if known, may
be expected to prove obnoxious. But moral agency supposes knowledge
with respect to the circumstances that are to have the effect of external
motives in giving birth to it. Now the obtaining such knowledge, with
respect to the commission of any obnoxious act, on the part of any
persons who may be disposed to make the agent suffer for it, is called
detection; and the agent concerning whom such knowledge is obtained,
is said to be detected. The dangers, therefore, which may threaten an
offender from this quarter, depend, whatever they may be, on the event
of his detection; and may, therefore, be all of them comprised under the
article of the danger of detection.

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XXXVIII. The danger depending upon detection may be divided
again into two branches: 1. That which may result from any opposition
that may be made to the enterprise by persons on the spot; that is, at the
very time the enterprise is carrying on: 2. That which respects the legal
punishment, or to other suffering, that may await at a distance upon the
issue of the enterprise.
XXXIX. It may be worth calling to mind on this occasion, that
among the tutelary motives, which have been styled constant ones, there
are two of which the force depends (though not so entirely as the force
of the occasional ones which have been or just mentioned, yet in a great
measure) upon the circumstance of detection. These, it may be remem-
bered, are, the love of reputation, and the desire of amity. In proportion,
therefore, as the chance of being detected appears greater, these motives
will apply with the greater force: with the less force, as it appears less.
This is not the case with the two other standing tutelary motives, that of
benevolence, and that of religion.
XL. We are now in a condition to determine, with some degree of
precision, what is to be understood by the strength of a temptation , and
what indication it may give of the degree of mischievousness in a man’s
disposition in the case of any offence. When a man is prompted to en-
gage in any mischievous act, we will say, for shortness, in an offense,
the strength of the temptation depends upon the ratio between the force
of the seducing motives on the one hand, and such of the occasional
tutelary ones, as the circumstances of the case call forth into action, on
the other. The temptation, then, may be said to be strong, when the
pleasure or advantage to be got from the crime is such as in the eyes of
the offender must appear great in comparison of the trouble and danger
that appear to him to accompany the enterprise: slight or weak, when
that pleasure or advantage is such as must appear small in comparison
of such trouble and such danger. It is plain the strength of the temptation
depends not upon the force of the impelling (that is of the seducing)
motives altogether: for let the opportunity be more favourable, that is,
let the trouble, or any branch of the danger, be made less than before, it
will be acknowledged, that the temptation is made so much the stronger:
and on the other hand, let the opportunity become less favourable, or, in
other words, let the trouble, or any branch of the danger, be made greater
than before, the temptation will be so much the weaker.
Now, after taking account of such tutelary motives as have been
styled occasional, the only tutelary motives that can remain are those

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118/Jeremy Bentham
which have been termed standing ones. But those which have been termed
the standing tutelary motives, are the same that we have been styling
social. It follows, therefore, that the strength of the temptation, in any
case, after deducting the force of the social motives, is as the sum of the
forces of the seducing, to the sum of the forces of the occasional tutelary
motives.
XLI. It remains to be inquired, what indication concerning the mis-
chievousness or depravity of a man’s disposition is afforded by the
strength of the temptation, in the case where any offense happens to
have been committed. It appears, then, that the weaker the temptation
is, by which a man has been overcome, the more depraved and mischie-
vous it shows his disposition to have been. For the goodness of his dis-
position is measured by the degree of his sensibility to the action of the
social motives: in other words, by the strength of the influence which
those motives have over him: now, the less considerable the force is by
which their influence on him has been overcome, the more convincing is
the proof that has been given of the weakness of that influence.
Again, The degree of a man’s sensibility to the force of the social
motives being given, it is plain that the force with which those motives
tend to restrain him from engaging in any mischievous enterprise, will
be as the apparent mischievousness of such enterprise, that is, as the
degree of mischief with which it appears to him likely to be attended. In
other words, the less mischievous the offence appears to him to be, the
less averse he will be, as far as he is guided by social considerations, to
engage in it; the more mischievous, the more averse. If then the nature
of the offense is such as must appear to him highly mischievous, and yet
he engages in it notwithstanding, it shows, that the degree of his sensi-
bility to the force of the social motives is but slight; and consequently
that his disposition is proportionably depraved. Moreover, the less the
strength of the temptation was; the more pernicious and depraved does
it show his disposition to have been. For the less the strength of the
temptation was, the less was the force which the influence of those mo-
tives had to overcome: the clearer therefore is the proof that has been
given of the weakness of that influence.
XLII. From what has been said, it seems, that, for judging of the
indication that is afforded concerning the depravity of a man’s disposi-
tion by the strength of the temptation, compared with the mischievous-
ness of the enterprise, the following rules may be laid down:
Rule 1. The strength of the temptation being given, the mischie-

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