Principles of Morals and

Principles of Morals and Legislation/111
tion in those countries (such as perhaps are most of the countries of
Europe at present) in which its dictates respecting the conduct of a man
towards other men approach very nearly to a coincidence with those of
utility. The dictates of religion, in their application to the conduct of a
man in what concerns himself alone, seem in most European nations to
savour a good deal of the ascetic principle: but the obedience to such
mistaken dictates indicates not any such disposition as is likely to break
out into acts of pernicious tendency with respect to others. Instances in
which the dictates of religion lead a man into acts which are pernicious
in this latter view, seem at present to be but rare: unless it be acts of
persecution, or impolitic measures on the part of government, where the
law itself is either the principal actor or an accomplice in the mischief.
Ravaillac, instigated by no other motive than this, gave his country one
of the most fatal stabs that a country ever received from a single hand:
but happily the Ravaillacs are but rare. They have been more frequent,
however, in France than in any other country during the same period:
and it is remarkable, that in every instance it is this motive that has
produced them. When they do appear, however, nobody, I suppose, but
such as themselves, will be for terming a disposition, such as they mani-
fest, a good one. It seems hardly to be denied, but that they are just so
much the worse for their notions of religion; and that had they been left
to the sole guidance of benevolence, and the love of reputation, without
any religion at all, it would have been but so much the better for man-
kind. One may say nearly the same thing, perhaps, of those persons
who, without any particular obligation, have taken an active part in the
execution of laws made for the punishment of those who have the mis-
fortune to differ with the magistrate in matters of religion, much more of
the legislator himself, who has put it in their power. If Louis XIV had
had no religion, France would not have lost 800,000 of its most valu-
able subjects. The same thing may be said of the authors of the wars
called holy ones; whether waged against persons called Infidels or per-
sons branded with the still more odious name of Heretics. In Denmark,
not a great many years ago, a sect is said to have arisen, who, by a
strange perversion of reason, took it into their heads, that, by leading to
repentance, murder, or any other horrid crime, might be made the road
to heaven. It should all along, however, be observed, that instances of
this latter kind were always rare: and that in almost all the countries of
Europe, instances of the former kind, though once abundantly frequent,
have for some time ceased. In certain countries, however, persecution at

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112/Jeremy Bentham
home, or (what produces a degree of restraint, which is one part of the
mischiefs of persecution) I mean the disposition to persecute, whenso-
ever occasion happens, is not yet at an end: insomuch that if there is no
actual persecution, it is only because there are no heretics; and if there
are no heretics, it is only because there are no thinkers.
9
XXIV. 9. Where the tendency of the act is good, and the motive (as
before) is the dissocial one of ill-will. In this case the motive seems not
to afford any indication on either side. It is no indication of a good
disposition; but neither is it any indication of a bad one.
You have detected a baker in selling short weight: you prosecute
him for the cheat. It is not for the sake of gain that you engaged in the
prosecution; for there is nothing to be got by it: it is not from public
spirit: it is not for the sake of reputation; for there is no reputation to be
got by it: it is not in the view of pleasing the Deity: it is merely on
account of a quarrel you have with the man you prosecute. From the
transaction, as thus stated, there does not seem to be any thing to be said
either in favour of your disposition or against it. The tendency of the act
is good: but you would not have engaged in it, had it not been from a
motive which there seems no particular reason to conclude will ever
prompt you to engage in an act of the same kind again. Your motive is of
that sort which may, with least impropriety, be termed a bad one: but the
act is of that sort, which, were it engaged in ever so often, could never
have any evil tendency; nor indeed any other tendency than a good one.
By the supposition, the motive it happened to be dictated by was that of
ill-will: but the act itself is of such a nature as to have wanted nothing
but sufficient discernment on your part in order to have been dictated by
the most enlarged benevolence. Now, from a man’s having suffered him-
self to be induced to gratify his resentment by means of an act of which
the tendency is good, it by no means follows that he would be ready on
another occasion, through the influence of the same sort of motive, to
engage in any act of which the tendency is a bad one. The motive that
impelled you was a dissocial one: but what social motive could there
have been to restrain you ? None, but what might have been outweighed
by a more enlarged motive of the same kind. Now, because the dissocial
motive prevailed when it stood alone, it by no means follows that it
would prevail when it had a social one to combat it.
XXV. 10. Where the tendency of the act is bad, and the motive is
the dissocial one of malevolence. In this case these disposition it indi-
cates is of course a mischievous one.

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