Principles of Morals and

Principles of Morals and Legislation/101
number of those which were ever brought into the world by the love of
reputation. On the other hand, it is manifest, that with respect to the
power of operating in secret, the dictates of religion have the same ad-
vantage over those of the love of reputation, and the desire of amity, as
is possessed by the dictates of benevolence.
XLI. Happily, the dictates of religion seem to approach nearer and
nearer to a coincidence with those of utility every day. But why? Be-
cause the dictates of the moral sanction do so: and those coincide with
or are influenced by these. Men of the worst religions, influenced by the
voice and practice of the surrounding world, borrow continually a new
and a new leaf out of the book of utility: and with these, in order not to
break with their religion, they endeavour, sometimes with violence
enough, to patch together and adorn the repositories of their faith.
XLII. As to the self-regarding and dissocial motives, the order that
takes place among these, and the preceding one, in point of extra-re-
garding influence, is too evident to need insisting on. As to the order that
takes place among the motives, of the self-regarding class, considered in
comparison with one another, there seems to be no difference which on
this occasion would be worth mentioning. With respect to the dissocial
motive, it makes a difference (with regard to its extra-regarding effects)
from which of two sources it originates; whether from self-regarding or
from social considerations. The displeasure you conceive against a man
may be founded either on some act which offends you in the first in-
stance, or on an act which offends you no otherwise than because you
look upon it as being prejudicial to some other party on whose behalf
you interest yourself: which other party may be of course either a deter-
minate individual, or any assemblage of individuals, determinate or in-
determinate. It is obvious enough, that a motive, though in itself dissocial,
may, by issuing from a social origin, possess a social tendency; and that
its tendency, in this case, is likely to be the more social, the more en-
larged the description is of the persons whose interests you espouse.
Displeasure, venting itself against a man, on account of a mischief sup-
posed to be done by him to the public, may be more social in its effects
than any good-will, the exertions of which are confined to an individual.

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102/Jeremy Bentham
§ 5. 
Conflict among motives.
XLIII. When a man has it in contemplation to engage in any action, he
is frequently acted upon at the same time by the force of divers motives:
one motive, or set of motives, acting in one direction; another motive, or
set of motives, acting as it were in an opposite direction. The motives on
one side disposing him to engage in the action: those on the other, dis-
posing him not to engage in it. Now, any motive, the influence of which
tends to dispose him to engage in the action in question, may be termed
an impelling motive: any motive, the influence of which tends to dispose
him not to engage in it, a restraining motive. But these appellations may
of course be interchanged, according as the act is of the positive kind, or
the negative.
XLIV. It has been shown, that there is no sort of motive but may
give birth to any sort of action. It follows, therefore, that there are no
two motives but may come to be opposed to one another. Where the
tendency of the act is bad, the most common case is for it to have been
dictated by a motive either of the self-regarding, or of the dissocial class.
In such case the motive of benevolence has commonly been acting, though
ineffectually, in the character of a restraining motive.
XLV. An example may be of use, to show the variety of contending
motives, by which a man may be acted upon at the same time. Crillon, a
Catholic (at a time when it was generally thought meritorious among
Catholics to extirpate Protestants), was ordered by his king, Charles
IX. of France, to fall privately upon Coligny, a Protestant, and assassi-
nate him: his answer was, “Excuse me, Sire; but I’ll fight him with all
my heart.” Here, then, were all the three forces above mentioned, in-
cluding that of the political sanction, acting upon him at once. By the
political sanction, or at least so much of the force of it as such a man-
date, from such a sovereign, issued on such an occasion, might be sup-
posed to carry with it, he was enjoined to put Coligny to death in the
way of assassination: by the religious sanction, that is, by the dictates of
religious zeal, he was enjoined to put him to death in any way: by the
moral sanction, or in other words, by the dictates of honour, that is, of
the love of reputation, he was permitted (which permission,when coupled
with the mandates of his sovereign, operated, he conceived, as an in-
junction) to fight the adversary upon equal terms: by the dictates of
enlarged benevolence (supposing the mandate to be unjustifiable) he
was enjoined not to attempt his life in any way, but to remain at peace
with him: supposing the mandate to be unjustifiable, by the dictates of

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/103
private benevolence he was enjoined not to meddle with him at any rate.
Among this confusion of repugnant dictates, Crillon, it seems, gave the
preference, in the first place, to those of honour: in the next place, to
those of benevolence. He would have fought, had his offer been ac-
cepted; as it was not, he remained at peace.
Here a multitude of questions might arise. Supposing the dictates of
the political sanction to follow the mandate of the sovereign, of what
kind were the motives which they afforded him for compliance? The
answer is, of the self-regarding kind at any rate: inasmuch as, by the
supposition, it was in the power of the sovereign to punish him for non-
compliance, or reward him for compliance. Did they afford him the
motive of religion (I mean independently of the circumstance of heresy
above mentioned) the answer is, Yes, if his notion was, that it was God’s
pleasure he should comply with them; No, if it was not. Did they afford
him the motive of the love of reputation? Yes, if it was his notion that the
world would expect and require that he should comply with them: No, if
it was not. Did they afford him that of benevolence? Yes, if it was his
notion that the community would upon the whole be the better for his
complying with them: No, if it was not. But did the dictates of the politi-
cal sanction, in the case in question, actually follow the mandates of the
sovereign: in other words, was such a mandate legal? This we see is a
mere question of local jurisprudence, altogether foreign to the present
purpose.
XLVI. What is here said about the goodness and badness of mo-
tives, is far from being a mere matter of words. There will be occasion
to make use of it hereafter for various important purposes. I shall have
need of it for the sake of dissipating various prejudices, which are of
disservice to the community, sometimes by cherishing the flame of civil
dissensions, at other times, by obstructing the course of justice. It will
be shown, that in the case of many offences, the consideration of the
motive is a most material one: for that in the first place it makes a very
material difference in the magnitude of the mischief: in the next place,
that it is easy to be ascertained; and thence may be made a ground for a
difference in the demand for punishment: but that in other cases it is
altogether incapable of being ascertained; and that, were it capable of
being ever so well ascertained, good or bad, it could make no difference
in the demand for punishment: that in all cases, the motive that may
happen to govern a prosecutor, is a consideration totally immaterial:
whence maybe seen the mischievousness of the prejudice that is so apt

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