Principles of Morals and

94/Jeremy Bentham
stronger name for it than self-preservation, terming it necessity. 5. To
save yourself from drowning, you beat off an innocent man who has got
hold of the same plank. In this case your motive will in general be deemed
neither good nor bad, and it will be termed self-preservation, or neces-
sity, or the love of life. 6. To save your life from a gang of robbers, you
kill them in the conflict. In this case the motive may, perhaps, be deemed
rather laudable than otherwise, and, besides self-preservation, is styled
also self-defence. 7. A soldier is sent out upon a party against a weaker
party of the enemy: before he gets up with them, to save his life, he runs
away. In this case the motive will universally be deemed a contemptible
one, and will be called cowardice. Yet in all these various cases, the
motive is still the same. It is neither more nor less than self-preserva-
tion.
XXVIII. In particular, to the pains of exertion corresponds the mo-
tive, which, in a neutral sense, may be termed the love of ease, or by a
longer circumlocution, the desire of avoiding trouble. In a bad sense, it
is termed indolence. It seems to have no name that carries with it a good
sense.
1. To save the trouble of taking care of it, a parent leaves his child
to perish. In this case the motive will be deemed an abominable one,
and, because indolence will seem too mild a name for it, the motive will,
perhaps, be changed, and spoken of under some such term as cruelty. 2.
To save yourself from an illegal slavery, you make your escape. In this
case the motive will be deemed certainly not a bad one: and, because
indolence, or even the love of ease, will be thought too unfavourable a
name for it, it will, perhaps, be styled the love of liberty. 3. A mechanic,
in order to save his labour, makes an improvement in his machinery. In
this case, people will look upon his motive as a good one; and finding no
name for it that carries a good sense, they will be disposed to keep the
motive out of sight: they will speak rather of his ingenuity, than of the
motive which was the means of his manifesting that quality. Yet in all
these cases the motive is the same: it is neither more nor less than the
love of ease.
XXIX. It appears then that there is no such thing as any sort of
motive which is a bead one in itself: nor, consequently, any such thing as
a sort of motive, which in itself is exclusively a good one. And as to
their effects, it appears too that these are sometimes bad, at other times
either indifferent or good: and this appears to be the case with every sort
of motive. If any sort of motive then is either good or bad on the score

---

Principles of Morals and Legislation/95
of its effects, this is the case only on individual occasions, and with
individual motives; and this is the case with one sort of motive as well
as with another. If any sort of motive then can, in consideration of its
effects, be termed with any propriety a bad one, it can only be with
reference to the balance of all the effects it may have had of both kinds
within a given period, that is, of its most usual tendency.
XXX. What then? (it will be said) are not lust, cruelty, avarice, bad
motives? Is there so much as any one individual e occasion, in which
motives like these can be otherwise than bad? No, certainly: and yet the
proposition, that there is no one sort of motive but what will on many
occasions be a good one, is nevertheless true. The fact is, that these are
names which, if properly applied, are never applied but in the cases
where the motives they signify happen to be bad. The names of those
motives, considered apart from their effects, are sexual desire, displea-
sure, and pecuniary interest. To sexual desire, when the effects of it are
looked upon as bad, is given the name of lust. Now lust is always a bad
motive. Why? Because if the case be such, that the effects of the motive
are not bad, it does not go, or at least ought not to go, by the name of
lust. The case is, then, that when I say, “Lust is a bad motive,” it is a
proposition that merely concerns the import of the word lust; and which
would be false if transferred to the other word used for the same motive,
sexual desire. Hence we see the emptiness of all those rhapsodies of
common-place morality, which consist in the taking of such names as
lust, cruelty, and avarice, and branding them with marks of reprobation:
applied to the thing, they are false; applied to the name, they are true
indeed, but nugatory. Would you do a real service to mankind, show
them the cases in which sexual desire merits the name of lust; displea-
sure, that of cruelty; and pecuniary interest, that of avarice.
XXXI. If it were necessary to apply such denominations as good,
bad, and indifferent to motives, they might be classed in the following
manner, in consideration of the most frequent complexion of their ef-
fects. In the class of good motives might begs placed the articles of, 1.
Good-will. 2. Love of reputation. 3. Desire of amity. And, 4. Religion.
In the class of bad motives, 5. Displeasure. In the class of neutral or
indifferent motives, 6. Physical desire. 7. Pecuniary interest. 8. Love of
power. 9. Self-preservation; as including the fear of the pains of the
senses, the love of ease, and the love of life.
XXXII. This method of arrangement, however, cannot but be im-
perfect; and the nomenclature belonging to it is in danger of being falla-

---