Principles of Morals and

90/Jeremy Bentham
strictly under this head. It coincides properly with a motive of a differ-
ent denomination; viz., a kind of sympathy or good-will, which has the
Deity for its object. In a good sense, it is styled devotion, piety, and
pious zeal. In a bad sense, it is styled, in some cases, superstition, or
superstitious zeal: in other cases, fanaticism, or fanatic zeal: in a sense
not decidedly bad, because not appropriated to this motive, enthusiasm,
or enthusiastic zeal.
 1. In order to obtain the favour of the Supreme Being, a man assas-
sinates his lawful sovereign. In this case the motive is now almost uni-
versally looked upon as abominable, and is termed fanaticism: formerly
it was by great numbers accounted laudable, and was by them called
pious zeal. 2. In the same view, a man lashes himself with thongs. In this
case, in yonder house, the motive is accounted laudable, and is called
pious zeal: in the next house it is deemed contemptible, and called su-
perstition. 3. In the same view, a man eats a piece of bread (or at least
what to external appearance is a piece of bread) with certain ceremo-
nies. In this case, in yonder house, his motive is looked upon as laud-
able, and is styled piety and devotion: in the next house it is deemed
abominable, and styled superstition, as before: perhaps even it is ab-
surdly styled impiety. 4. In the same view, a man holds a cow by the tail
while he is dying. On the Thames the motive would in this case be deemed
contemptible, and called superstition. On the Ganges it is deemed meri-
torious, and called piety. 5. In the same view, a man bestows a large sum
in works of charity, or public utility. In this case the motive is styled
laudable, by those at least to whom the works in question appear to
come under this description: and by these at least it would be styled
piety. Yet in all these cases the motive is precisely the same: it is neither
more nor less than the motive belonging to the religious sanction.
XXV. To the pleasures of sympathy corresponds the motive which,
in a neutral sense, is termed good-will. The word sympathy may also be
used on this occasion: though the sense of it seems to be rather more
extensive. In a good sense, it is styled benevolence: and in certain cases,
philanthropy; and, in a figurative way, brotherly love; in others, human-
ity; in others, charity; in others, pity and compassion; in others, mercy;
in others, gratitude; in others, tenderness; in others, patriotism; in oth-
ers, public spirit. Love is also employed in this as in so many other
senses. In a bad sense, it has no name applicable to it in all cases: in
particular cases it is styled partiality. The word zeal, with certain epi-
thets prefixed to it, might also be employed sometimes on this occasion,

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/91
though the sense of it be more extensive; applying sometimes to ill as
well as to good will. It is thus we speak of party zeal, national zeal, and
public zeal. The word attachment is also used with the like epithets: we
also say family-attachment. The French expression, esprit de corps, for
which as yet there seems to be scarcely any name in English, might be
rendered, in some cases, though rather inadequately, by the terms cor-
poration spirit, corporation attachment, or corporation zeal.
1. A man who has set a town on fire is apprehended and committed:
out of regard or compassion for him, you help him to break prison. In
this case the generality of people will probably scarcely know whether
to condemn your motive or to applaud it: those who condemn your con-
duct, will be disposed rather to impute it to some other motive: if they
style it benevolence or compassion, they will be for prefixing an epithet,
and calling it false benevolence or false compassion. 2. The man is taken
again, and is put upon his trial: to save him you swear falsely in his
favour. People, who would not call your motive a bad one before, will
perhaps call it so now. 3. A man is at law with you about an estate: he
has no right to it: the judge knows this, yet, having an esteem or affec-
tion for your adversary, adjudges it to him. In this case the motive is by
every body deemed abominable, and is termed injustice and partiality.
4. You detect a statesman in receiving bribes: out of regard to the public
interest, you give information of it, and prosecute him. In this case, by
all who acknowledge your conduct to have originated from this motive,
your motive will be deemed a laudable one, and styled public spirit. But
his friends and adherents will not choose to account for your conduct in
any such manner: they will rather attribute it to party enmity. 5. You
find a man on the point of starving: you relieve him; and save his life. In
this case your motive will by every body be accounted laudable, and it
will be termed compassion, pity, charity, benevolence. Yet in all these
cases the motive is the same: it is neither more nor less than the motive
of good-will.
XXVI. To the pleasures of malevolence, or antipathy, corresponds
the motive which, in a neutral sense, is termed antipathy or displeasure:
and, in particular cases, dislike, aversion, abhorrence, and indignation:
in a neutral sense, or perhaps a sense leaning a little to the bad side, ill-
will: and, in particular cases, anger, wrath, and enmity. In a bad sense it
is styled, in different cases, wrath, spleen, ill-humour, hatred, malice,
rancour, rage, fury, cruelty, tyranny, envy, jealousy, revenge, misan-
thropy, and by other names, which it is hardly worth while to endeavour

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