Principles of Morals and

230/Jeremy Bentham
point of magnitude, be raised a great deal above that level. Thus it is,
wherever the danger of detection is, or, what comes to the same thing, is
likely to appear to be, so small, as to make the punishment appear in a
high degree uncertain. In this case it is necessary, as has been shown, if
punishment be at all applied, to raise it in point of magnitude as much as
it falls short in point of certainty. It is evident, however, that all this can
be but guess-work: and that the effect of such a proportion will be ren-
dered precarious, by a variety of circumstances: by the want of suffi-
cient promulgation on the part of the laws: by the particular circum-
stances of the temptation: and by the circumstances influencing the sen-
sibility of the several individuals who are exposed to it. Let the seducing
motives be strong, the offence then will at any rate be frequently com-
mitted. Now and then indeed, owing to a coincidence of circumstances
more or less extraordinary, it will be detected, and by that means pun-
ished. But for the purpose of example, which is the principal one, an act
of punishment, considered in itself, is of no use: what use it can be of,
depends altogether upon the expectation it raises of similar punishment,
in future cases of similar delinquency. But this future punishment, it is
evident, must always depend upon detection. If then the want of detec-
tion is such as must in general (especially to eyes fascinated by the force
of the seducing motives) appear too improbable to be reckoned upon,
the punishment, though it should be inflicted, may come to be of no use.
Here then will be two opposite evils running on at the same time, yet
neither of them reducing the quantum of the other: the evil of the disease
and the evil of the painful and inefficacious remedy. It seems to be partly
owing to some such considerations, that fornication, for example, or the
illicit commerce between the sexes, has commonly either gone altogether
unpunished, or been punished in a degree inferior to that in which, on
other accounts, legislators might have been disposed to punish it.
XIV. Secondly, with regard to the cases in which political punish-
ment, as applied to delinquency, may be unprofitable, in virtue of the
danger there may be of its involving the innocent in the fate designed
only for the guilty. Whence should this danger then arise? From the
difficulty there may be of fixing the idea of the guilty action: that is. of
subjecting it to such a definition as shall be clear and precise enough to
guard effectively against misapplication. This difficulty may arise from
either of two sources: the one permanent, to wit, the nature of the ac-
tions themselves: the other occasional, I mean the qualities of the men
who may have to deal with those actions in the way of government. In as

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/231
far as it arises from the latter of these sources, it may depend partly
upon the use which the legislator may be able to make of language;
partly upon the use which, according to the apprehension of the legisla-
tors the judge may be disposed to make of it. As far as legislation is
concerned, it will depend upon the degree of perfecting to which the arts
of language may have been carried, in the first place, in the nation in
general; in the next place. by the legislator in particular. It is to a sense
of this difficulty, as it should seem, that we may attribute the caution
with which most legislators have abstained from subjecting to censure,
on the part of the law, such actions as come under the notion of rude-
ness, for example, or treachery, or ingratitude. The attempt to bring acts
of so vague and questionable a nature under the control of law, will
argue either a very immature age, in which the difficulties which give
birth to that danger are not descried; or a very enlightened age, in which
they are overcome.
XV. For the sake of obtaining the clearer idea of the limits between
the art of legislation and private ethics, it may now be time to call to
mind the distinctions above established with regard to ethics in general.
The degree in which private ethics stands in need of the assistance of
legislation is different in the three branches of duty above distinguished.
Of the rules of moral duty, those which seem to stand least in need of the
assistance of legislation are the rules of prudence. It can only be through
some defect on the part of the understanding, if a man be ever deficient
in point of duty to himself. If he does wrong, there is nothing else that it
can be owing to but either some inadvertence or some mis-supposal
with regard to the circumstances on which his happiness depends. It is a
standing topic of complaint, that a man knows too little of himself. Be it
so: but is it so certain that the legislator must know more? It is plain,
that of individuals the legislator can know nothing: concerning those
points of conduct which depend upon the particular circumstances of
each individual, it is plain, therefore, that he can determine nothing to
advantage. It is only with respect to those broad lines of conduct in
which all persons, or very large and permanent descriptions of persons,
may be in a way to engage, that he can have any pretense for interfering;
and even here the propriety of his interference will, in most instances, lie
very open to dispute. At any rate, he must never expect to produce a
perfect compliance by the mere force of the sanction of which he is
himself the author. All he can hope to do, is to increase the efficacy of
private ethics, by giving strength and direction to the influence of the

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