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person’s payoff, but the penalty was not revealed to the others. subjects in this
experimental condition increased their withdrawal levels when compared to
the outcomes obtained when face-to-face communication was allowed and
no rule was imposed. other scholars have also found that externally imposed
regulation that would theoretically lead to higher joint returns “crowded
out” voluntary behavior to cooperate (see frey and oberholzer-Gee 1997;
reeson and tisdell 2008).
fehr and leibbrandt (2008) conducted an interesting set of public goods
experiments with fishers who harvest from an “open-access” inland lake
in northeastern Brazil. they found that a high percentage (87 percent) of
fishers contributed in the first period of the field experiment and that contri-
butions leveled off in the remaining periods. fehr and leibbrandt examined
the mesh size of the nets used by individual fishermen and found that those
who contributed more in the public goods experiment used nets with bigger
mesh sizes. larger mesh sizes allow young fish to escape, grow larger, and
reproduce at a higher level than if they are caught when they are still small.
in other words, cooperation in the field experiment was consistent with
observed cooperation related to a real cPr dilemma. they conclude that
the “fact that our laboratory measure for other-regarding preferences
predicts field behavior increases our confidence about the behavioral rel-
evance of other-regarding preferences gained from laboratory experiments”
(ibid.: 17).
in summary, experiments on cPrs and public goods have shown that
many predictions of the conventional theory of collective action do not hold.
More cooperation occurs than predicted, “cheap talk” increases cooperation,
and subjects invest in sanctioning free-riders. experiments also establish that
motivational heterogeneity exists in harvesting or contribution decisions as
well as decisions on sanctioning.
6. stUdyinG coMMon-Pool resoUrce ProBleMs in the field
having conducted extensive meta-analyses of case studies and experiments,
we also needed to undertake field studies where we could draw on the iad
framework to design questions to obtain consistent information about key
theoretically important variables across sites.
A. Comparing Farmer- and Government-Managed Irrigation Systems in Nepal
an opportunity to visit nepal in 1988 led to the discovery of a large number
of written studies of farmer-built and maintained irrigation systems as well
as some government-constructed and managed systems. Ganesh shivakoti,
Paul Benjamin, and i were able to revise the cPr coding manual so as to
include variables of specific relevance to understanding irrigation systems in
a new coding manual for the nepal irrigation and institutions (niis) project.
We coded existing cases and again found numerous “missing variables” not
discussed by the original author. colleagues made several trips to nepal to
visit previously described systems in written case studies to fill in missing data
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and verify the data in the original study. While in the field, we were able to
add new cases to the data set (Benjamin et al. 1994).
in undertaking analysis of this large data set, lam (1998) developed three
performance measures that could be applied to all systems: (1) the physical
condition of irrigation systems, (2) the quantity of water available to farmers
at the tail end of a system at different seasons of the year, and (3) the agricul-
tural productivity of the systems. controlling for environmental differences
among systems, lam found that irrigation systems governed by the farmers
themselves perform significantly better on all three performance measures.
on the farmer-governed systems, farmers communicate with one another at
annual meetings and informally on a regular basis, develop their own agree-
ments, establish the positions of monitors, and sanction those who do not
conform to their own rules. consequently, farmer-managed systems are likely
to grow more rice, distribute water more equitably, and keep their systems
in better repair than government systems. While farmer systems do vary in
performance, few perform as poorly as government systems – holding other
relevant variables constant.
over time, colleagues have visited and coded still further irrigation
systems in nepal. the earlier findings regarding the higher level of perfor-
mance of farmer-managed systems was again confirmed using the expanded
database containing 229 irrigation systems (Joshi et al. 2000; shivakoti and
ostrom 2002). our findings are not unique to nepal. scholars have carefully
documented effective farmer-designed and operated systems in many coun-
tries including Japan (aoki 2001), india (Meinzen-dick 2007; Bardhan
2000), and sri lanka (Uphoff 1991).
B. Studying Forests around the World
in 1992, dr. Marilyn hoskins, who headed the forest, trees and People
Program at the food and agriculture organization (fao) of the United
nations, asked colleagues at the Workshop to draw on our experience in
studying irrigation systems to develop methods for assessing the impact of
diverse forest governance arrangements in multiple countries. two years of
intense development and review by ecologists and social scientists around the
world led to the development of ten research protocols to obtain reliable in-
formation about users and forest governance as well as about the ecological
conditions of sampled forests. a long-term collaborative research network
– the international forestry resources and institutions (ifri) research
program – was established with centers now located in Bolivia, colombia,
Guatemala, india, kenya, Mexico, nepal, tanzania, thailand, Uganda,
and the United states, with new centers being established in ethiopia and
china (see Gibson, Mckean, and ostrom 2000; Poteete and ostrom 2004;
Wollenberg et al. 2007). ifri is unique among efforts to study forests as it
is the only interdisciplinary long-term monitoring and research program
studying forests in multiple countries owned by governments, private
organizations, and communities.
forests are a particularly important form of common-pool resource given