Russia's Attitudes towards the eu: Political Aspects

Prospects of cooperative interaction

It is clear that all these theoretical speculations can vary within rather broad spectrum. This in itself promotes 'wait and see' approach: Russia should be prudent until things clear up and not be in a rush to define its position.

But there is also an alternative point of view proceeding from a possibility of developing very high level of interaction between Russia and CESDP, up to participating in joint actions and setting up joint structures. Thus, a prominent analyst argues in favour of establishing a joint Russia EU body for dealing with security and defence, the one that would be 'modeled' upon Russia NATO Permanent Joint Council⁷⁸.

With such prospects in mind, Russia should intensify its efforts to be involved in CESDP. And it should act quickly while this new policy of the EU and its modus operandi are still being shaped because when this process is over and the rules of the game are set it will be very difficult to change them afterwards. In other words, there is still a possibility today for Russia to influence the final outcome of CESDP development process while tomorrow it will be too late and Russia will be forced to adapt to what has been created without its involvement and participation.

Perhaps this approach contains somewhat exaggerated notions of Russia's capabilities to have leverage on the process of shaping the Common European Security and Defence Policy'. However, it contains a principle orientation on cooperative interaction between Russia and CESDP. The logic promoting such interaction appeals to a number of arguments, all pointing to the fact that it could be a common interest of the EU and Russia:

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  First, Russia might offer the EU a certain potential to assist militarily in the CESDP missions—for instance, with transport aviation, satellite communication, observation and navigation. It is true that there are various (including negative) assessments of Russian eventual contribution and the degree of its compatibility with the EU's assets. However, the issue is worth serious analysis, especially in the light of considerable shortages of the EU in some areas that are of key importance in the context of CESDP, such as airlift.
  
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  Secondly, the decision of the EU to promote a non-military component of crisis management opens one more area for cooperation with Russia. During the past 10 years its special Ministry for Emergency Situations has acquired considerable experience that could be of use for CESDP rescue operations.
  
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  Thirdly, for Russia crisis management in its vicinity is becoming increasingly relevant. As it was already mentioned, there may be serious political problems with respect to the eventual involvement of the EU with 'Petersberg missions' into the post-Soviet space. But provided these political problems are settled, Russia might find cooperation worthwhile in terms of developing more effective and consolidated efforts.
  
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  Fourthly, effectiveness is not the only thing that might matter in Russia's interaction with the CESDP. There may be a case for a hypothesis that Russia in general could find itself closer to the missions designated to the EU rather than to the USA. According to a slightly schematic vision, the CESDP heralded a certain division of labour between the USA and the EU, with the former focusing upon major conflicts (like in the Gulf war) and the latter on crisis-management (Bosnia-type operations)⁷⁹. Yet, a perspective of being involved in a major conflict with the West is meaningless for the post-cold war Russia; in addition, such a risk might be believed to be neutralized by Russia's nuclear potential, even if it is eroding and becoming obsolete. Crisis management, on the contrary, represents a more realistic challenge that might be associated with various potential threats ranging from civilian riots to separatist violence to terrorist intrusion from outside Russia. In a sense, even the military operations in Chechnya could be ranked into this category. If so, this means that Russia might have additional reasons for considering CESDP crisis management as deserving closer attention and by no means incompatible with Russian armed forces' missions.
  
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  Fifth, even more meaningful are the political aspects of such a cooperative endeavour. The area of crisis management opens the way for truly equal cooperation, and this might be politically and psychologically important for overcoming some of the residual instincts inherited from the period of the cold war. Indeed, it is something relatively new; there is no burden of the past; and the agenda is less controversial (if compared with the task of transforming common defence into a different pattern). Furthermore, the fact that it is not yet defined completely might be a positive element in terms of mutual accommodation.
  

It is true that here, as anywhere else, there could be a gap between theoretical arguments and their implementation into practice. In particular, it became clear in the context of the crisis in Macedonia in 2001.

Indeed, this could have been the right case for CESDP to act—when the US/NATO was unwilling to send more forces to the Balkans⁸⁰, whereas there were ideas about the EU to get involved⁸¹. Meanwhile, Russia's comments on developments in and around Macedonia were focused upon the scandalous failure (or even more scandalous lack of desire) of NATO-led armed forces deployed in the area to prevent or neutralize the intensifying hostilities. Less attention, at least publicly, was paid to what could be an alternative to NATO military role in the area. One might assume, however, that anti-US, anti-NATO and pro-EU elements in Russia's logic would promote Moscow's positive attitude towards eventual involvement of the EU.

Politically, joint EU-Russia efforts to settle the crisis did not look as something impossible. Moscow, searching to re-establish its reduced positions in the Balkans, attempted to promote its own involvement in Macedonia. Noteworthy, when President Putin participated in the session of the European Council in Stockholm in March 2001, President Boris Traikovsky of Macedonia was another invitee to this EU summit. It was perhaps not accidentally that the idea of sending the EU crisis-management force to Macedonia was raised by François Léotard, CFSP envoy to this country, during his visit to Moscow in September 2001. In principle, one could hypothesize that this was the first case when Russia-CESDP interaction could have been translated into practice.

This did not happen because the EU turned out unprepared for such kind of independent involvement—both technically and politically. This perhaps even could not have happened as a joint Russian EU endeavor at that stage. A sine qua non requirement for Russia to engage in building a cooperative pattern with the EU on CESDP-related matters seemed to consist in overcoming the inertia and the temptation to consider the problem exclusively or predominantly in the context of relations with NATO. There was (and there still is) a need to recognize that military-related cooperation with the EU is simply not feasible without restoring interaction with NATO and, even more so, when this cooperation is presented as an antithesis thereto⁸².

It looks like the official policy of Russia is evolving exactly in this direction. For instance, the Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union 2000-2010 officially presented by Vladimir Putin at the EU-Russia summit in Helsinki in October 1999 contained a provision that the cooperation with the EU in the area of security 'could become, inter alia, a counterbalance to NATO centrism in Europe'. A year later, at the above-mentioned EU-Russia summit in Paris, the Russian president did not even mention the issue. It was also absent in the Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation adopted in June 2000—this document just impassively stated that the evolving EU's military and political dimension 'should become the subject of special attention'.

This allowed to move rather quickly on a political level, with the peak of the process reached at the above mentioned Paris summit of Russia and the EU. Since that, the theme of Russia's eventual involvement in the EU crisis-management operations has been routinely mentioned in practically all important meetings of the two sides. However, the vagueness of these references has also become a routine; their future-oriented character could have inspired hopes, if it had not underlined the spectacular absence of real progress. In any case, it is quite remarkable that the EU official comments look rather inspiring in this regard⁸³ whereas Russia seems somehow disappointed.

Indeed, the Russian side, after having made its political choice with respect to the CESDP, was anticipating a considerably higher pace of rapprochement that would allow discussing (and taking decisions on) practical steps rather than general principles. In this particular respect, the Russia EU summit in Moscow (May 2001) provoked rather skeptical comments, since the overall positive assessments of this meeting⁸⁴ did not conceal its failure in producing tangible results that it had seemed legitimate to expect after the political breakthrough at the previous summit in Paris.

Russian analysts point to a paradoxical reversal of roles that have occurred since the Paris summit. Before that, Russia had focused upon political aspects of eventual interaction with CESDP and maintained a certain vagueness in its attitude. Nowadays, it is eager to promote its own practical involvement and to prompt visible results thereof. The EU, on the contrary, is suspected to become more reluctant with respect to the development of the whole pattern because it has got Moscow's political support of the CESDP in principle but apprehends political implications of Russia's eventual involvement. According to this vision⁸⁵:

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  The EU is focused upon operational tasks of establishing rapid reaction capability by 2003⁸⁶, whereas the ability of Russia to contribute to this process in practical terms is assessed skeptically.
  
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  Neither there is enthusiasm about Russia's possible participation in, or influence on decision-making with respect to the CESDP.
  
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  Russian proposal to delimitate the area of eventual crisis-management runs against the intention to keep broader options for the CESDP—in any case, not to restrict its area of responsibility by the EU zone.
  
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  Or, another source of troubles could be Russia's insistence on 'equal cooperation' in crisis-management.
  
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  Also, the very fact of Russian involvement could complicate the Atlanticist parameters of the CESDP (related, in particular, to NATO and the USA).
  
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  Finally (and perhaps most importantly), there are concerns that Russia, still proceeding from its own political considerations, might 'politicize' the whole agenda of the CESDP.
  

Noteworthy, such skeptical assessments seem to ignore the development of the EU position on the eventual involvement of non-member-states in the crisis-management carried out with CESDP tools. Indeed, conceptually, the CESDP is becoming more open. In particular, since the Nice summit, Russia has been offered a place in the committee of contributors should it wish to participate in an EU-lead operation.

A real breakthrough in terms of Russia's cooperation with, and involvement in the CESDP will most probably require going beyond the pattern of this bilateral interaction. This by no means seems an improbable proposition. Noteworthy, the idea of a tri-lateral NATO—EU—Russia co-operation in crisis management has been first tentatively (although unofficially) formulated by Russian diplomats. The problem could be put in a radically altered context if the new spirit of cooperation emerging after terrorist attacks of 11 September in New York and Washington prompts the overall changes in Russia's relations with the West and makes them irreversible.

If CESDP–Russia interaction evolves into a tangible international pattern, this could have at least two extremely important international implications.

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  It would be the best guarantee against suspicions, mistrust and concerns that are still persisting in Russian-European agenda. Russia's involvement in the system of military and political relations in Europe, which is presently being shaped around and on the basis of the EU, is more important than cultivation of somewhat flimsy image of 'common European architecture'.
  

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  In terms of longer-term prospects, it could be the nucleus of a globally oriented mechanism of crisis management that functions well beyond Europe.