Russia's Attitudes towards the eu: Political Aspects

Reservations and uncertainties

Thus, confusion and lack of clarity about CESDP is not an exclusively Russian policy's monopoly. For the EU, the problem of its own military dimension's correlation with NATO seems to be even more sensitive and controversial. It is worth mentioning that other questions arising within the EU are remarkably similar to those that the Russians are asking themselves. However, this certainly does not mean that 'Russian questions' fail to highlight some specifically Russian concerns and sensitivities.

For instance, what will be the impact of CESDP on the status of neutral countries, which are members of the European Union but are not part of NATO (such as Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Ireland)? If CESDP is going to be closely linked to NATO, will it result in those countries drifting towards membership in the Alliance (even if only de facto rather than de jure)? Will their neutrality become formal or not?

Or, there is another uncertain aspect of the problem: where will the EU intend to use the crisis management mechanism it is presently developing? It is clear that the first and obvious choice would be the Balkans—in case the instability there persists or even becomes greater. But what else will be within the scope of CESDP? The question, as some analysts believe, is by no mean theoretical, as CESDP, in order to be credible, will have to prove its validity somewhere sooner rather than later.

Yet, if the area of operation of the CESDP is unofficially defined as covering an area with a radius of 4000 kilometres from Brussels, then it might reach not only the Balkans or North Africa, but also post-Soviet territories, which is certainly a sensitive issue for Russia. Furthermore, if the application of the CESDP is considered appropriate in Nagorny Karabah, Abkhazia or the Transdniester area, would it not mean that the set of instruments being developed now will be exclusively (or mainly) oriented towards post-Soviet geopolitical space? In fact, even if there were nobody in the EU who would really think along this line, Russia's alarmists would have the impression that their country is being squeezed out of the regions vital to its national interests—and this impression would be directly linked to CESDP.

Another issue that may not be indifferent to Russia concerns the impact of the CESDP on the nature and scale of military preparations. They will inevitably have to alter in terms of scale and qualitative characteristics if the EU intends to acquire independent military capability. The EU member-states will have to focus seriously on restructuring their armed forces and spend more on purchasing modern military hardware, so that not to face again a situation similar to Kosovo case where Europe's participation was more than modest (whereas the US Air Force, for instance, accounted for 80 per cent of all combat sorties). Meanwhile, the intensification of military preparations in the EU countries may be taken by Russia as not a very reassuring sign—especially against the backdrop of uncertainties about how the ever-increasing capabilities are going to be used.

In Russian eyes, there are other questions that are still open, and some of them will perhaps remain so at least for some time. For instance:

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  Will the CESDP retain a crisis management function, or should it be considered a first step towards collective defence?
  
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  To what extent will it be autonomous from NATO—both politically and in terms of fulfilling its own missions (strategic planning, intelligence, infrastructure, and so on)?
  
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  Will it increase the role of military factors in European developments?
  
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  To what extent might it change the character of the EU—turning it from a civilian actor to a military one?
  
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  Whether the CESDP will always be in accordance with international law? Is there a prospect for it become just a tool for multiplying 'Kosovo models'?
  

Such questions, under certain political circumstances, could generate alarmist perceptions in almost hysterical proportions. In principle, this logic could even make a case that CESDP is potentially 'more dangerous than NATO'. A quotation illustrating this approach runs as follows: 'Behind all the EU's statements about the need to make a military choice there is just the idea of creating a powerful European strike force entrusted with functions that geographically would greatly exceed NATO's capabilities. […] As it was the case of NATO in the Balkans, armed European Union will act in accordance with its own desire while the UN and its peacekeeping contingents will basically become irrelevant'⁷⁶.

To be sure, this is a marginal point of view. But even if such extreme approaches are put aside, the question about CESDP's long-term prospects still remains. There may be wide-ranging views on this point in Russia. To make things simpler, the question may be formulated in a surrealistic way: could militarily strong 'united Europe', even independent in its decisions from the United States, become the same political challenge to Russia as NATO was considered to be in the Soviet time? Or to turn into an existential challenge, like the one represented by China?

The analysts from the Russian institute for strategic studies, a well-known research establishment with a solid unbiased reputation, give the following answer: the CESDP plans 'should remain an object of Russia's most serious attention, [because they] envisage the development of armed forces under the EU control with such qualitative and quantitative characteristics that for the first time during the last 50 years would allow force projection beyond the member-states. As far as possible directions of this force projection are concerned, Russia's experience, over many centuries, of relations with West European and Central European countries does not give it grounds to rely completely on the words of these countries' official representatives. […] Especially because the words such as 'Caucasus', 'Black Sea', 'oil' that had been pronounced by some Western European analysts, suggest certain thoughts. Taking into account the 'deeds' of some Western Europeans [in the Balkans or in the Gulf], the character of these thoughts cannot be complacent'⁷⁷.