The eu’s Legitimacy in the Eye of the Beholders

Chapter 8 – The French Discourse

The final discourse is the French one. The findings of the French newspapers Le Figaro and Libération are presented in the same way as the previous discourses.⁸⁹

8.1 – General Findings

Both French newspapers published only a few articles during period one. Libération was a low point in the search efforts with only 4 articles and Le Figaro was no success either with 13. These limited findings turned out not to be the result of unsuitable keywords or some other methodological error, as one might think, because in the second period the same keywords turned up more articles than The Independent published all together. In period two, Le Figaro published 31 and Libération 27 articles. The total number of articles was 44 for Le Figaro and 31 for Libération.

The content analysis of the articles from Le Figaro lead to 86 observations in period one and 220 in period two. This brings the total number of observations in Le Figaro to 306. Libération’s four articles contained 18 observations. The second period compensated for this meagre result with 165 observations. Libération had 183 observations in total, which is more than The Independent.

The French newspapers were the most negative in their overall judgement of the EU. Le Figaro published three negative articles: two in period one (July 15, 2000 and December 12, 2000) and one in period two (March 2, 2005). Libération is more negative with three articles as well – one during period 1 (May 4, 2001) and two during period 2 (March 17, 2005 and June 1, 2005) –, but on a smaller population. This brings the percentages to 93,3% of the articles positive in Le Figaro, whilst in Libération 91,7% is positive.

The observations’ evaluation of legitimacy is once again opposite to the general judgement of the European project. For most observations are negative in their evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. No major shifts took place between the periods. Overall, the French percentage of negative evaluations lies between the Dutch and British percentage.

Table 8.1: French Distribution of Judgements

Judgement/Period	Period One	Period Two	Overall
Positive	17,3%	19,7%	19,2%
Negative	82,7%	80,3%	80,8%

8.2 – Facets and Judgements of Legitimacy

As in the previous discourses the EU is supported as a whole, but most observations are negative in their evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. Thus we turn once again to the different facets to see what role each category plays in the evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy.

8.2.1 – Dimensions and Judgements of Legitimacy

As in the previous discourses we will first investigate the role dimensional conceptualisation plays in the EU’s legitimacy deficit. More than half the observations use a universalist conception of legitimacy. A nationalist conceptualisation characterises most of the other observations, but, like in the other discourses, there is also a marginal number of observations that combine both dimensions.

Table 8.2: French Distribution of Dimensions

Dimension/Period	Period One	Period Two	Overall
Universalist	56,7%	58,2%	57,9%
Nationalist	41,3%	38,7%	39,3%
Both	1,9%	3,1%	2,9%

The impact of the dimensions on the evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy is stable. Observations characterised by a universalist concept of legitimacy lead the most often to a negative evaluation. Those using a nationalist conception also lead mostly to a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy, but less often in comparison.

Table 8.3: French Dimension * Judgement Crosstabulation

Dimension/Judgement	Positive Evaluation	Negative Evaluation
Universalist	17,3%	82,7%
Nationalist	20,8%	79,2%
Both	35,7%	64,3%

If we compare the distribution within the categories to the French average (Table 8.1; The overall percentage) we find something interesting. The universalist conceptualisation of legitimacy is more often negative than the French average, whilst a nationalist perspective is more positive. This is in line with the other discourses, but the difference is only very marginal, respectively 1,9% more negative and 1,6% more positive, unlike the other discourses where the universalist conceptualisation is much more negative and nationalist conceptualisation is much more positive.

8.2.2 – Components and Judgements of Legitimacy

The role of the different components within the French discourse is the next subject of analysis. The French focus shifts away from throughput legitimacy to more observations focussing on both input and output legitimacy in period two. Overall, just over half the observations focus on input legitimacy. Nearly a third of the observations focus on output legitimacy and the rest of the observations on throughput legitimacy.
Table 8.4: French Distribution of Components

Component/Period	Period One	Period Two	Overall
Input	48,1%	53,5%	52,4%
Throughput	24,0%	14,0%	16,2%
Output	27,9%	32,5%	31,5%

The distribution of judgments within the components is next, but first some important shifts. The observations that focus on throughput legitimacy were more often negative in period two (an increase of 10,4%). Those focussing on output legitimacy, on the other hand, become more often positive (18,8%). Overall, observations focusing on output legitimacy lead most often to a positive evaluation compared to the other focuses, but still most observations are negative. The observations focussing on throughput legitimacy lead the most often to a negative evaluation, but also those focussing on input legitimacy are often negative in their evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy.

Table 8.5: French Component * Judgement Crosstabulation

Component/Judgement	Positive Evaluation	Negative evaluation
Input	14,5%	85,5%
Throughput	8,9%	91,1%
Output	32,5%	67,5%

Now let us compare the distribution within different components to the French average. A focus on throughput legitimacy leads more often to a negative evaluation than average. To a lesser extent so does a focus on input legitimacy. Like in the other discourses, observations focussing on output legitimacy lead more often to a positive observation compared to the national average.

8.2.3 – Models and Judgements of Legitimacy

Thus we arrive at the final facet: the models and their relationship to the evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. The discourse is relatively stable in this regard. A majority of observations, more than half, focus on direct legitimacy. Just over a quarter of the observations do not use a model of a political order to assess the EU’s legitimacy. In third place come observations that focus on indirect legitimacy. And finally a marginal number of observations combine both models of political order.
Table 8.6: French Distribution of Models

Model/Period	Period One	Period Two	Overall
Neither	25,0%	25,7%	25,6%
Direct	55,8%	57,4%	57,1%
Indirect	17,3%	15,8%	16,2%
Both	1,9%	1,0%	1,2%

The distribution of evaluations within different models is the same in both periods. Overall, the majority of observations that focuses on direct legitimacy lead to a negative evaluation. Those focussing on indirect legitimacy are also often negative in their evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. Those not using a model of political order are the least often negative in comparison, but they are overall more often negative than positive.

Table 8.7: French Model * Judgement Crosstabulation

Model/Judgement	Positive Evaluation	Negative Evaluation
Neither	35,2%	64,8%
Direct	12,9%	87,1%
Indirect	16,5%	83,5%
Both	16,7%	83,3%

Compared to the average French distribution of judgments, only observations that do not use a model lead less often to a negative evaluation. Those focussing on direct legitimacy lead more often to a negative evaluation than the French average. These two findings are in line with the other discourses. The French discourse stands out, because observations with a focus on indirect legitimacy lead more often to a negative evaluation than the French average. In the other discourses, a focus on indirect legitimacy means a more positive evaluation than the national average.

8.2.4 – Conclusions on Facets and Judgements of Legitimacy

In the French discourse, once again the category with the most observations – a universalist conceptualisation, a focus on input legitimacy, and a focus on direct legitimacy – lead more often to a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy than the national average. Again both a universalist conceptualisation and a focus on direct legitimacy lead the most often to a negative evaluation within their facet, and also again a focus on throughput legitimacy leads more often to negative evaluation then a focus on input legitimacy.

Secondly, also in line with the other discourses observations using either both dimensions in their conceptualisation of legitimacy or combing both models are rare.

Thirdly, all non-marginal categories in the French discourse lead more often to a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy than a positive one.

Fourthly, the relationship between dimensional conceptualisation and evaluation is much more in line with the national expectation than in the other discourses where the use of universalist concept of legitimacy is clearly more negative and nationalist ones more positive than the national average.

The final conclusion comes from the model-judgement relationship. Observations with a focus on indirect legitimacy lead more often to a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy than the national average. This is interesting, because it sets France apart from the other discourses where such a focus leads to a more positive evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy than the national average.