The eu’s Legitimacy in the Eye of the Beholders

Chapter 10 – The Reasons: The Denial of Identity and Reality

Although usually couched in terms of sovereignty and national identity, the real question at the heart of the Europe debate has always been one of political economy.

David Clark¹²⁹
We should see Brussels for what it is: a way of tackling problems in common, settling disputes between traditionally fractious neighbours and applying the rule of law to agreements that have been entered into. It serves British interests, and if we didn't have it, we would have to invent it.

Timothy Garton Ash¹³⁰

The European Union is the result of a project that started out as a way to address the problems of a ‘broken’ continent and it has grown into the means of dealing with issues arising from a complex and interdependent world. The European level of governance though lacks legitimacy and to understand why and possibly help overcome this situation we have analysed the discourse on the EU’s legitimacy in three Member States. This brings us to the central research question:
What are the reasons for the European Union’s legitimacy deficit

and how can this deficit be overcome?

10.1 – Determining the Reasons for the Deficit

The answers to the research questions are the first step toward answering the first part of the central research question. Step two is a reflection on the answers to hypotheses. These two steps give us the answer to the first part of the central question.

10.1.1 – The Diverse Deficits

First to refresh our memories the research questions are:

1. 
   How is the modern nation-state legitimised?
   
2. 
   What are the different facets that form the legitimacy of a political order?
   
3. 
   What is the influence of the mass media on the legitimacy of a political order?
   
4. 
   How will the EU’s legitimacy deficit be investigated?
   
5. 
   How is the EU’s legitimacy perceived in the public discourse in the Netherlands?
   
6. 
   How is the EU’s legitimacy perceived in the public discourse in the United Kingdom?
   
7. 
   How is the EU’s legitimacy perceived in the public discourse in France?
   
8. 
   What are the similarities and differences between these public discourses?
   

The first question was answered by approaching legitimacy from a historical perspective. Legitimacy is a consensus among the governor(s) and governed on the right to rule. The modern nation-state’s legitimacy is the result of a mixture of universalist republicanism, which includes ‘unbound’ democratic principles, and nationalist republicanism, which territorialised and divided people along state lines.

On the basis of the second question, three different facets were distinguished to the legitimacy of a political order: dimensions (universalist and nationalist), components (input, throughput and output) and models (direct and indirect). In theory and (national) reality both dimensions, input, throughput and direct legitimacy play an important role in the legitimation of the nation-state. This combination applied to the EU is the perspective of multi-level government, but in reality the EU is emerging as a political order of multi-level governance: a possible mismatch between the (implicit) theoretical conceptualisation of legitimacy and reality came in sight.

The third research question made us take a closer look at the role of the mass media. The legitimacy of a political order is a consensus, which is mainly established through public discourse. In modern society, the mass media is the mediator that brings the public discourse to the majority of the people, but its role is critised. Several shortcomings can increase the EU’s legitimacy deficit, but there are also ways in which they can be overcome.

The fourth research question is methodological. The EU’s legitimacy deficit was investigated by analysing the articles published in the two national, quality newspapers in three countries during two periods of a year on the role of different facets play in perception and the influence thereof on the evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. Also three hypotheses were formulated on the basis of the theoretical framework.

In answer to the fifth, sixth, seventh research question, we saw that the Dutch elites perceive the legitimacy deficit from the perspective of (future) federalisation, but the people are not convinced of its legitimacy. The British fear the superstate perspective. One group seems sure this will not happen – the Blairight Gaullists –, whilst the others fear submerging in a future superstate – the Europhobes. The traditional proponents of the EU in France, the Gaullist, are becoming Euro-sceptics. They supported the EU for as long as it was ‘theirs’, but now perceive it as a threat to their sovereignty: political power. The French federalists perceive the EU’s legitimacy deficit as a result of too little democratisation and too many Anglo-Saxon liberal policies.

The eighth research question lead to a comparison of the three discourses. Even though there are the similarities, the specific analysis and debate on the deficit differs per country and even within countries. There are different perceptions of the deficit in the countries and therefore it might be more accurate to refer to the EU’s legitimacy deficits.

10.1.2 – Identity, Reality and the Mass Media

The three hypotheses uncovered several insights into the reasons for the EU’s legitimacy deficit. First, the EU might have a democratic deficit from the federalist perspective, because they interpretate the lack of support as a lack of popular mandate. Therefore they call for more (direct) democracy and transparency. On the basis of Hont’s analysis a different interpretation of the problem is possible, which is more in line with the findings. The lack of support is not the result of a lack of democracy, but a lack of identification. The state is not easily cared for, but through nationalism nation-states create(d) a feeling of sameness and representation that nurtured attachment to the state. The democratic deficit is a (federalist) misinterpretation of the gap between the EU and its citizens.¹³¹ When people say the EU is too far away: They are not primarily, if at all, calling for more influence or participation, but that they cannot identify with it. This explains why the EU is often perceived as (a) foreign (invader). This lack of identification means the EU’s legitimacy deficit is a ‘nationalist deficit’

The national identity is a powerful means to raise support for the state, but it is now the cause of a clash between state-interests and the population. These two elements of nationalist republicanism find themselves at odds with one another on the subject of the EU. The state’s interests lie in the EU, but ‘the national identity’ feels threatened. One could ironically conclude that the ‘monster of nationalism has turned against its master: the state.’

The relationship though is more complex. On the one hand, the EU is necessary to solve the problems the people want to have solved, but at the same time the nation cannot identify with this ‘instrument’. On the other hand, the states need the EU to stay influential and competitive in a global age, but at the same time, the nation-states do not want surrender their power and claim their national sovereignty. The (nation-)state and the nation(/people) will find themselves aligned and opposition when it comes to the EU depending on the issue. The national identity and national sovereignty will thus emerge/be invoked or not depending on the situation.

This brings us to the second hypothesis. The EU is an emerging political order of multi-level governance, but this reality and its possible implications for the (theoretical) conceptualisation of legitimacy are almost completely absent from the discourse. This absence has two sides to it. On the one hand, there is the multi-level government perspective or those who want the EU to become a federal (super)state. The problem is the EU is not a level of government, and it is not very likely to become a federation any time soon either. First of all, the heads of states are unlikely to transfer all their authority – state power¹³² –, and secondly, as the nationalist deficit shows those governed do not and probably will not any time soon accept this new authority. National identities are still strong, and their denial could be harmful and even dangerous.¹³³ See here the two elements of nationalist republicanism and their complex relationship emerge again. Further, the constant reference to EU as a future federation and putting its legitimacy to utopian tests carries with it the danger of disillusionment among the ‘federalist’ electorate and inspiring fear among the Europhobes.

On the other hand, the EU perceived as simply an international regime leads to a deficit as well. For ‘regimists’, the will of that nation is expressed through national parliamentary sovereignty. Therefore the EU is, should, and cannot be anything but an international regime.¹³⁴ This perspective plays more to the strengths of the EU with a focus on performance, but then again the EU is not an international regime either. The results of this perspective are complains about too much institutionalisation, which in turn are (unrealistically) interpretated as the start of a European superstate. Furthermore, too much interference in sovereign matters becomes a concern. This will likely lead to unconditional, irrational Euro-scepticism stemming from the fear of being ‘invaded by Brussels’. Finally, complains about democratisation cannot logically be addressed from this perspective, because for ‘regimists’ the EU already is ‘too democratic’. On the other hand, this perspective can do more justice to the ‘nationalist deficit’, because identification stays with the nation-state.

The analysis of the EU as less than a federation, but more than a regime is spot on. Yet, the EU is perceived as either one rather than neither. Both models are applied, but the theoretical conceptualisations of legitimacy behind them are not able to address the reality of multi-level governance. As just argued they could actually have very undesirable results, because we are going to keep this source of authority in the foreseeable future. The lack of realism leads to a ‘reality deficit’.

The final hypothesis is the only one supported by this research. The EU’s legitimacy deficit is indeed increased by the mass media’s shortcomings. It is important to stress the different acknowledged and apparent shortcomings seem to increase rather be a reason for the EU’s legitimacy deficit. Further, some of the methods for overcoming the shortcomings are not used – explaining EU-policy and institutions – and some that are used have the opposite effect – quantity, personalisation, and nationalisation. Finally, the lack of a European public discourse helps to keep differences between the Member States in place.

10.1.3 – Not a Democratic Deficit, but a Nationalist and Reality Deficit

This brings us to the answer to the first part of the research question:
What are the reasons for the European Union’s legitimacy deficit?
In the introduction the idea of the democratic deficit was called into question. Yet, in political, public and surprisingly quit often academic discourse, the EU’s legitimacy deficit is referred to as a democratic deficit. This label ‘democratic deficit’ is inadequate and actually misleading to describe the EU’s legitimacy deficit.¹³⁵

The first reason for the EU’s legitimacy deficit is the ‘nationalist deficit’. Or the fact that people do not identify with the EU as they do with their nation-state. Nationalism, in particular the symbol of sameness the national identity, is still strong and leads people to perceive the EU as foreign. This though is primarily a problem for federalists, who will have to start taking people’s national identity into account or else get even further Euro-detached populations. For Gaullist and Europhobes this attachment to the nation-state is useful to rally support to protect state powers and resist further ‘Europeanisation’ when they see fit.

The second reason is the ‘reality deficit’. The fact that neither the perspective of multi-level government nor international regime can justify and explain – legitimise – the emerging system of multi-level governance.¹³⁶ For the former, the EU has to federalise or at least for now democratise. They are the inventors of the ‘democratic reading’ of the legitimacy deficit. The idea of closing the gap through democratisation or even federalisation is unrealistic, because it misinterprets the deficit and underestimates the importance of nationalist concepts in the legitimacy of the far away (nation-)state. The lack of sameness between Member States’ populations and the rootedness of national loyalties nowadays make the creation of such legitimacy for the EU problematic. Furthermore, it underestimates the resolve of states to cling to their power.

Those who perceive the EU as an international regime might have a better understanding of the nature of legitimacy or are more indoctrinated by it. Either way, also this position leads to problems for the EU’s legitimacy, because the EU is more ‘than a regime’. First, it leads to the misconception that the EU is too influential or the start of a superstate. Secondly, the Member States need the EU for its economic competiveness, problem solving capabilities, but also a safeguard against conflict on the European continent. This cannot be achieved without some supranationlisation. The national politicians need Europe to retain power, but are unwilling to forfeit all their power. In a sense they want to stay in the ‘driver’s seat’.¹³⁷

Finally, one of the, if not the, most important mediators of public discourse in our large scale, modern societies are the mass media. They have become a necessity for the creation of a consensus on a large scale. Yet, we have seen the mass media only seem to increase the EU’s legitimacy deficit and this is even acknowledged in the discourses. Furthermore, because there is not one public discourse, but many discourses the EU’s legitimacy deficit is actually interpretated differently in each discourse.

In conclusion, the perception of the legitimacy deficit differs in each country, but they do have reasons in common for the deficit. First, there is the lack of identification of people with the EU, which makes the deficit is nationalist rather than democratic. Secondly, the EU is and in the near future will stay a political order of multi-level governance. The theoretical conceptualisations of legitimacy however do not match this reality. This reality deficit is another reason for the deficit. Finally, the mass media increase the deficit, but they do not create it.