l
INTRODUCTION: SECTION TWO
to biography, questionnaire and interview. Such work was recently
brought together in Cardeña, Lynn & Krippner’s examination of the
scientific evidence for such “anomalous” experiences as hallucina-
tion, synesthesia, lucid dreaming, out-of-body experience, near-death
experience and mysticism.
42
The work presents the “current empir-
ical and conceptual developments” in psychology and neuroscience
with an open mind rather than dismissal. It assumes it follows the
“spirit of James’s ‘radical empiricism’ ” and “pays homage” to James
with its title, Varieties of Anomalous Experience.
43
To what extent it
follows the “spirit” of James’s
VRE is another matter, but it does, at
least, acknowledge the limits of the project.
Science may not have come very far in addressing the ontological status
of these questions, but readers of the book will discover that psychology
has much to offer in terms of proposing appropriate ways to obtain and
evaluate evidence, characterize variables associated with these phenomena,
and describe and investigate anomalous experiences.
44
The advances in neuroscience and religion are without doubt fas-
cinating and insightful, but the scope of their project may perhaps
be overestimated. Such studies persistently suffer from a convenient
utility of disciplinary amnesia and above all forget the foundational
insights of William James’s first Gifford lecture on “Religion and
Neurology”. In so far as it forgets the remit of its work, there is a
fundamental methodological flaw in much of the recent work apply-
ing neuroscience to religion (not to mention the debates within
neuroscience itself ). Neuroscience is a valuable and important part
of the biology of human mental functions, it can locate functions
and activities, help in the understanding of mental diseases and
neuronal dysfunction. However, to apply such knowledge to assess-
ments of religious experience is to make a fundamental category
error. An error James realises in his assessment of the project in 1901
and 1902. This disciplinary amnesia of contemporary neuroscientific
assessments of religion is significant and requires an important and
urgent return to James.
42
Cardeña, E., Lynn, S. J. & Krippner, S., Varieties of Anomalous Experience: Examining
the Scientific Evidence, Washington, D.C.:
American Psychological Association, 2000.
43
Cardeña, Lynn & Krippner, Varieties of Anomalous Experience, p. 7.
44
ibid., p. 10.
INTRODUCTION: SECTION TWO
li
James established a crucial distinction between two orders of
enquiry “existential judgement or proposition” and “propositional
value” or “spiritual judgement”; one judgement cannot be deduced
from the other.
45
In a similar way to Theodore Flournoy’s distinc-
tion between the “principle of the exclusion of the transcendent”
and the “principle of biological interpretation”, James was trying to
separate out two different orders of reality.
46
As James made clear:
“They proceed from diverse intellectual preoccupations . . .”.
47
To
identify the biological or psychological grounds for an experience
does not necessarily eradicate it spiritual worth. The key assump-
tion here is that “the existential facts by themselves are insufficient
for determining the value”.
48
The neuroscientific facts may well
contribute to the assessment of the religious value of an object, but
they do not in themselves reduce experience to a material fact.
This very straightforward and basic methodological fact has often
been forgotten in later work in the psychology of religion and
category errors abound in the scientific literature. The principal
reason for such confusion is that neuroscientists and psychologists
have little critical training in the nature of religious language and
social theory. There is a mistaken assumption in some scientific
circles that the field of religion has not developed its own thinking
and critical assessment in the last hundreds years of scientific
development. To locate discursive ideas such as “God” in the
temporal lobes shows no appreciation of the complexity of religious
language and the nature of such referents in the linguistic-cultural
processes of experiences demarcated as “religious”.
James’s argument becomes even stronger in his assessment of what
he calls the “medical materialists”, who reduce Saint Paul’s Damascus
road experience to a discharging lesion of the occipital cortex or
George Fox’s spiritual insights to a disordered colon.
49
James’s assess-
ment of such reductive assumptions can be applied to the literature
of psychologists and neuroscientists. Whether it is examination of
Zen meditation by electroencephalographic studies of alpha waves,
50
45
James, W.,
The Varieties of Religious Experience, London: Routledge, [1902] 2002, p. 9.
46
Flournoy, T., “Les principes de la psychologie religieuse” Archives de Psychologie, 1903,
Vol. 2, pp. 33–57.
47
James, The Varieties, p. 9.
48
ibid., p. 10.
49
ibid., p. 16.
50
Kasamatsu, A. & Hirai, T., “An Electroencephalographic Study on the Zen Meditation
(Zazan)”, 1966, in Tart, C., Ed., Altered States of Consciousness, San Francisco: HarperCollins,
[1969] 1990, pp. 581–595.