POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM
14
at The Workshop in Political Theory and
Policy Analysis at Indiana University initiated
the International Forestry Resources and
Institutions (IFRI) program, which would
provide over-time data on peopled forests
to link information on socio-economic,
institutional and ecological aspects. Now
active in a number of countries across multiple
continents, IFRI was founded and tested using
a small set of sites that included locations
in India and Nepal, and continues to contain
active programs in these two countries.
Research from IFRI locations in India has been
fundamental in demonstrating the importance
of self-governance and local monitoring for
the sustainable management of community
forests in critical wildlife habitats in central
India (Ghate 2004; Ostrom and Nagendra
2006; Ghate, Ghate and Ostrom 2013) and
the eastern Himalayas (Agrawal and Chhatre
2006). Local monitoring, sanctioning and
enforcement of rules seem to be important
predictors of forest condition in several
IFRI studies (Ghate and Nagendra 2006). A
complete reliance on government monitoring
through forest guards is difficult in the Indian
context, where guards have to cover large
areas, are lightly armed, and have to deal with
social challenges that make it difficult for
them to enforce rules. In fact, as Agrawal and
Chhatre (2006) conclude from IFRI studies in
India and elsewhere, government involvement
may be negatively associated with forest
condition in some contexts, while community
managed forests may be better suited to cater
to local needs (Agrawal and Chhatre 2006;
Chhatre and Agrawal 2008).Thus, warning
against a mis-interpretation of the need for
monitoring, Ostrom and Nagendra (2006,
19230-19231) stated that “We do not advocate
using fences and guns to protect government
forests… Unless one ensures the livelihoods
of those living around or within a forest, a
major investment in monitoring alone is not a
sufficient, long-run management strategy and
may even be counterproductive”.
Through a careful examination of forest
change in the Tadoba Andhari Tiger Reserve
in Maharashtra, the Mahananda Wildlife
Sanctuary in West Bengal, and the Chitwan
National Park in Nepal, Ostrom and Nagendra
(2006) found that the official designation
Plate 1: Elinor Ostrom at a community forest group meeting organized by the Foundation for Ecological
Security in Karnataka State, India, in February 2012 (Photo credit: Harini Nagendra)
POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM
15
of a forest as government, community, or
co-managed did not appear to impact forest
conservation as much as the legitimacy of
ownership and degree of local monitoring.
Corroborating this, data from 42 forests in
multiple countries established that the type
of ownership did not have a statistically
significant impact on forest quality as
measured using assessments of tree density
or tree size. What emerged as most significant
was the involvement of communities in
regular monitoring, with this study concluding
that “when users are genuinely engaged in
decisions regarding rules affecting their use,
the likelihood of them following the rules and
monitoring others is much greater than when
an authority simply imposes rules.” (Ostrom
and Nagendra 2006, 19224). Local forest users
can also provide reliable, low cost assessments
of changes in forest density that can be
significant inputs for monitoring ecological
change (Nagendra and Ostrom 2011).
The research of Ostrom and colleagues holds
great significance for Indian forest policy, in
particular to the discussions of the Scheduled
Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers
(Recognition of Forest Rights) Act (FRA)
of 2006, which provides traditional forest
dwellers with rights over forest land that
is customarily used and managed by them.
Presently, debates around implementation
of the FRA are centred on questions such
as: Are communities capable of monitoring
and managing such a valuable resource?
Will the transfer of authority result in large-
scale deforestation? Are traditional norms of
sustainable harvesting and equitable benefit
sharing effective in traditional communities?
FIELD EXPERIMENTS IN INDIGENOUS
INDIAN COMMUNITIES
Generally assumed in these discussions
is the fact that access to markets and
commercialisation has affected local
communities’ attitudes and behaviour
regarding forests, making them less inclined
to cooperate, and more likely to engage in
destructive practices of over-harvesting.
Ostrom and her colleagues examined this issue
in detail using field experiments conducted
in predominantly tribal communities in the
Indian State of Maharashtra. From eight
experiments conducted in four forest/tribal
rich areas of the state, Ghate, Ghate and
Ostrom (forthcoming) found that communities
that have had strong previous traditions of
shared norms and mutual trust tend to be non-
exploitative, non-commercial, and cooperate
towards prioritising, planning, and sustainably
managing forest resources. Thus, human
beings are not always “Homo economicus”,
they can be “Homo reciprocans” and even
“Homo cooperatus”
in the case of common-
pool resources. The study confirms Ostrom’s
(1998) observation that it is also possible for
individuals to achieve results that are “better
than rational” in certain conditions.
Another study that used evolving field
experiments (Ghate, Ghate and Ostrom
2013) indicates that indigenous communities
can be trusted with forest management
responsibilities, and policies such as Joint
Forest Management (JFM) and the FRA are
moving in the right direction. In one of the
experiments, participants adopted plantations
of fast-growing trees for fuel wood and fodder,
which, they argued, helped them protect
high-value timber trees. It was also clear by
their behaviour during the experiments that
communities are able to address the issue
of equity while sharing the benefits from
collective forest protections measures. The
study concludes that if forests collectively
managed by communities are not degraded
below the critical minimum, communities
are capable of successfully protecting and
regenerating the resource. However, at least in
the initial period, some failures of community
management should not be generalized,
because “once altruist and reciprocal
motivations are crowded out, it takes some
time to re-establish trust and reciprocity”
(Vollan 2008: 563).
RESEARCH ON URBAN INDIAN
COMMONS
Ostrom argued it was time to really pay
attention to urban commons. The Social-
Ecological Systems (SES) Framework she
developed provides a useful common