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descriptive, and even prescriptive or normative. The theory of global rationality,
says he, operates based only on an “objective” description of the environment of
decision — the “external constraints” —, the agent being fully depicted by his or
her preferences. Simon claims for the explicit inclusion in the theory of other char‑
acteristics of the agent, such as the knowledge he or she effectively has and his or
her cognitive capabilities — the “internal constraints”. In the 1950s, the attempts
he made to deal with this theoretical impasse went in two main directions. In the
first place, the lack of realism he pointed in the theory implied a need for the em‑
pirical study of how decision making is performed in practice. Field studies proper
are not absent from Simon’s work, but they are certainly not very representative.
The attempt to empirically study decision making process was done principally
through the joint use of laboratory experiments, observing subjects in the process
of decision making over relatively simple and standardized problem situations, and
the computer simulation of models conceived based on such experiments. In the
second place, Simon proposed a series of “simplifications”
6
which would make
the decision making process more tractable to the agent. No doubt, the most im‑
portant of them is the satisficing hypothesis:
In these two essays [the papers of 1955 and 1956] the focus is upon
ways of simplifying the choice problem to bring it within the power of
human computation. [...] The key to the simplification of the choice pro‑
cess in both cases is the replacement of the goal of maximizing with the
goal of satisficing, of finding a course of action that is ‘good enough’. I
have tried, in these two essays, to show why this substitution is an es‑
sential step in the application of the principle of bounded rationality.
(Simon, 1957, pp. 204‑5)
7
According to this hypothesis, decision makers, instead of trying to maximize
values in a given choice, aim at
satisficing: they search for alternatives that are
good enough according to some pre‑established criteria. The decision maker op‑
timizes if he or she chooses an alternative that is
the best one, as judged by a
criterion that allows comparing all alternatives between themselves. The decision
maker satisfices if he or she chooses an alternative that attends or exceeds a set
of minimal acceptability criteria, if he or she chooses a satisfactory alternative,
but one that is not necessarily the unique, nor the best. Optimization requires
6
For example, in Simon (1955) they appear under the name of “the essential simplifications”, in Si‑
mon (1956) as “simplification of the choice mechanisms”, in Simon (1957) as “simplification of the
choice process” and in March and Simon (1958) as “simplified models”.
7
The concept of satisficing emerges clearly, in its content, in Simon (1955), the term appears shortly
afterwards in Simon (1956, pp. 261, 270‑1). Other statements of the definition can be found scattered
throughout his work, in general without significant variations in its content, that is, the use he does of
the concept is consistent through time. Some reference points are: Simon (1957, p. 205; 1976a, pp.
xxix‑xxx; 1987) and March and Simon (1958, pp. 140‑141).
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computation several orders of magnitude more complex than satisficing. In gen‑
eral, the satisficing hypothesis is accompanied by search processes, for alternatives
as well as for new information (learning). Satisficing is also compatible with in‑
complete orderings of alternatives and with multiple criteria of choice. Other
relevant simplifications advanced by Simon include: (i) the adoption of simplified
models of reality; and (ii) the factoring of decisions in hierarchical chains of means
and ends.
It is important to notice that in the 1955 paper the ideas of computational
capacity and demand — the latter implicitly, under the “environment” which the
agent faces — are clearly posed:
Broadly stated, the task is to replace the global rationality of eco‑
nomic man with a kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the
access to information and the computational capacities that are actually
possessed by organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments in
which such organisms exist. (Simon, 1955, p. 241)
This quote is taken from the very paper in which the content of satisficing is
first advanced, although the term only came about in Simon (1956). According
to the author himself, this is also the paper economists most frequently chose for
citation to refer to bounded rationality and satisficing (Simon, 1996, p. 165).
8
From the perspective of the argument here proposed, it is worth emphasizing the
following about this quote. The specter of global rationality is still markedly
present in the formulation: the comparison between the two types of rationality
is still structural to the theory. The general attitude of the paper denotes it too,
for he first describes the model of global rationality and then, subsequently, pro‑
poses a set of “essential simplifications”.
9
The idea of “simplification” presup‑
poses something that becomes simpler, and the standard of comparison is pre‑
cisely global rationality. Notwithstanding, these simplifications in the process of
choice proposed by Simon indeed advance in the direction of specifying the con‑
cept of rationality used by the author and go beyond, on account of this, the strict
argument of the bounds to rationality. I argue next that these specifications can
be grouped under the concept of procedural rationality, advanced by Simon in
1976, being this, then, the most appropriate general concept to capture Simon’s
positive definitions of rationality.
8
What is, actually, a very curious fact, considering none of the two terms — neither bounded rational‑
ity, nor satisficing — was present in the paper.
9
The paper that pairs this one (Simon, 1956) — together forming “the central core of the theory of
choice” advanced in the book of 1957 — proceeds in very distinct manner, and treats rationality in a
more positive fashion. However, it was published in the Psychological Review and it is, therefore, not
surprising to find that it gives less weight to the concept of rationality cogent in the field of economic
science.