8
Notably, inequality in Japan has been above the G7 average and even its pace of increase has
exceeded that of the G7 average in most years (text chart). The latest figure is about 0.33,
slightly above the G7 average.
Looking at both market and disposable income Gini, and further disaggregating these
measures between working-age and elderly population, gives important insights into various
aspects of inequality. First, fiscal redistribution is effective in reducing inequality for both the
elderly and the working-age population, as seen in the gaps between the respective market
and disposable income Gini coefficients. At the same time, this reduction of inequality
through redistribution is very effective for the elderly, but less so for the working-age
population (text charts).
It is evident that fiscal redistribution significantly reduces income inequality for the elderly
population. The Gini drops from close
0.7 to close to 0.3 in most recent years
as a result of redistribution, with the
disposable income Gini even showing a
slight downward trend. On the contrary,
inequality in disposable income for the
working population – that is, mostly the
wage inequality – shows a high
correlation with market inequality. A
simple bilateral regression suggests that,
for the working-age population, each
point increase in the market income Gini
translates into a 0.4 point increase in the
disposable income Gini.
2
This suggests that for working
households
variations in market income
inequality are highly associated with
variations in disposable income
inequality, although fiscal redistribution
brings down the level of inequality to
some extent. In other words, the
dynamics of market income inequality
for the working-age populations
correspond to the dynamics of
disposable income inequality changes, which have a direct impact on their living standards.
2
The goodness-of-fit is about 0.76, and the linear correlation coefficient about 0.87. Both indicate significance
of the correlation between the two measures of income inequality.
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Gini (at disposable income, post taxes and transfers)
Gini before taxes and transfers
Gini before/after Tax and Redistribution
Elderly Households
Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
Gini (at disposable income, post taxes and transfers)
Gini before taxes and transfers
Gini before/after Tax and Redistribution
Working-Age Households
Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
9
The large gap between the market income and disposable income inequality for the elderly is
a sign of fiscal burden. A report by OECD (2011) warns that reliance on the tax and transfer
system as a major mechanism of equalization of income is not an efficient or sustainable
strategy. In the same vein, a more recent country brief (OECD 2014) points out that
“population ageing will put pressure on public finances, which are already over-stretched.”
Although a discussion of feasible fiscal policy options is beyond the scope of this paper,
Japan might need to take into account the fiscal costs of redistribution, given its high and
rising public debt, its increasing share of the elderly population, low fertility rate, and rising
dependency ratio. In this regard, the Japanese government’s emphasis on structural reforms,
including labor market reforms, seems appropriate.
B. Poverty
Relative poverty rates – measured by the number of households whose income levels are
below half of median income level –
have been high and increasing in Japan
since the 1980s. In 2009, this indicator
marked around 16 percent, which is one
of the highest in advanced countries.
Compared to other G7 countries, Japan’s
relative poverty rate is 4 percentage
points highest than the average, and the
second highest following the US (text
chart). Japan’s rate is also the sixth
highest amongst OECD country, and
above the OECD average by 5
percentage points.
A noteworthy trend is the rapid increase in the child poverty rate, defined as the ratio of
working households with children who
are in relative poverty. Since 2006, the
child poverty rate has risen faster than the
full-sample poverty rate, and has
surpassed the latter in 2012 (text chart).
Further disaggregation of poor
households with children by the number
of adults reveals that the rate is largely
driven by the significantly higher relative
poverty rate of single-parent households
(the majority being single-mother
households), which remained above 50
percent for 1985-2012.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Relative Poverty Rates of G7Countries
(OECD comparison, %, year 2009)
Source: OECD
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Relative Poverty (%)
Child Poverty (%)
Relative Poverty Rates by Household Type
Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2013)
(% of all households)