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1953, Sweden requested that the clearing debt be converted at a ratio of 1:5 instead of the
ratio of 1:7 defined by the law. To support its claim, Sweden terminated the payment
agreement. Czechoslovakia did not enter any further negotiations
66
because during 1953,
Czechoslovakia succeeded in getting rid of the dependency on the import of Swedish iron ore,
ball bearings and accumulator material. Iron ore was purchased from Brazil, India, Norway,
France, Austria and Iran on a diversified basis. Nevertheless, Prague was ready to resume
import of Swedish ore in a certain quantity due to the high quality of Swedish ore and the
advantageous transport routes, if the negotiating situation improved.
67
A provisional agreement between the central banks on a provisional system of
payments was concluded in 1953: 50% of the value of Czechoslovak export was used to repay
the Czechoslovak clearing debt and 50% was used for import of goods. The absence of a trade
agreement resulted in reduction of mutual trade by 75% in comparison with 1952. A new
trade agreement was not concluded until 1955.
After 1948, the trade relations with Sweden were constantly retaining their
significance in comparison with the relations with most developed capitalist countries and the
scope of these relations did not change substantially until 1951. However, the structure of the
trade was changing. The amount of raw materials was decreasing, while the amount of
machines and – to the discontent of the Czechoslovak planners – the consumer goods and
food was increasing (see appendix no. 7). During the critical period 1950-1952, Sweden also
served as a country, through which deliveries of "strictly embargoed goods" were shipped to
Czechoslovakia. One example of this was an electronic microscope made in the USA and
imported to the Czechoslovak Republic in May 1951.
68
After 1948, Czechoslovakia had
constantly a passive trade balance in relation to Sweden (see appendix no. 5). Starting from
1952, the trade was declining. The quotas set in the agreements for the volumes of exchanged
goods were clearly decreasing since 1950; however, until the absence of agreement in the
trade relations, the volume of the actually exchanged goods was not affected by this. The
market but also "largely a result of the sabotage by the anti-governmental centre of Slánský in foreign trade". (A
report of 11 January 1954 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Viliam Široký, the Prime Minister, PMO –
confidential files 1945 – 1959, file 262, ref. no. 17.879/53).
66
A report of 6 August 1953 by the Ministry of Finance for the government, NAP, the resources of ÚPV-T 1952
– 1954, file 262, ref. no. 13.594/53; a proposal for governmental resolution, with a rational report of
11 November 1954, NAP, PMO 1945 – 1968, uninventoried materials, resolutions and source materials for
resolutions, no. 2319/1954.
67
A proposal for governmental resolution, with a rational report of 11 November 1954, NAP, PMO 1945 – 1968
uninventoried materials, resolutions and source materials for resolutions, no. 2319/1954.
68
A record of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, dated 25 May 1951, NAP, MFT, Secretariate of Dr. Margolius,
Sweden, no. 1406/51.
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reason was that the quotas only represented the limit of the proposed relations but the reality
was substantially different. In practice, the value of the exchanged goods was lower even by
one half. The cause of this phenomenon lied with numerous implementation problems
predominantly on the part of the Czechoslovak Republic, which was unable to carry out the
deliveries of agreed goods by agreed deadlines; it sometimes even happened that the
deliveries were not carried out at all. The Czechoslovak Republic succeeded in getting rid of
its commercial dependency on Sweden as concerned iron ore as a mono-commodity in a
relatively short period of time.
Conclusions
1/ Czechoslovak trade with advanced capitalist states during the years 1949 – 1953 underwent
a dramatic transformation under pressure from the international situation and the structural
changes of the Czechoslovak economy, both in its territorial focus and in its volume and
structure. The first complications in relations with the West occurred even before the
beginning of the embargo, since interest fell in Czechoslovak “non-essential” goods (mainly
food and consumer goods). Export difficulties were all the more unpleasant in that
Czechoslovakia used the export proceeds to pay off loans and obligations from the inter-war
period, to which was now also added compensation for nationalized property. The total
volume of trade with capitalist states during the years 1948 – 1953 was reduced to less than
half.
69
It wasn’t until the early 1960s that it reached the level from 1948. The measures of the
most advanced western countries with which Czechoslovakia traditionally traded, whether the
USA, France, Britain, Denmark or Japan, led to the fact that relations with these advanced
countries, from which Czechoslovakia took a number fundamental raw materials, substances
and technical products essential to the economy, became dramatically constricted.
Czechoslovakia searched for a substitute on the markets of advanced neutral countries which
offered possibilities of ensuring the missing commodities, whether as producers or mediators.
Occupying an exclusive role in connection with the Czechoslovak economy on the world
market were Sweden and Switzerland.
2/ Assessing the impact of the western embargo on the Czechoslovak economy and the
significance of substituting Czechoslovakia’s economic relations with the most developed and
biggest economies of the world is in truth not easy. It is evident that the embargo’s impact on
69
Calculations by a team of economic historians of the University of Economics from the early 1950s show
45%. Václav Pr cha et al., Hospodá ské d jiny eskoslovenska v 19. a 20. století [Economic History of
Czechoslovakia in the 19th and 20th Centuries], Praha: Svoboda 1974, p. 423.
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the Czechoslovak economy was considerable. It brought the country deeper under the Soviet
patronage of the approved project to hyperindustrialize the already industrialized
Czechoslovakia producing in fact a whole profile of world production. It also brought serious
problems in carrying out gigantic growth of a number of industrial sectors on the order of
hundreds of percent. Of course Czechoslovakia managed to find and secure substitute sources,
albeit with difficulty. The country’s economic stability and the program to carry out the first
five-year plan were not threatened. Internal documents of the Czechoslovak economic report
showed relief from overcoming the difficulties that had arisen relatively easy. In short, losses
and difficulties that arose were considerable, but less than had been originally expected both
in western countries and in Prague. Available statistics, either of Czechoslovak origin, Swiss
or Swedish, do not give the full picture of trade with these countries or the significance of the
commodities for the national economy, which should not only be measured by price but also
by their real significance to the functioning of the economy. The scope of trade of goods was
evidently greater than these statistics show since the statistics include only bilateral trade; the
significance of goods guided by these two countries (so-called transit trade) and the
significance of so-called triangular trade, which brought in a third partner to secure essentially
significant goods, remains unevaluated.
3/ Czechoslovak trade with neutral Switzerland and Sweden have the following factors in
common:
a/ They were relations with advanced market economies of medium size, whose
distance behind the global technical and technological elite was relatively not big. Neutrality
undoubtedly provided business entities with wider room for beneficial trade with the East than
to companies from large western democracies.
b/ Relations with both economies stemmed from long-term traditions laid out by treaty
during the inter-war period, and in fact based back in the period of the Habsburg monarchy.
The traditional part of such trade was supplemented after 1948 by the part representing the
substitution of relations with the biggest and most advanced economies of the world.
c/ Relations were renewed on a treaty basis after the end of World War II even in late
1945. Also symptomatic was the fact that in both relations during 1945 – 1948
Czechoslovakia played the role of the “stronger” partner, i.e. a partner whose goods were in
demand and which gave it a good starting position in compensation negotiations. The reality
of Czechoslovak predominance was also expressed in the given period by the Czechoslovak
trade balance. Technically and technologically these were fundamental comparable
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economies. After 1948 the role of Czechoslovakia and its neutral partners was transformed.
Czechoslovakia became a weaker partner, looking to the Swiss and Swedish markets for
strategically important raw materials, substances and technical products. The Czechoslovak
trade balance with both countries changed to deeply passive. The falling quality of
Czechoslovak products did not meet the demands of these countries’ markets for goods more
demanding in terms of production. In both cases relations after World War II were carried out
by barter transactions, after 1948, when Czechoslovakia was faced with foreign currency
problems, it was solved by clearing.
d/ In both cases Czechoslovak partners also managed to gain a number of extra
concessions from their own apparent superiority after 1949. These were mainly compensation
payments for nationalization that were resolved in parallel to trade relations. Both neutral
countries thus over dozens of years surpassed the compensation granted to legal entities of
large western democracies like the USA and Great Britain. Czechoslovakia made these
concessions unwillingly and only under the pressure of circumstances. Czechoslovak
documents at the time interpret such meetings as “extortion”.
e/ In any case it involved mutual beneficial trade whose conditions were toughly
negotiated. It was made on the principle of deficit goods for deficit goods, or goods for
foreign currency. Mutual trade allowed Czechoslovakia to overcome the effects of restrictions
of relations with advanced western markets, and thus provided Switzerland and Sweden the
special bonus of overcoming the post-war crisis and improving their position in European
trade more easily. Switzerland was even very much perceived as a country temporarily taking
the place of defeated Germany.
f/ Both Switzerland and Sweden occupied unique, irreplaceable positions in
Czechoslovak foreign trade. In the case of Sweden it involved supplies of quality iron ore and
metal alloys (still the major part of Czechoslovak consumption in the early 1950s). In the case
of Switzerland it was about using its geographical position in the middle of Europe, its
traditional relations with most states of the world and its extraordinary international position
of financial center that enabled reexports of western goods and the development of so-called
transit trades with partners from countries that applied an embargo against eastern states.
g/ The trade with the two countries was gradually declining (see graphs in appendix 3
and 4). The American pressure contributed significantly to this fact. Switzerland and Sweden
were gradually losing their exclusive position of the "Czechoslovak gate to the international
market". The process of reducing trade exchange culminated in 1953. It was the year when
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the legal regulation, on which the relations with both of these countries were based and which
was building on the contractual pre-war documents complemented by annual innovating trade
negotiations, became obsolete and lost validity to be subsequently replaced by other
agreements, which were indisputably less important for Czechoslovakia.
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Appendices:
Appendix No. 1
Free-World Imports from U.S.S.R. and its European Satellities
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
Years
Mi
llions
of US Dolla
rs
U.S.S.R.
European Soviet Satellities
Source: The 1958 Revision of East-West Trade Controls. Mutual Defence
Assistance Act of 1951, Washington: Department of State, Publication
6797 April 1959, p. 38.
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Appendix No. 2
Quota of important raw materials imports on total consumption
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
years
% o
f to
tal
co
n
su
mti
o
n
iron ore
pyrrites
ferric alloys
aluminium
copper
lead
Source: Data on performing of First Five-Year Plan of The Czechoslovak
Republic, Part III, Geologic survey, technical advancement, capital
construction, foreign trade, NAP, State Planning Office II 1949 – 1959,
carton 335, no 51.734/53.
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Appendix No. 3
Czechoslovak Exports to Switzerland and Sweden
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Years
Mi
ll
ions of
C
zec
hosl
ovak C
row
ns
Switzerland
Sweden
Developed capitalistic countries
Appendix no. 4
Czechoslovak Imports from Switzerland and Sweden
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Years
Mi
llions
of Cz
e
c
hos
lov
a
k
Cr
owns
Switzerland
Sweden
Developed capitalistic countries
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Appendix no. 5
Balance of Czechoslovak Trade with Switzerland and Sweden
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Years
Mi
ll
ions of
C
zec
hosl
ovak C
row
ns
Sweden
Switzerland
Appendix no. 6
Structure of Czechoslovak Imports from Switzerland
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Years
P
er cen
t
o
f
C
zech
o
sl
o
vak i
mp
o
rt
s f
ro
m
S
wi
tzer
lan
d
Maschines
Raw materials
Animal
Foods
Consumption goods
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Appendix no. 7
Structure of Czechoslovak im ports from Sw eden
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Years
Pe
r
c
e
nt
of
tot
a
l impo
rt
s
fr
om S
we
de
n
Maschines
Raw materials
Animals
Foods
Consumption goods
Sources of graphs in Appendix 3-7:
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Appendix no. 8
The „Triangl“ Compensation Trade between Switzerland (Gebrüder Sulzer, Winterthur),
Czechoslowakia and Poland
(one of examples – 1950/1951)
Correspondent
Switzerland
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Switzerland
- export
machines (13,67 mil.
Sfrs)
13,67 mil. Sfrs
- import
material of metallurgy
(6,52 mil. Sfrs)
ship´s material (2,9
mil. Sfrs)
coke (1 mil. Sfrs)
machines tool (1 mil.
Sfrs)
11,42 mil. Sfrs
Goods in Polish-Swiss
clearing (2,25 mil.
Sfrs)
2,25 mil. Sfrs
Czechoslovakia
- export
material of metallurgy
(6,52 mil. Sfrs)
ship´s material (2,9
mil. Sfrs)
coke (1 mil. Sfrs)
machines tool (1 mil.
Sfrs)
11,42 mil. Sfrs
- import
coal (9,137 mil. Sfrs)
zinc (2,284 mil. Sfrs)
11,42 mil. Sfrs
Poland
- export
Goods in Polish-Swiss
clearing (2,25 mil.
Sfrs)
2,25 mil. Sfrs
coal (9,137 mil. Sfrs)
zinc (2,284 mil. Sfrs)
11,42 mil. Sfrs
- import
machines (13,67 mil.
Sfrs)
13,67 mil. Sfrs
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Appendix no. 9
Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade, Secretariate of viceminister Dr. Rudolf
Margolius, 1951, Trojúhleník Sulzer- SR-Polsko, Information for Minister
Antonín Gregor, Prague 3.2.1951
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