withdrawing rather than put off his supercilious gravity.
Let him fall into discourse, and he shall
make more sudden stops than if he had a wolf before him. Let him buy, or sell, or in short go about
any of those things without there is no living in this world, and you’ll say this piece of wisdom
were rather a stock than a man, of so little use is he to himself, country, or friends; and all because
he is wholly ignorant of common things and lives a course of life quite different from the people;
by which means it is impossible but that he contract a popular odium, to wit, by reason of the great
diversity of their life and souls. For what is there at all done among men that is not full of folly,
and that too from fools and to fools? Against which universal practice if any single one shall dare
to set up his throat, my advice to him is, that following the example of Timon, he retire into some
desert and there enjoy his wisdom to himself.
But, to return to my design, what power was it that drew those stony, oaken, and wild people into
cities but flattery? For nothing else is signified by Amphion and Orpheus’ harp. What was it that,
when the common people of Rome were like to have destroyed all by their mutiny, reduced them
to obedience? Was it a philosophical oration? Least. But a ridiculous and childish fable of the belly
and the rest of the members. And as good success had Themistocles in his of the fox and hedgehog.
What wise man’s oration could ever have done so much with the people as Sertorius’ invention of
his white hind? Or his ridiculous emblem of pulling off a horse’s tail hair by hair? Or as Lycurgus
his example of his two whelps? To say nothing of Minos and Numa, both which ruled their foolish
multitudes with fabulous inventions; with which kind of toys that great and powerful beast, the
people, are led anyway. Again what city ever received Plato’s or Aristotle’s laws, or Socrates’
precepts? But, on the contrary, what made the Decii devote themselves to the infernal gods, or Q.
Curtius to leap into the gulf, but an empty vainglory, a most bewitching siren? And yet ’tis strange
it should be so condemned by those wise philosophers. For what is more foolish, say they, than for
a suppliant suitor to flatter the people, to buy their favor with gifts, to court the applauses of so
many fools, to please himself with their acclamations, to be carried on the people’s shoulders as in
triumph, and have a brazen statue in the marketplace? Add to this the adoption of names and
surnames, those divine honors given to a man of no reputation, and the deification of the most
wicked tyrants with public ceremonies; most foolish things, and such as one Democritus is too little
to laugh at. Who denies it? And yet from this root sprang all the great acts of the heroes which the
pens of so many eloquent men have extolled to the skies. In a word, this folly is that that laid the
foundation of cities; and by it, empire, authority, religion, policy, and public actions are preserved;
neither is there anything in human life that is not a kind of pastime of folly.
But to speak of arts, what set men’s wits on work to invent and transmit to posterity so many famous,
as they conceive, pieces of learning but the thirst of glory? With so much loss of sleep, such pains
and travail, have the most foolish of men thought to purchase themselves a kind of I know not what
fame, than which nothing can be more vain. And yet notwithstanding, you owe this advantage to
folly, and which is the most delectable of all other, that you reap the benefit of other men’s madness.
And now, having vindicated to myself the praise of fortitude and industry, what think you if I do
the same by that of prudence? But some will say, you may as well join fire and water. It may be
so. But yet I doubt not but to succeed even in this also, if, as you have done hitherto, you will but
favor me with your attention. And first, if prudence depends upon experience, to whom is the honor
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In Praise of Folly
of that name more proper? To the wise man, who partly out of modesty and partly distrust of himself,
attempts nothing; or the fool, whom neither modesty which he never had, nor danger which he
never considers, can discourage from anything? The wise man has recourse to the books of the
ancients, and from thence picks nothing but subtleties of words. The fool, in undertaking and
venturing on the business of the world, gathers, if I mistake not, the true prudence, such as Homer
though blind may be said to have seen when he said, “The burnt child dreads the fire.” For there
are two main obstacles to the knowledge of things, modesty that casts a mist before the
understanding, and fear that, having fancied a danger, dissuades us from the attempt. But from
these folly sufficiently frees us, and few there are that rightly understand of what great advantage
it is to blush at nothing and attempt everything.
But if you had rather take prudence for that that consists in the judgment of things, hear me, I
beseech you, how far they are from it that yet crack of the name. For first ’tis evident that all human
things, like Alcibiades’ Sileni or rural gods, carry a double face, but not the least alike; so that what
at first sight seems to be death, if you view it narrowly may prove to be life; and so the contrary.
What appears beautiful may chance to be deformed; what wealthy, a very beggar; what infamous,
praiseworthy; what learned, a dunce; what lusty, feeble; what jocund, sad; what noble, base; what
lucky, unfortunate; what friendly, an enemy; and what healthful, noisome. In short, view the inside
of these Sileni, and you’ll find them quite other than what they appear; which, if perhaps it shall
not seem so philosophically spoken, I’ll make it plain to you “after my blunt way.” Who would not
conceive a prince a great lord and abundant in everything? But yet being so ill-furnished with the
gifts of the mind, and ever thinking he shall never have enough, he’s the poorest of all men. And
then for his mind so given up to vice, ’tis a shame how it enslaves him. I might in like manner
philosophize of the rest; but let this one, for example’s sake, be enough.
Yet why this? will someone say. Have patience, and I’ll show you what I drive at. If anyone seeing
a player acting his part on a stage should go about to strip him of his disguise and show him to the
people in his true native form, would he not, think you, not only spoil the whole design of the play,
but deserve himself to be pelted off with stones as a phantastical fool and one out of his wits? But
nothing is more common with them than such changes; the same person one while impersonating
a woman, and another while a man; now a youngster, and by and by a grim seignior; now a king,
and presently a peasant; now a god, and in a trice again an ordinary fellow. But to discover this
were to spoil all, it being the only thing that entertains the eyes of the spectators. And what is all
this life but a kind of comedy, wherein men walk up and down in one another’s disguises and act
their respective parts, till the property-man brings them back to the attiring house. And yet he often
orders a different dress, and makes him that came but just now off in the robes of a king put on the
rags of a beggar. Thus are all things represented by counterfeit, and yet without this there was no
living.
And here if any wise man, as it were dropped from heaven, should start up and cry, this great thing
whom the world looks upon for as a god and I know not what is not so much as a man, for that like
a beast he is led by his passions, but the worst of slaves, inasmuch as he gives himself up willingly
to so many and such detestable masters. Again if he should bid a man that were bewailing the death
of his father to laugh, for that he now began to live by having got an estate, without which life is
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Desiderius Erasmus
In Praise of Folly