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with positive discrimination or exposure, and instead to include all
representative groups in regular activities regardless of their religious or
secular references. Even those who are critical of enhanced direct
engagement stress the need for the EU to “actively demonstrate that there
is no rejection of any political actors”.
Trial and error in a diplomatic grey zone
Among European governments, clear criteria for the choice of permissible
interlocutors are rare. Beyond the limits of the EU’s terror list as the only
set criteria, there is agreement that engagement with groups or individuals
that have not renounced violence as a means of action is taboo. There are
differences, however, as to whether that includes implicit endorsement of
violence or armed resistance against foreign occupation. In a similar vein,
groups linked to terrorist groups/activities are considered off-limits,
although here again individual member states are coming to very different
assessments as to what that means in practice. There is broad consensus
that engagement with individuals in public office, especially elected MPs, is
permissible and desirable, even though not all EU member states take
advantage of it.
There is no general consensus on engagement with moderate Islamist
actors who do not hold a public office, in particular with representatives of
outlawed parties and organisations. All interlocutors emphasise the
difficulties of engaging with outlawed groups. While the criterion of
legality is mentioned by some member states as a precondition for
engagement, for others this does not constitute an obstacle per se, but
rather reduces the number of channels through which engagement can take
place.
Formal political contacts with opposition Islamist movements and
individuals at the ministry or ambassador level are rare exceptions. The
level at which contacts are deemed appropriate largely depends on the
respective group’s legal situation and its degree of integration in political
institutions. The great majority of direct contacts between European
government representatives and moderate Islamists take place in the large
diplomatic grey area of active and passive informal contacts. Indirect
contacts through intermediaries are unproblematic and frequent in most
settings, but lack the advantages of first-hand engagement. Striking the
balance between first-hand insights and diplomatic provocation is a
challenging tightrope walk for diplomats, at times entailing substantial
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diplomatic and personal risk. Maintaining engagement with a low profile is
widely considered not only a matter of precaution but also of efficiency, as
the success of engagement with many groups depends heavily on
discretion.
Engagement with Islamist parties in power largely follows the pre-
defined channels and terms of international diplomacy (and is therefore not
the focus of this chapter). When engaging with Islamists in opposition, the
democratic legitimacy of an elected deputy provides foreign governments
with a conveniently given channel for engagement, making it easier to
justify contacts before the country’s authorities. Moreover, the legitimacy
and official policy-making role of elected MPs further raise the level of EU
interest in engaging with them. But even in the case of elected
parliamentarians, contacts are usually not appreciated by the regime, so
engagement must often take place above all informally and in the context
of larger meetings involving other parties and factions as well. Several
embassy personnel expressed doubts that contacts limited to
parliamentarians were enough to provide a realistic picture of the internal
developments of certain Islamist movements, as depending on the electoral
framework, parliamentarians elected by their local constituencies are not
necessarily key figures in the higher leadership of their party/movement.
The most politically delicate – and least assessed – cases are those
where Islamists have no parliamentary representation, so there is no pre-
defined formal channel for foreign diplomats to approach them. The legal
status and more importantly the de facto quality of the group’s relations
with the regime are decisive in determining the diplomatic risk entailed in
engagement. In this context, European diplomats typically stress the
primacy of intergovernmental relations. Many officials claim that
engagement with the Islamist opposition is underscored by the same
conditions and rules as engagement with other opposition groups.
Evidence from the MENA region, however, shows that such claims are an
expression of wishful thinking rather than a reflection of political realities.
With a few exceptions, most European capitals do not give any
explicit written directives to their embassies as to which groups they are
allowed to meet or under what conditions. In most cases, this decision is
left to the ambassador or the personal discretion of the political embassy
staff. Likewise, most of the dialogue personnel at the foreign ministries in
Europe do not have clearly outlined mandates or directives, leaving most
activities to the ‘common sense’ and priorities of the diplomats in charge.
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The absence of over-rigid, technocratic policy directives is widely seen as
crucial to guaranteeing the necessary flexibility of action on the ground.
Yet, the relative absence of clear directives from above on a matter as
politically sensitive as engagement with Islamist organisations is a striking
feature across many EU member states and institutions, often to the
detriment of institutionalisation, policy coherence and the formation of
strategic relationships.
In a few cases, European capitals have instructed embassies not to
engage with a specific group or with Islamists in general. After creating a
special division for dialogue with the Islamic world in Berlin in 2002, the
German foreign office gave directions to the embassies not to enter into
direct contact with Islamists under any circumstances. In the following
years, German diplomats say, reports from the embassies made clear to
those in charge in Berlin that differentiated, reliable reporting about the
political situation in the region was impossible without the option of
entering into direct contact with all the important social and political
actors. Consequently, the directive was loosened, allowing direct contact in
principle but “without shouting it from the rooftops”.
Embassy receptions and similar social occasions are often considered
a convenient opportunity by both sides to meet under relatively low
diplomatic risk. Embassy staff report how they are at times visiting
“otherwise uninteresting conferences” at which they know Islamists will be
present, “taking advantage of the coffee breaks” to meet members of
outlawed groups in particular. But not even these meetings are free of
diplomatic risk, as demonstrated by various incidents.
18
To evaluate the diplomatic risk involved in meeting a particular
individual, diplomats stress the importance of labels. For example,
parliamentarians can be met in their capacity as elected officials, but not
necessarily as party representatives. While there is little objection to
meeting elected Islamist parliamentarians even if their party is banned, it is
considered essential to meet individuals solely in their capacity as
parliamentarians. It is also considered important to avoid singling out their
18
On one occasion, the UK deputy head of mission in Cairo invited Muslim
Brotherhood parliamentarians among many other guests to a reception at his home
and the Brotherhood’s MPs themselves leaked this to the press, leading to frictions
with the Egyptian authorities.
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