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incomplete democratic consolidation and an absence of strong secularist
rivals who would help keep the party in check and pressure it to follow a
moderate course.
2.
The violent fringe
Radical/militant Islamic fundamentalism with recourse to violence has
generally remained a marginal force in Turkey. There are two main
radical/militant Islamic fundamentalist groups currently present in the
country, namely al-Qaeda and the Turkish Hizbullah.
2.1
Al-Qaeda
33
A Turkish al-Qaeda cell was responsible for the consecutive bombing of
two synagogues as well as the British Consulate General and the HSBC
Bank headquarters in Istanbul in November 2003. The perpetrator was
arrested by the Turkish police in August 2005, after which 33 suspects were
arrested in 2007.
34
Further investigations revealed that Turkish militants in
al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan had organised a cell before 11
September 2001, that the Istanbul bombings were ordered directly by
Osama bin Laden and that preparations for these bombings were carried
out under the guidance of Muhammad Atef – also known as Abu Hafs al-
Misri – then leader of al-Qaeda’s military wing. Initially, Atef assigned two
targets for the Turkish militants: the Incirlik Air Base in Adana and an
Israeli tourist ship travelling to the southern port of Antalya. The militants
decided that it was impossible to stage an assault on Incirlik, and
postponed an attack on the Israeli cruise ship because of a lack of
intelligence.
This attack came as a shock to Turkey given the widespread belief in
the country that al-Qaeda would not perpetrate crimes in a Muslim
country. Yet, there were already sufficient grounds for concern about the
possibility of al-Qaeda attacks in Turkey. It is well known that many
Turkish radical Islamists, who had earlier fought in Afghanistan, Bosnia,
Chechnya and Kashmir, had later joined the international network of al-
33
Some parts of this section draw from R. Çakir, “Turkey in Denial of al-Qaeda”,
Terrorism Focus, Vol. 5, No. 2, Jamestown Foundation, January 2008.
34
Rabasa and Larrabee (2008), p. 27.
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Qaeda. It is also known that hundreds of Turkish radical Islamists have
been trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It can be
reasoned that Turkey constitutes an obvious target as a Muslim country
with close ties to the West. Its secular political system, which (albeit with its
problems) has managed to incorporate the Islamists, presents an alternative
model where Islam and democracy coexist. On top of that, although Turkey
has recently experienced some setbacks in its relations with the US, it has
generally supported US actions in both Afghanistan and Iraq.
As part of its global strategy, Turkey has long been used by al-Qaeda
as a transit country that provided key logistics such as international money
transfers and a base for international travel for its members. It can be
argued that Turkey’s importance for al-Qaeda significantly increased with
the war in Iraq, where it became a crucial route for the transmission of
weapons, members and money to Iraq via Syria. Following the US
occupation of Iraq, there was also a steady outflow of Turkish volunteers
ready to fight in the Iraqi insurgency. Newspapers often report stories of
Turkish nationals who die in suicide attacks or in armed combat. For
instance, Habib Akdas – the ringleader of the Istanbul bombings – was
reportedly killed in a US bombardment of al-Anbar province in September
2004. Similarly, it is claimed that Gurcan Bac, another leading member of
al-Qaeda, died in a clash in Fallujah in 2005.
35
The 2003 attacks confirmed fears that Turkey is now a major target
country for al-Qaeda attacks. Two years after the Istanbul bombings, Louai
Muhammad Hajj Bakr al-Saqa – an al-Qaeda operative of Syrian origin –
was arrested after a failed plot to attack an Israeli cruise ship near Antalya.
Even though al-Qaeda has so far never staged an attack on Turkish soil
using non-Turkish operatives, the al-Saqa incident shows that it would be
possible. The latest al-Qaeda attack in Turkey was directed at the US
consulate in Istanbul in July 2008. Three Turkish policemen were killed in
the attack, which was described by the Turkish security forces as al-
Qaeda’s retaliatory response to the recent effective operations carried out
by the Turkish security forces.
36
35
Hürriyet, 15 February 2005.
36
Taraf, 10 July 2008.
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In fact, in the wake of the Istanbul bombings, groups linked to or
inspired by al-Qaeda have been the target of greater scrutiny by the
Turkish intelligence services and the security forces. As is the case in many
parts of the world, however, it is much harder to trace small groups that
have no direct link to al-Qaeda than larger movements that are better
organised. For example, on 9 March 2004, two Islamist youths
independently sought to bomb 40 Freemasons congregating at the Masonic
Lodge in Istanbul’s Kartal district.
37
Security prevented the two from
deploying the bomb properly. The activists had no direct connection with
al-Qaeda, but were clearly inspired by the network.
38
Far from being
professional militants, Turks influenced by al-Qaeda are generally ordinary
citizens. One of the suspects arrested as part of a major operation in the
central Anatolian city of Aksaray in December 2007 was a high school
English teacher, and four others were likewise employed and socially
integrated individuals. Al-Qaeda style militancy in Turkey continues to
attract individuals outside the usual profile of young, single,
unemployed/underemployed youths.
Turkish intelligence services and security forces are well equipped
and experienced in counter-terrorism. Yet for several reasons, Turkey is ill
prepared for a potential fight against al-Qaeda. One of the main reasons is
that Turkish counter-terrorism is overwhelmingly focused on the PKK.
Furthermore, Turkish public opinion remains unconvinced of the threat
posed by al-Qaeda. Some believe that this organisation does not exist,
having been fabricated for manipulative purposes by countries such as the
US and Israel. Others accept that al-Qaeda is real, although they do not
view it as an organisation countering US and Israeli hegemony, but rather
as a tool used by these countries to colonise the Middle East. With Turkish–
US relations strained as never before, a larger number of Turks are also
inclined to sympathise – or at least empathise – with al-Qaeda’s stated goal
of combating US policies. Many Turks continue to believe that it is
impossible for al-Qaeda to target Turkey, especially as the country is run by
a party with Islamist roots. Others subscribe to the theory that al-Qaeda did
not, in fact, target Turkey in November 2003. According to this view, the
intended victims of the synagogue bombings were Jews, and therefore a
37
Freemasons are considered pro-Zionist by many Turkish Islamists.
38
Hürriyet, 12 March 2004.
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