Karl marx an Intellectual Biography Rolf Hosfeld

Phenomenology of Communism

Compared to his view on the Silesian uprising, Marx regarded the communism he encountered in Paris as nothing more than in- complete dogmatic abstraction. “This communism,” he wrote in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, is itself only “a special expression of the humanistic principle, an expression which is still infected by its antithesis—the private system.” It was no coincidence, then, that other socialist doctrines arose alongside communism, “because it is itself only a special, one-sided realisation of the socialist principle.” By this Marx meant above all the conceptions of Charles Fourier and Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon, who as philosophers of history and sociologists had turned to the problems of the present from differ- ent perspectives and with different imaginative approaches. In Paris he dealt very intensely with both these schools and the communist groups, predicting the sublation of their one-sidedness—according to the model of Hegel’s phenomenological stages of a consciousness that is unintelligible to itself.¹³⁹

“The transcendence of self-estrangement follows the same course as self-estrangement,” he wrote in a quite Hegelian fashion in his posthumously published Paris Manuscripts, mentioning Proudhon, who denounced property as theft; Fourier, who regarded standardized and divided—and thus unfree—labor as the source of an alienated existence; and Saint-Simon, who was the first to look at industrial labor as such and from that drew formulations for improving condi- tions for workers. The communist schools had finally reached the stage of the positive transcendence of private property, even if still only imperfectly, Marx wrote. The first positive annulment of pri- vate property—crude communism, he stated further in his Hegelian

manner—is thus merely one form of the vileness of private property, a culmination of this envy and an abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilization. Some of the forms of this communism were still of a political nature, democratic or despotic, and others wanted to abolish the state without dealing further with the nature of pri- vate property and thus the alienation of man. In any form, accord- ing to Marx, communism demanded the reintegration or return of man unto himself. But because it had not dealt with the nature of private property, with its ideas of egalitarian distribution it was still entirely captive to and infected by it. It had admittedly grasped its concept, but not its essence.¹⁴⁰

Parisian communism of the 1840s was a child of the French Revo- lution. For a long time it was intellectually dominated by its over- lord, Filippo Buonarroti, who died in 1837. Buonarroti was a de- scendant of the Italian artist Michelangelo and a former member of the Parisian Jacobin Club, and for a while he moved within Robespierre’s intimate circle. In 1795 he got to know “Gracchus” Babeuf, who after the attempt to lead the poor from the suburbs in an uprising under the slogan “bread and the constitution of 1793!” served time in the Collège du Plessis prison until, as a republican, he was again released after a royalist revolt. Driven underground for good by Napoleon in 1796, Babeuf had formed the Conspiracy of Equals, a secret communist organization with a strongly centralized leadership. With his book, Conspiration pour l’Egalité dite de Babeuf, published in 1828, Buonarroti made the history of the organization popular again in the 1830s. Babeuf and Buonarroti represented what Marx called “crude” communism in its despotic form.

Buonarroti in particular, a Rousseauist of the purist order, was of the view that in a morally corrupt society, the journey to societal happiness inevitably had to be enforced by an uncompromising edu- cational dictatorship. This was, according to Marx, the first idea of the new world order¹⁴¹ to emerge from the French Revolution. Max- imilien de Robespierre was Buonarroti’s great hero, and Buonarroti introduced to the world the myth, popular since the 1830s, that the measures of the Jacobin Committee of Public Safety—the first people’s republic in history and the model for all future insurgen- cies—would ultimately have led to an egalitarian society, had they not been violently interrupted by Robespierre’s arrest and execution. His program was followed by a significant neo-Babouvist movement, whose most important leading figures included Robespierre’s admirer

Albert Laponneraye; Theodore Dézamy, who in Marx’s eyes was the most scientific of all of the French communists; and the conspirator Louis-Auguste Blanqui, who in a certain sense would become the legitimate heir to Gracchus Babeuf and whom Marx always regarded with a very ambivalent love-hatred. The neo-Babouvists supported class struggle and had as their objective, as Laponneraye put it, “the abolition of the exploitation of man by man.”¹⁴²

The more democratic form of communism mentioned by Marx was represented by Etienne Cabet. With around two hundred thou- sand supporters, he was by far the most influential communist of his time, among other reasons because of the widely distributed peri- odical Populaire and the five editions of his Travel and Adventures of Lord William Carisdall in Icaria, a description of a communist society in the form of a literary travelogue. In Icaria, common property pre- vailed and a central planning commission looked after production and distribution as justified by need. The political organization of his utopian future state followed the model of direct democracy. For the real future of France, Cabet envisioned a democratic republic that, without an overthrow or violent expropriations, would intro- duce communism in a democratic manner within a transition period of fifty years.¹⁴³ However, in the mid 1840s, while Marx was living in Paris, Cabet became increasingly radical, ever more convinced that communism would only be possible as the result of an organized workers’ movement.¹⁴⁴ Later, Marx still considered him respectable for this reason, that is, for his practical attitude towards the French pro- letariat. Marx viewed the socialist Louis Blanc similarly—at least, until 1848; at one point Blanc was supposed to be recruited to col- laborate on the Jahrbücher, and his call for the “organization du tra- vail”—for the elimination of competition through the organization of labor—was very popular and helped inspire Marx’s ideas about planned economies.

Marx considered Proudhon’s first work, What is Property?, to be by far his best. In this text, according to Marx, Proudhon acted with re- spect to Saint-Simon and Fourier much as Feuerbach had done with respect to Hegel: he drew attention to the right problems and, by questioning the legal basis of property, managed an act of liberation without even being a serious theoretician. But such sensationalistic writings could play their catalytic role in the sciences just as well as they did in fiction. And in fact, in terms of theory Marx owed a far greater debt to Saint-Simon and Fourier than to the communist

schools of his period, or even to Proudhon, who at the time was at height of his fame and with whom, during the summer of 1844, Marx sat and debated throughout the night.¹⁴⁵ Communism offered projects, but it did not offer a real philosophy of history.

Even later, Friedrich Engels saw Saint-Simon and Fourier as the first Enlightenment thinkers who were enlightened about the En- lightenment and, next to Hegel, the most important representatives of the dialectic of Enlightenment of their time. During the course of the French Revolution the state of reason had gone to pieces; Rousseau’s social contract found its reality during the Jacobin Terror. The promise of eternal peace turned into Napoleon’s endless wars of conquest, and the society of reason had shown itself to be unsup- portable without the poverty and misery of the working masses.¹⁴⁶ According to Engels, these were the problems that Saint-Simon and Fourier saw themselves confronted with.

Marx and Engels got to know each other better during that sum- mer of 1844. The first long conversation between just the two of them took place on 28 August as they sat at a marble table in the Café de la Régence, a hub for chess players that was rich in tradition, having been frequented by Voltaire and Rousseau and described by Diderot in Rameau’s Nephew. Marx and Engels had already met in Cologne during the period of the Rheinische Zeitung, but at the time Marx, seeing Engels as an excited envoy of the “Free Ones” in Ber- lin, had shown little interest in a closer relationship. In the mean- time, however, he had changed his mind, above all because of the two articles Engels submitted to the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher. In particular, Engels’s “Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy” (long afterward, Marx still called it a brilliant essay¹⁴⁷) had an inspi- rational effect on Marx, who was always open to impulses.

Engels had just returned from Manchester, where his father had sent him as an agent for the Elberfeld textile company Ermen & En- gels. There he was confronted with the harsh world of labor in mod- ern industrialized society. Soon he saw England as nothing but a vile class state ruling over a class society. Even in the words of philan- thropic Tories like Lord Ashley and Benjamin Disraeli, England was really composed of “two nations” that found themselves in a state of war. From the outset, the young man from Elberfeld, strongly in- fluenced by the enthusiastic communist ideas of his Rhenish friend Moses Hess, viewed the irritating modern world on the other side of the Channel through the eyes of a man awash in chiliastic ex-

pectations of crises. His later book on the condition of the working classes in England—in large part an impressive achievement of early empirical sociological research—revealed these chiliastic traits in its discussion of the consequences of industrialization for the imme- diate future. During this first visit to England, Engels began to write for Robert Owen’s communist New Moral Order and the Northern Star of the radical Chartist George Julian Harney. Initially he was completely under the influence of Proudhon, whom Engels called the “most important writer”¹⁴⁸ among the French socialists because he considered property the crux of the explanation of the modern world’s contradictions.

Apart from dealing with the classics of English economics, how- ever, the “Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy” revealed clear signs that Engels had closely studied Charles Fourier, particularly re- garding the destructive effects of trade crises. Civilization, by which Fourier meant developing industrial society, was moving in a faulty cycle. Industry was developed in order to create workplaces, but in reality it only increased the army of the unemployed; by increas- ing production, one caused crises of overproduction; by increasing abundance, one exacerbated poverty. Civilization, “the most recent of our scientific illusions,”¹⁴⁹ according to Fourier, in reality meant nothing more than industrial anarchy. It was a topsy-turvy world. The twenty-three-year-old Engels saw things the same way. “What are we to think of a law,” he asked with an eye to the repeatedly recurring trade crises of the preceding years, “which can only assert itself through periodic upheavals? It is certainly a natural law based on the unconsciousness of the participants.” The system of free trade that had been erected on Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, thought Engels, had in reality brought the world nothing but “hypocrisy, in- consistency and immorality.”¹⁵⁰ It was irrational, self-destructive, and as a consequence, transitory. This made a strong impression on Marx, and over the next one and a half weeks they elaborated these ideas during daily meetings in the Rue Vaneau. “When I visited Marx in Paris in the summer of 1844,” Engels remembered, “our complete agreement in all theoretical fields became evident and our joint work dates from that time.”¹⁵¹ It was the beginning of a lifelong friendship between two thoroughly kindred spirits.

By the time Marx and Engels resided in Paris, the Saint-Simon school had long been defunct. Its adherents, among them Pierre Le- roux, had long ago moved elsewhere, yet its core ideas lived on. In

its heyday in the late 1820s and early 1830s, Leroux had published the Saint-Simonian periodical Globe¹⁵² and Saint-Amand Bazard conducted an exposition of the systematized doctrines of Saint- Simon in weekly Wednesday lectures on the Rue Taranne 12, the former house of the philosophe Baron Paul Thiry d’Holbach.¹⁵³ Soon the “belle formule” of the Saint-Simonists, as Heinrich Heine called it in the early 1830s—the catchphrase about the “exploitation de l’homme par l’homme,”¹⁵⁴ the exploitation of man by man—was on everyone’s lips.¹⁵⁵

In the ongoing social crisis since the French Revolution, the Saint-Simonists saw the creation of a cycle. The Revolution could not be understood because it was still ongoing, but it was still ongo- ing because it could not be understood. And the reason it was not understood, Bazard thought, was that so few understood exploita- tion. In reality the modern world was not characterized by reason but rather by the “final transformation” of slavery, the “relation of the master to the wage worker.” But property formed the “basis of the political order,” and like everything else in the world it was sub- ject to the law of progress. The exploitation of man by man must end, Bazard announced before a well-read public of intellectuals and artists, and consequently the constitution of property in which the exploitation persisted also had to disappear. The industrial crises caused by the constitution of property were due solely to the ab- sence of a general plan.

Yet the future, Bazard taught with explicit reference to Leibniz’s concept of tendency, had already begun in the “germs” of the pres- ent. A “Plan of Providence”¹⁵⁶ was in force, and its agenda was the continuation of the divine work of creation on earth, that is, the re- placement of the antagonisms of exploitation and competition with a rationally controlled social administration aided by the sciences, unified under a general metaphysical principle, and the systematic organization of industry.¹⁵⁷ The nuclei of almost all of the noneco- nomic ideas of later socialism, thought Engels with a certain amount of justification, were already present in Saint-Simon.¹⁵⁸

Despite the reference to providence, however, evidence of teleo- logical necessity from the so-called real course of history was still missing. For this reason Marx, shortly after his brief Feuerbach eu- phoria, found himself in Paris, compelled to return to Hegel. All the elements of criticism were hidden in the latter’s Phenomenol- ogy of Spirit, he wrote in his Parisian Manuscripts; they were already

prepared and elaborated in a manner often rising far above the Hegelian standpoint. The greatness of the Phenomenology lay in the fact that Hegel grasped the self-education of man as a process, and objectifi- cation as loss of the object, as alienation, and as transcendence of this alienation; that he thus grasped the essence of labor and under- stood objective man—true man, because he was real—as the result of man’s own labor.

Here, for Marx, also lay hidden the unresolved question Proud- hon had raised about the essence of property. “We have already gone a long way to the solution of this problem,” Marx noted,

by transforming the question of the origin of private property into the question of the relation of alienated labor to the course of humanity’s development. For when one speaks of private property, one thinks of dealing with something external to man. When one speaks of labor, one is directly dealing with man himself. This new formulation of the question already contains its solution.
The subjective essence of private property was nothing other than labor, just as, for Hegel, the essence of the master was the servant. The whole of human servitude, Marx continued, was involved in the relation of the worker to production, and “all relations of servitude are but modifications and consequences of this relation.”¹⁵⁹ With his “Outlines,” Engels had drawn Marx’s attention to the fact that, ac- cording to economists, capital was “stored-up labour.” The division between capital and labor that followed from private property, En- gels thought, is thus nothing other than an “inner dichotomy of la- bour.”¹⁶⁰ From this Marx concluded that here lay a developed state of contradiction—hence a dynamic relationship driving towards resolution.

This required yet another reversal of Hegel, leading Marx be- yond Feuerbach and then away from him again. Marx maintained that when Hegel grasped wealth, state power, and so on as concepts estranged from the human being, he grasped them only in their form as thoughts. “The whole process therefore ends with absolute knowledge,”¹⁶¹ according to Marx—that is, with a mere interpreta- tion of the course of the world as a trail of human self-alienation. Hegel’s path to consciousness had thereby completed a negation of the negation, but this only led to the intellectual transparency of a self-made history without abolishing the real alienations and the ob- jectified power structures of an inverted world determined by these alienations. Only at the Copernican turning point of communism

as the truth of this world, in which man, instead of moving around an illusory sun, moves around himself in real life,¹⁶² thought Marx, did a true—material—abolishment of alienation become possible. Only communism is thus the actual negation of the negation, and finally the riddle of history solved¹⁶³ as the movement of material his- tory itself. Private property, Marx and Engels argued with an eye to their immediate present, drives itself in its economic movement toward its own dissolution, and the proletariat only executes the sentence that private property pronounces on itself by producing the prole- tariat.¹⁶⁴ This was nothing less than the prognosis of an imminent final judgment, in which the real people—the proletariat, as Marx prophesized—might appear as puer robustus, sed malitiosus, as a ro- bust and angry boy.¹⁶⁵ Fantasies? Yes, and big ones!

Marx’s oft-misunderstood and frequently cited eleventh thesis about Feuerbach, written in 1845, states: “Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”¹⁶⁶ The entire thesis makes sense only in relation to Hegel’s construc- tion of absolute knowledge. But if it is put this way, the material- ist philosopher who is unwilling to abandon the aim of abolishing self-alienation is then forced to become a revolutionary politician. Hegel ultimately reconciled himself to the world the way it was, but he interpreted this world as a product of people and wanted to make it transparent as such. As a consequence, naturally this could result in a demand for change, but never a demand for the abolishment of a complex differentiation that was almost foreordained by the de- velopment of history. Was Marx aware that this was precisely what the result of his conceptualization had to be? Or did he merely auto- matically follow an idea once it had taken hold? Compared to Marx, Karl Löwith once said, Hegel was in any case far more of a realist.¹⁶⁷

The Discovery of Simplicity

Marx’s fourth idea also concerned a leveling of complexities. It in- volved his thoughts about politics and the state as a repressive insti- tution of the ruling class. Neither Hegel nor the French Revolution was the ground from which these thoughts were mined. Family and civil society were the actual components of the state;¹⁶⁸ quite distinct and opposite from Hegel’s construction, they were the genuinely ac- tive elements, as Marx had previously stated in his Kreuznach cri-

tique of Hegelian constitutional law. A little later, his criticism of German ideology would maintain that the state issues from the real material life-process and thus does not have its own history. Mate- rial life—the mode of production—was the real basis of the state and remained so at every stage, which incidentally is something Thomas Hobbes had already recognized in a certain way in Leviathan, where power represents the basis for all law. The state did not arise through a dominant will, Marx maintained, but vice versa, the state that emerged from the material mode of human life also took on the form of a dominant will.¹⁶⁹

His actual problem, however, remained the modern state and how it had classically come into being through the French Revolu- tion and contemporary civil society. During this time Marx delved intensively into the history of the French Revolution, in particular more recent works by a number of liberal historians who had been influenced by Saint-Simon—among them François Auguste Mig- net, who described the drama of the French Revolution as a struggle between all the classes involved that had arrived at a certain peace only under the bourgeois government of the Directory after the fall of Robespierre. Just as the English Revolution had ushered in an era of new forms of government, so did the age of a new society in Europe begin with the French Revolution. Mignet also put forth the thesis that in the founding acts of history there had as yet been “no sovereign but force,”¹⁷⁰ ushering in a concept that would be cen- tral for Marx: that of class struggle. “Modern Europe was born in the struggle of the different social classes,” François Pierre Guillaume Guizot announced in 1828 before the tiered lecture hall of the Pari- sian Faculté des lettres: “The struggle between them did not become the starting point of stagnation but rather the cause of progress.” Guizot had already described property relations as the basis of every class struggle¹⁷¹ in his 1826 history of the English Revolution and thereby also revised his earlier thesis that ultimately referred back to Henri de Boulainvilliers’s Recherches sur l’ancien gouvernement de la France, namely that the development of classes in France was based solely on the conquest of Gaul by a caste of Frankish warriors. Guizot, however, considered the class oppositions to be a given fact and therefore sought, like Hegel, the mediation of those oppositions by the state as a universal third party.¹⁷² Apart from that, he also felt that in modern Europe “national unity” would allow the class struggle to find peace.¹⁷³ This was before the July Revolution.

But to every attentive observer, French society after 1830 made Guizot’s prognosis look like a fleeting chimera. The July Revolution, noted the conservative Hegelian Lorenz von Stein in 1850, was nothing other than the signal for a series of fierce new battles, and “the condition that followed it was a permanent state of war.”¹⁷⁴ At the time of Marx’s residence in Paris, Guizot was the exterior minis- ter, but in reality he was the actual strongman in the cabinet of Louis Philippe, the “citizen king.” The catchphrase issued by this French Calvinist, “Enrichissez-vous par le travail et par l’éspargne”—enrich yourselves through work and frugality—significantly aggravated the social climate during the July Monarchy.

In 1830 the bourgeoisie finally managed to fulfill its wishes from the year 1789, Marx noted at the time.

with the only difference that its political enlightenment was now com- pleted, that it no longer considered the constitutional representative state as a means for achieving the ideal of the state, the welfare of the world and universal human aims but, on the contrary, had acknowl- edged it as the official expression of its own exclusive power and the political recognition of its own special interests.¹⁷⁵
And in fact, with the possible exception of England, nowhere had there ever been such unrestrained bourgeois rule as in France dur- ing the period of the July Monarchy, which made its debut with the words of the finance magnate Lafitte at the Paris Hôtel de Ville: From now on the bankers will rule.¹⁷⁶

Marx made a theory out of this. Soon thereafter he wrote:

By the mere fact that it is a class and no longer an estate, the bour- geoisie is forced to organise itself no longer locally, but nationally, and to give a general form to its mean average interests. Through the emancipation of private property from the community, the State has become a separate entity, beside and outside civil society; but it is nothing more than the form of organisation which the bourgeois necessarily adopt both for internal and external purposes, for the mu- tual guarantee of their property and interests.
And further:
Since the State is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests, and in which the whole civil society of an epoch is epitomised, it follows that the State mediates in the for-

mation of all common institutions and that the institutions receive a political form. Hence the illusion that law is based on the will, and indeed on the will divorced from its real basis—on free will.¹⁷⁷

Naturally, it was not merely experience that spoke in these sen- tences but primarily the view of the state and politics that necessar- ily followed from his new base/superstructure paradigm of historical materialism.

In any case, the state by no means represented for him a neutral and positively configured legal order—or even parts of it. Marx saw even the doctrine of the division of powers as merely a dominant idea—elevated to the status of an eternal law—of a transition pe- riod during which the monarchy, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for domination.¹⁷⁸ With respect to Montesquieu this idea was perhaps somewhat correct, but as a general thesis it suffered from sociological reductionism and a complete lack of understanding of the complex political institutions and rules that generally remained characteristic of Marx’s historical materialism. All political struggles were for him nothing more mere manifestations of social collisions,¹⁷⁹ and the democratic representative state with its emancipated slav- ery was only a spiritualistic-democratic illusion. “What a terrible illu- sion,”¹⁸⁰ he railed indignantly in a style that was almost reminiscent of Fourier’s satirical polemics.

Marx had difficulty giving this theory a consistent form. Particu- larly when it came to supporting his philosophical-systematic expla- nation with empirical details, he occasionally lapsed into platitudes that elsewhere he would certainly have mocked as the shallowness of British utilitarian thought. The modern state, he wrote for in- stance in The German Ideology, had gradually been purchased by the taxes of private property holders. Through the national debt, the state had fallen entirely into their hands, and through the rise and fall of state funds on the stock exchange it had become wholly de- pendent on commercial credit.¹⁸¹ Even if that was somewhat true for the July Monarchy—in 1832 Heine called the Parisian market price for state funds the “thermometer of popular prosperity” and the halls of the stock market the place “where the interests are at home which in this our time decide peace and war”¹⁸²—it was neither a systematic nor profound theoretical explanation. It also did not de- velop any further. Engels would repeat it almost verbatim in 1884 in The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, even the

thesis about the spiritualistic-democratic illusion. In a democratic republic, Engels maintained, wealth exercises its power “indirectly, but all the more surely,” especially with universal suffrage. As long as the oppressed class is “not yet ripe” for its self-liberation, argued Engels, “it will in its majority regard the existing order of society as the only one possible and, politically, will form the tail of the capi- talist class, its extreme Left wing.”¹⁸³ In short, the democratic state would remain a class state until the majority of the workers had be- come Marxists and abolished it. One can hardly call this a modern theory of the state.

New Species

Marx’s fifth idea was the dictatorship of the proletariat as the nec- essary result of the modern class struggle. He never systematically explained this thesis, yet from early on he considered it the most important result of his actual discoveries. Writing to a friend in New York in 1852, Marx noted:

Now as for myself, I do not claim to have discovered either the ex- istence of classes in modern society or the struggle between them. Long before me, bourgeois historians had described the historical development of this struggle between the classes, as had bourgeois economists their economic anatomy. My own contribution was 1. to show that the existence of classes is merely bound up with certain his- torical phases in the development of production; 2. that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat; 3. that this dicta- torship itself constitutes no more than a transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society.¹⁸⁴
The concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat appeared for the first time in the 1850 statutes of the Universal Society of Revolu- tionary Communists.¹⁸⁵ It pertained to an agreement—co-signed by Marx—between German communists, Blanquists, and revolution- ary Chartists who had been influenced by an English translation of Buonarroti’s book about Babeuf. The society did not exist for very long. Nonetheless, the statutes are of historical interest because they show that Marx appropriated the designation “dictatorship of the proletariat” from the Blanquists. Actually, it was the concept of a purely educational dictatorship. Faced with the question from the

democratic socialist Théophile Thoré: “Why do you need a dicta- torship if you have the people behind you?” the Égalitaire responded in 1840: because of the hundreds of years of being accustomed to de- moralizing tyranny.¹⁸⁶ The neo-Babouvists and Blanquists evidently did not see a contradiction between sovereignty of the people and an educational dictatorship. They simply resolved it in a political “contrat pédagogique,” an educational contract analogous to that in the fourth book of Rousseau’s Émile. “Make me free,” Émile says to his educator, “by guarding me against the passions which do me violence; do not let me become their slave; compel me to be my own master and to obey, not my senses, but my reason.”¹⁸⁷ The peo- ple were thus sovereign only insofar as they voluntarily subjugated themselves for their own good.

In his third thesis about Feuerbach, Marx had already objected to such ideas, maintaining that they divided society into two parts, one of which is superior to society, and that it had been forgotten that the educator himself had to be educated.¹⁸⁸ In detail, the statutes of the universal association were a political compromise. But it is reveal- ing that Marx felt closer to the Blanquists than to any other stream of French socialism and communism—not because he considered them great theorists, but because they were resolute proponents of class struggle and unconditionally affirmed the creative role of vio- lence in history. Beyond that, they were proponents of a concept of permanent revolution. In his eyes, all of this gave them an un- conscious depth, for they bluntly—if also somewhat crudely—pro- claimed what the proletariat is, and what, in accordance with this being, it will historically be compelled to do.¹⁸⁹

Thus he spoke with admiration about that revolutionary social- ism for which the bourgeoisie has itself invented the name of Blanqui. This Blanquist socialism was the declaration of the permanence of the revolution. The class dictatorship of the proletariat was a neces- sary way station along the road to the abolition of class distinctions in general, the abolition of all the relations of production on which they rest, the abolition of all the social relations that correspond to these relations of production, and the overthrow of all the ideas that result from these social relations¹⁹⁰—precisely points two and three of Marx’s supposed actual discoveries. Basically, he had simply thrown the philosophical mantle of his historical materialism over the legacy of the Conspiracy of Equals and inserted the dictatorship of the proletariat into an eschatological figure of the negation of the

negation. Only because of this did the Blanquist project become a historical necessity, the painfully riven but unavoidable transition period at the end of the prehistory of humanity. “O sacred head, now wounded”—the death of an inverted and resurrection of a re- deemed modernity.

What distinguished Marx from Blanqui, however, was his idea that a determined minority could introduce communism at any time with a deftly engineered coup d’état. “The longer the time that events allow to thinking humanity for taking stock of its posi- tion, and to suffering mankind for mobilising its forces,” he thought, “the more perfect on entering the world will be the product that the present time bears in its womb.”¹⁹¹ Marx always held the view that the emancipation of the working class had to be achieved by the working class itself ¹⁹² and not by a small avant-garde. But this sup- posedly most important point of his political theory also remained the cloudiest, and it became the critical Achilles’ heel in the history of communism. Regarding the task of the worker, he asked in his text about the 1850 class struggles in France, who accomplishes that? The Revolution was by no means a short-lived affair. And he fol- lowed with a puzzling sentence: The present generation is like the Jews whom Moses led through the wilderness: “It has not only a new world to conquer, it must go under in order to make room for the men who are able to cope with a new world.”¹⁹³ Thus spoke Zarathustra as well, when he proclaimed the Übermensch to be the meaning of the earth.¹⁹⁴ Paradoxically, the museum curators who kept the eschato- logical flame in the secular nineteenth century were not so much the great theologians but the worldly-pious atheists like Marx—and Nietzsche.¹⁹⁵

Notes

1. 
   Karl Marx, “Introduction,” Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Collected Works of Marx and Engels (henceforth MECW), electronic edition (InteLex Corporation: 2003), vol. 3, 182.
   
2. 
   Marx, Announcement, 17 March 1843, in MECW, vol. 1, 376.
   
3. 
   Marx, “The Ban on the Leipziger Allgemeine Zeitung within the Prussian State,” in MECW, vol. 1, 311.
   
4. 
   Marx to Ruge, 25 January 1843, in MECW, vol. 1, 397f.
   

5. 
   Heinrich Heine, Ludwig Börne, in Werke und Briefe in zehn Bänden, ed. Klaus Briegleb, 10 vols. (Munich, 1976), vol. 7, 50.
   
6. 
   Benedetto Croce, History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, trans. Henry Furst (New York, 1933), 102.
   
7. 
   Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (Kitchener, Ontario, 2001), 471.
   
8. 
   Hanns-Günter Reissner, Eduard Gans: Ein Leben im Vormärz (Tübingen, 1965), 131.
   
9. 
   Günter Busch, Eugène Delacroix – Die Freiheit auf den Barrikaden (Stuttgart, 1960), 16.
   
10. 
    Karl Gutzkow, Wally the Sceptic (Frankfurt am Main, 1974), 39.
    
11. 
    Marx to his Father, 10 November 1837, in MECW, vol. 1, 10, 18, 12. Trans- lator note: some of the words here are translated directly from the German version: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke (hereafter MEW), 39 vols., 2 suppl. vols. (Berlin, 1956–1990), suppl. vol. 1, 9.
    
12. 
    Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, preface to Phenomenology of Spirit, in G.W.F. Hegel: The Oxford University Press Translations, electronic edition (Oxford, 2000), 32.
    
13. 
    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, in MECW, vol. 5, 37.
    
14. 
    Marx to his Father, 10 November 1837, in MECW, vol. 1, 19.
    
15. 
    Marx, “Debates on Freedom of the Press and Publication of the Proceedings of the Assembly of the Estates,” in MECW, vol. 1, 154.
    
16. 
    Hegel to Hardenberg, mid October 1820, in Briefe von und an Hegel, ed. Jo- hannes Hoffmeister, 4 vols. (Hamburg, 1954), vol. 2, 249.
    
17. 
    Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Additions, §258, in
    

G.W.F. Hegel: The Oxford University Press Translations, 279.

18. 
    Eduard Gans, Naturrecht, in Philosophische Schriften, ed. Horst Schröder (Ber- lin, 1971), 136, 124f.
    
19. 
    Eduard Gans, Rückblicke auf Personen und Zustände, in Philosophische Schriften,
    

87.

20. 
    Golo Mann, Friedrich von Gentz: Geschichte eines europäischen Staatsmannes
    

(Frankfurt am Main, 1972), 304; quotations translated by Bernard Heise.

21. 
    Barclay, David. Frederick William IV and the Prussian Monarchy 1840–1861
    

(Oxford, 1995), 91.

22. 
    Marx to Ruge, May 1843, “Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher,” in MECW, vol. 3, 139.
    

23. Ibid., 139.

24. 
    Reinhart Kosellek, Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution (Stuttgart, 1987), 423.
    
25. 
    Marx to Ruge 1843, Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, in
    

MECW, vol. 3, 139f.

24. 
    August von Cieszkowski as quoted in David McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx (London, 1969), 52.
    
25. 
    Arnold Ruge as quoted in McLellan, Young Hegelians, 52.
    
26. 
    Georg Herwegh, “Die Literatur im Jahre 1840,” in Werke in einem Band (East Berlin, 1975), 320.
    
27. 
    Marx, Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy, Sixth Notebook, from the Prepara- tory Materials, in MECW, vol. 1, 491.
    

24. 
    David Friedrich Strauß, Das Leben Jesu, in Die Junghegelianer: Ausgewählte Tex- te, ed. Hans Steussloff (Berlin, 1963), 30.
    
25. 
    David Friedrich Strauß, Allgemeines Verhältnis der Hegelschen Philosophie zur theologischen Kritik, in Die Hegelsche Linke, ed. Ingrid Pepperle (Berlin, 1978), 65, 61, 66; quotation translated by Bernard Heise.
    
26. 
    Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 321.
    
27. 
    Strauß, Allgemeines Verhältnis, 55.
    
28. 
    Marx, “Yet Another Word on Bruno Bauer und die Akademische Lehrfreiheit,” in
    

MECW, vol. 1, 211–214.

24. 
    Schweitzer, Albert, Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung (Tübingen, 1933).
    
25. 
    Bruno Bauer, Critique of the Synoptics, vol. 3, quoted in McLellan, Young Hege- lians, 57.
    
26. 
    Bruno Bauer, “Die gute Sache der Freiheit und meine eigene Angelegenheit,” in Bruno Bauer, Feldzüge der reinen Kritik (Frankfurt am Main, 1968), 122.
    
27. 
    Bruno Bauer, Das entdeckte Christentum, quoted in David McLellan, Die Jung- hegelianer und Karl Marx (Munich, 1974), 70.
    
28. 
    Bauer, “Die gute Sache der Freiheit,” 122; quotation translated by Bernard Heise.
    
29. 
    Bruno Bauer, “Der christliche Staat und unsere Zeit,” in Feldzüge der reinen Kritik, 29, 32.
    
30. 
    Bauer to Marx, 11 December 1839, quoted in McLellan, Young Hegelians,
    

70.

24. 
    Xavier Tiliette, Schelling: Biographie (Stuttgart, 2004), 392.
    
25. 
    Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, in MECW, vol. 4, 108f.
    
26. 
    Bruno Bauer to Edgar Bauer, 9 December 1841, in Bruno Bauer, Feldzüge der reinen Kritik, 237.
    
27. 
    Karl Ernst Schubarth, “Über die Unvereinbarkeit der Hegelschen Staatslehre mit dem obersten Lebens- und Entwicklungsprinzip des Preußischen Staats (1839),” in Materialien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie, ed. Manfred Riedel, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), vol. 1, 256, 250.
    
28. 
    Bruno Bauer, Die Posaune des jüngsten Gerichts über Hegel, den Atheisten und Antichristen: Ein Ultimatum, in Pepperle, Die Hegelsche Linke, 297, 236, 300; quotation translated by Bernard Heise.
    
29. 
    Marx to Ruge, 5 May 1842, in MEW, vol. 27, 397.
    
30. 
    Bauer to Marx, 5 April 1840, in Pepperle, Die Hegelsche Linke, 297, 236, 300; quotations translated by Bernard Heise.
    
31. 
    Marx, Notebooks on the Epicurean Philosophy, sixth notebook, in MECW, vol. 1, 491, 492.
    

50. Ibid., 492.

51. 
    Marx, Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, in
    

MECW, vol. 1, 86.

51. 
    Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, vol. 2, (Munich, 1996) 199, 426.
    
52. 
    Moses Hess to Berthold Auerbach, 2 September 1841, in Erinnerungen an Karl Marx (Berlin, 1953), 111.
    
53. 
    Thomas Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1800–1866: Arbeitswelt und Bürger- geist (Munich, 1994), 287, 377f.
    
54. 
    Marx, “Debates on Freedom of the Press,” in MECW, vol. 1, 162.
    

51. 
    Marx, The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law, in MECW,
    

vol. 1, 209.

51. 
    Marx, “The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung,” in MECW,
    

vol. 1, 199f.

51. 
    Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1800–1866, 378.
    
52. 
    Marx, “The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung,” 202.
    
53. 
    Marx to Ruge, 9 July 1842, in MECW, vol. 1, 391.
    
54. 
    Quoted in David McLellan, Karl Marx: His Life and Thought (Bristol, 1973), 53.
    
55. 
    Karl Heinzen, “Erlebtes,” in Der negative Marx: Marx im Urteil seiner Zeitgenos- sen, ed. Siegfried Weigel (Stuttgart, 1976), 57.
    
56. 
    Bruno Bauer, “Das Juste-Milieu,” Rheinische Zeitung, 5 June 1842, in McLellan,
    

Young Hegelians, 82.

51. 
    Marx to Dagobert Oppenheim, 25 August 1842, in MECW, vol. 1, 392.
    
52. 
    Marx to Ruge, 30 November 1842, in MECW, vol. 1, 394. 66. Ibid., 393.
    

67. 
    Ruge to Marx, 4 December 1842, in Pepperle, Die Hegelsche Linke, 856f.
    
68. 
    Ruge to Moritz Fleischer, 12 December 1842, in Pepperle, Die Hegelsche Linke,
    

859.

67. 
    Marx to Oppenheim, 25 August 1842, in MECW, vol. 1, 392.
    
68. 
    Renard’s Letter to Oberpräsident von Schaper, in MECW, vol. 1, 283.
    
69. 
    Heinrich Lutz, Zwischen Habsburg und Preußen: Deutschland 1815–1866 (Ber- lin, 1985), 114ff.
    
70. 
    Marx, “Justification of the Correspondent from the Mosel,” in MECW, vol. 1, 333.
    
71. 
    Richard Friedenthal, Karl Marx: Sein Leben und seine Zeit (Munich, 1983), 173, 151.
    
72. 
    Lutz, Zwischen Habsburg und Preußen, 222.
    
73. 
    Marx, Randglossen zu den Anklagen des Ministerialreskripts, MEW, suppl. vol. 1, 425, 420.
    
74. 
    Heinz Frederick Peters, Die rote Jenny: Ein Leben mit Karl Marx (Munich, 1984), 42, 48.
    
75. 
    Friedenthal, Karl Marx, 174.
    
76. 
    Ruge to Prutz, 25 January 1843, in Pepperle, Die Hegelsche Linke, 863.
    
77. 
    Ruge to Marx, 1 February 1842, in Pepperle, Die Hegelsche Linke, 866.
    
78. 
    Marx to Ruge, 13 March 1843, in MECW, vol. 1, 399.
    
79. 
    Marx, preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in MECW,
    

vol. 29, 262.

67. 
    Arnold Ruge, foreword to Arnold Ruge, Eine Selbstkritik des Liberalismus, in Pepperle, Die Hegelsche Linke, 573.
    
68. 
    Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, in MECW, vol. 3, 29.
    
69. 
    Georges Gurvitch, Dialektik und Soziologie (Berlin, 1965), 145.
    
70. 
    Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, in MECW, vol. 3, 88, 30, 75, 48.
    
71. 
    Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 357f.
    
72. 
    Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, in MECW, vol. 3, 118, 121.
    

67. 
    Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” in MECW, vol. 3, 168.
    
68. 
    Jürgen Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne (Frankfurt am Main, 1988), 83.
    
69. 
    Pierre Leroux, Die Gesellschaft liegt im Staube, in Die frühen Sozialisten, ed. Frits Kool and Werner Krause, 2 vols. (Munich, 1972), vol. 1, 277; quotation translated by Bernard Heise.
    
70. 
    Heinrich Heine, The Works of Heinrich Heine, trans. Charles Godfrey Leland, 20 vols. (London, 1893), vol. 4, 25.
    

92. Ibid., vol. 8, 449.

93. Ibid., vol. 4, 153.

94. Ibid., vol. 8, 450.

95. Ibid., vol. 8, 458.

96. 
    Kool and Krause, Die frühen Sozialisten, vol. 1, 258ff.
    
97. 
    Heine, Works, vol. 8, 457.
    
98. 
    Kool and Krause, Die frühen Sozialisten, vol. 1, 261.
    
99. 
    Arnold Ruge, “Plan der Deutsch-Französischen Jahrbücher,” in Deutsch- Französische Jahrbücher [1844], ed. Arnold Ruge and Karl Marx (Frankfurt am Main, 1973), 90.
    
100. 
     Jacques Grandjonc, “Deutsche Emigrationspresse in Europa während des Vor- märz 1830–1848,” in Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR, Zentralinstitut für Literaturgeschichte and Centre d’Histoire et d’Analyse des Manuscrits Modernes am Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, eds., Heinrich Heine und die Zeitgenossen: Geschichtliche und literarische Befunde (East Berlin, 1979), 229–297.
     
101. 
     Heine to Laube, 7 November 1842, in Werke und Briefe, vol. 9, 99; quotation translated by Bernard Heise.
     
102. 
     Feuerbach to Ruge, June 1843, in Ruge and Marx, Deutsch-Französische Jahr- bücher, 122.
     
103. 
     Feuerbach to Ruge, 20 June 1843, in Pepperle, Die Hegelsche Linke, 877.
     
104. 
     Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, in
     

MECW, vol. 26, 364.

96. 
    Marx, Capital, vol. 1, Afterword to the Second German Edition, in MECW,
    

vol. 35, 19.

96. 
    Ludwig Feuerbach, Vorläufige Thesen zur Reformation der Philosophie, in Ludwig Feuerbach, Philosophische Kritiken und Grundsätze (Leipzig, 1969), 170, 186.
    
97. 
    John Locke, quoted in Paul Hazard, Die Krise des europäischen Geistes 1680– 1715 (Hamburg, 1939), 284, 281, 287.
    
98. 
    Feuerbach, Vorläufige Thesen, 169; quotation translated by Bernard Heise.
    
99. 
    Marx to Feuerbach, 11 August 1844, in MECW, vol. 3, 354.
    
100. 
     Eduard Gans, “Über Lerminier introduction à l’histoire du droit,” in Gans,
     

Philosophische Schriften, 241; quotation translated by Bernard Heise.

96. 
    Moses Hess, “Socialismus und Communismus: Vom Verfasser der europä- ischen Triarchie,” in Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz [1843], ed. Georg Herwegh (Lepizig, 1989), 175.
    
97. 
    Lorenz von Stein, Die industrielle Gesellschaft: Der Sozialismus und Kommunis- mus Frankreichs von 1830 bis 1848 (Munich, 1921), 1, 34.
    
98. 
    Herbert Marcuse, Vernunft und Revolution: Hegel und die Entstehung der Gesell- schaftstheorie (Berlin, 1962), 327.
    

96. 
    Moses Hess, “Socialism and Communism,” in Moses Hess, The Holy History of Mankind and Other Writings, translated and edited with an introduction by Shlomo Avineri (Cambridge, 2004), 110 and 112.
    
97. 
    Marx to Feuerbach, 11 August 1844, in MECW, vol. 3, 355.
    
98. 
    Feuerbach, Vorläufige Thesen, 181.
    
99. 
    Feuerbach to Friedrich Kapp, 15 October 1844, in Werner Schuffenhauer, Feuerbach und der junge Marx (East Berlin, 1972), 125; quotation translated by Bernard Heise.
    
100. 
     Marx, introduction to Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosphy of Law,
     

in MECW, vol. 3, 176.

96. 
    Marx, Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, in MECW, vol. 3, 144.
    
97. 
    Marx, introduction to Critique of Hegel’s Philosphy of Law, in MECW, vol. 3, 178.
    
98. 
    Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, in MECW, vol. 5, 31, 35f., 47f.
    
99. 
    Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in MECW, vol. 29, 263f.
    
100. 
     Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, in MECW, vol. 6, 212.
     
101. 
     Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, in MECW, vol. 5, 438.
     
102. 
     Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, in MECW, vol. 6, 212.
     
103. 
     Marx to Ruge, “Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher,” in MECW,
     

vol. 3, 141.

96. 
    Marx, introduction to Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, in MECW, vol. 3, 184, 185, 186.
    
97. 
    Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1800–1866, 195.
    
98. 
    Kosellek, Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution, 620.
    
99. 
    Hegel, Philosophy of Right, § 281, § 280, in G.W.F. Hegel: The Oxford Univer- sity Press Translations.
    
100. 
     Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, in MECW, vol. 4, 37.
     
101. 
     Franz Mehring, Karl Marx: The Story of His Life (London, 2003), 68.
     
102. 
     Ruge to his mother, 28 March 1844, quoted in McLellan, Karl Marx, 99.
     
103. 
     Ibid., 99; Fritz J. Raddatz, Karl Marx: Eine politische Biographie (Hamburg, 1975), 78; quotation translated by Bernard Heise.
     
104. 
     Karl August Varnhagen von Ense, Diary entry for 16 June 1844, in Kommen- tare zum Zeitgeschehen (Leipzig, 1984), 132.
     
105. 
     Heinrich Heine, “The Silesian Weavers,” in The Poems of Heine, trans. Edgar Alfred Bowring (London, 1866), 395.
     
106. 
     Marx, “Critical Marginal Notes on the Article ‘The King of Prussia and So- cial Reform: by a Prussian,’” in MECW, vol. 3, 201, 201, 205, 199, 201.
     
107. 
     Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, in MECW, vol. 6, 177.
     
108. 
     Marx, “Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher,” in MECW, vol. 3, 136, 143, 144.
     
109. 
     Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in MECW, vol. 3, 237, 295, 296.
     
110. 
     Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, in MECW, vol. 4, 119.
     
111. 
     Jean Bruhat, “Französischer Sozialismus von 1815 bis 1848,” in Geschichte des Sozialismus, ed. Jacques Droz, 4 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1974), 192.
     

96. 
    Joachim Höppner and Waltraud Seidel-Höppner, Von Babeuf bis Blanqui: Französischer Sozialismus vor Marx. 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1976), vol. 1, 318–327; Bruhat, “Französischer Sozialismus von 1815 bis 1848,” 189–191.
    
97. 
    Christopher H. Johnson, “Etienne Cabet und das Problem des Klassenant- agonismus,” in Vormarxistischer Sozialismus, ed. Manfred Hahn (Frankfurt am Main, 1974), 212.
    
98. 
    Marx, “On Proudhon,” in MECW, vol. 20, 31, 26, 28.
    
99. 
    Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, in MECW, vol. 24, 289.
    
100. 
     Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in MECW, vol. 29, 264.
     
101. 
     Engels, “Progress of Social Reform on the Continent,” in MECW, vol. 3, 399.
     
102. 
     Charles Fourier, Ökonomisch-philosophische Schriften (Berlin, 1980), 57; quo- tation translated by Bernard Heise.
     
103. 
     Engels, “Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy,” in MECW, vol. 3, 433f, 420
     
104. 
     Engels, “On the History of the Communist League,” in MECW, vol. 26, 318.
     
105. 
     Kool and Krause, Die frühen Sozialisten, vol. 1, 259.
     
106. 
     Gottfried Salomon-Delatour, introduction to Die Lehre Saint-Simons, ed. Gottfried Salomon-Delatour (Neuwied, 1962), 19ff.
     
107. 
     Heinrich Heine, French introduction to the French edition of Reisebilder, in Heinrich Heine, Sämtliche Schriften in zwölf Bänden, ed. Klaus Briegleb, 20 vols. (Munich, 1976), vol. 3, 677.
     
108. 
     Eliza Marian Butler, The Saint-Simonian Religion in Germany (New York, 1960), 60: “The newspaper-reading German public could no more be in ignorance of Saint-Simonism than of the cholera.”
     
109. 
     Salomon-Delatour, Lehre Saint-Simons, 117, 105, 108f., 117, 209, 225.
     
110. 
     Otto Warschauer, Saint-Simon und der Saint-Simonismus (Leipzig, 1892), 62.
     
111. 
     Engels, “Socialism: Utopian and Scientific,” in MECW, vol. 24, 293.
     
112. 
     Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, in MECW, vol. 3, 332, 333, 281, 280.
     
113. 
     Engels, “Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy,” in MECW, vol. 3, 430.
     
114. 
     Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, in MECW, vol. 3, 294, 331.
     
115. 
     Marx, introduction to Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law,
     

in MECW, vol. 3, 176.

96. 
    Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, in MECW, vol. 3, 297.
    
97. 
    Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, in MECW, vol. 4, 36.
    
98. 
    Marx, “The Communism of the Rheinischer Beobachter,” in MECW, vol. 6, 233.
    
99. 
    Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” in MECW, vol. 5, 5.
    
100. 
     Karl Löwith, Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen: Die theologischen Voraussetzun- gen der Geschichtsphilosophie (Stuttgart, 2004), 61.
     
101. 
     Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, in MECW, vol. 3, 8.
     

96. 
    Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, in MECW, vol. 5, 329.
    
97. 
    François Auguste Mignet, Geschichte der Französischen Revolution von 1789 bis 1814 (Leipzig, 1975), 409ff., 13, 15.
    
98. 
    François Guizot, Cours d’histoire, histoire générale de la civilisation en Europe, Lecture 7, quoted in Rudolf Herrnstadt, Die Entdeckung der Klassen (East Ber- lin, 1965). Quotation translated by Bernard Heise.
    
99. 
    François Pierre Guillaume Guizot, Die Demokratie in Frankreich (Grimma, 1849) 49, 67, 71.
    
100. 
     Francois Guizot, Cours d’histoire, Lecture 7, quoted in Herrnstadt. Quotation translated by Bernard Heise.
     
101. 
     Stein, Die industrielle Gesellschaft, 5.
     
102. 
     Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, in MECW, vol. 4, 124.
     
103. 
     Marx, The Class Struggles in France 1848–1850, in MECW, vol. 10, 48.
     
104. 
     Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, in MECW, vol. 5, 90.
     

178. Ibid., 59.

179. 
     Marx, “Public Prosecutor Hecker and the Neue Rheinische Zeitung,” in
     

MECW, vol. 7, 488.

179. 
     Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, in MECW, vol. 4, 122.
     
180. 
     Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, in MECW, vol. 5, 90.
     
181. 
     Heine, Works, vol. 7, 126.
     
182. 
     Engels, Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State, in MECW, vol. 26, 271f.
     
183. 
     Marx to Weydemeyer, 5 March 1852, in MECW, vol. 39, 62ff.
     
184. 
     Universal Society of Revolutionary Communists, in MECW, vol. 10, 614f.
     
185. 
     Höppner and Seidel-Höppner, Von Babeuf bis Blanqui, vol. 1, 373.
     
186. 
     Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile (Teddington, 2007), 274.
     
187. 
     Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” in MECW, vol. 5, 7.
     
188. 
     Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, in MECW, vol. 4, 37.
     
189. 
     Marx, Class Struggles in France, in MECW, vol. 10, 127.
     
190. 
     Marx to Ruge, May 1843, in MECW, vol. 3, 141.
     
191. 
     Marx, Provisional Rules of the Association, in MECW, vol. 20, 14.
     
192. 
     Marx, Class Struggles in France, in MECW, vol. 10, 117.
     
193. 
     Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, trans. Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge, 2006), 5f.
     
194. 
     Löwith, Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen, 76.