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overlook another factor which was looming behind the stage. Engels was pointing
out, and justly, that Napoleon would not have dared to declare war upon Austria had
he not been confident of the silent consent of Russia, had he not been assured that
she would not go to the aid of Austria. He thought it quite probable that in this there
existed some sort of an understanding between France and Russia. During the
Crimean War, Austria had repaid in "base ingratitude" that same Russia which had
so "self-sacrificingly" and so "unselfishly" helped her to strangle the Hungarian
revolution. Russia now had obviously no scruples about punishing Austria with
Napoleon's hands. If an agreement between France and Russia actually existed by
which Russia promised to come to the aid of France, it would be the duty of Germany
to hasten to the assistance of Austria, but it would already be a revolutionary
Germany. Then the situation would be similar to that upon which Marx and Engels
had been counting in the days of the Revolution of 1848. It would be a war of
revolution against reaction. The bourgeois parties would not be able to attract to
themselves all the lower classes; they would give way successively to ever-more
radical parties, thus creating the opportunity for the victory of the most extreme, the
most revolutionary party -- the proletarian party.
Such was the point of view of Marx and Engels. Lassalle regarded this
question differently. To a degree this difference could be explained by the different
objective conditions to which these people were directly exposed. Lassalle lived in
Prussia and was too closely bound up with the local Prussian conditions. Marx and
Engels lived in England, on the watchtower of the world; they considered European
events from the point of view of the World Revolution, not only the German, nor
merely the Prussian.
Lassalle argued in the following manner: To him the most dangerous foe of
Germany was the internal foe, Austria. She was a more dangerous enemy than liberal
France, or than a Russia which was already in the grip of liberal reforms. Austria was
the main cause of the bleak reaction that pressed 80 insufferably upon Germany.
Napoleon, though a usurper, was none the less an expression of liberalism, progress,
and civilisation. That was why, Lassalle felt, that in this war the German Democracy
should abandon Austria to her own fate, and that the defeat of Austria would be the
most desirable outcome.
When we read Lassalle's writings dealing with this question -- all the
compliments he showered upon Napoleon and Russia, the extreme caution he
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displayed in discussing official Prussia -- we are compelled to make an effort so as
not to become confused. We constantly have to remind ourselves that Lassalle tried
to speak as a Prussian democrat who wanted to convince the ruling class of Prussia,
the Junkers, that no aid should be granted to Austria. But, having donned the cloak
of a Prussian democrat, Lassalle really expounded his own ideas which diverged
sharply from those of Marx and Engels. Later this divergence took on a graver aspect.
Carried away by the desire to attain immediate and tangible success, determined to
become a "practical politician," instead of a doctrinaire, he allowed himself to resort
to arguments and proofs which placed him under obligations to the ruling party,
which inveigled him into flattering those whom he tried to persuade to leave Austria
without assistance. Abuse hurled upon Austria, a gentle attitude toward Russia, the
coquetting with official Prussia -- all this was so far only the enthusiasm of a publicist
who was not writing in the name of the party. The same tactics, however, when they
were subsequently carried over by Lassalle into the immediate practical struggle,
became fraught with danger.
The war between France and Austria terminated differently from what either
side expected. At the beginning, Austria, opposed by a lonely Italy, was unequivocally
victorious. Later she was defeated by the combined forces of France and Italy. But as
soon as the war began to assume a popular character and to threaten an actual
revolutionary unification of Italy and the abolition of the Papal district, Napoleon
accepted Russian mediation and hurried to crawl out of the war. Sardinia had to be
satisfied with Lombardy. Venice remained in the hands of Austria. To compensate
himself for French blood and French money, Napoleon helped himself to the whole
province of Savoy, the birthplace of the Sardinian kings and, to prove to the famous
Italian revolutionist and fighter for a United Italy, Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882),
that one must not be misled by the promises of crowned knaves, he annexed
Garibaldi's native city, Nice, and its environs. Thus did the "liberal" Napoleon with
the thunderous applause of liberal fools and bamboozled revolutionists defend the
"right of self-determination" of Italy and other oppressed nationalities. Lassalle, too,
was to discover that not only was Napoleon not better than Austria, but that he could
run rings about Austria when it came to Machiavellian double-dealing. Italy was left
as dismembered as it had been. Only Sardinia became more rounded out. But now
something quite unexpected happened. Owing to the disillusionment and
indignation resulting from Napoleon's policies, a strong revolutionary movement was
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started in Italy. At the head was the noble revolutionist, but the bad politician,
Garibaldi. In 1861, Italy was changed into a United Kingdom, but without Venice.
The further unification of Italy now passed into the hands of bourgeois business men,
Garibaldian renegades and adventurers.
Marx had to engage in another polemic in connection with the Franco-
Austrian war. We have seen that the entire German democracy took a definite stand
in this conflict between Napoleon and Austria. The most noted and influential man
among the German democrats was the old revolutionist, Karl Vogt (1817-1895), who
in 1849 had also been forced to flee to Switzerland. He was not merely active in
politics; he was a great savant with a European reputation. He is known as one of the
chief exponents of naturo-historical materialism which is so often confused,
particularly by bourgeois scholars, with the historical materialism of Marx and
Engels. His influence was wide, not only among the German democrats, but also
among the international revolutionary emigrants, especially the Polish, Italian and
Hungarian. His home at Geneva served as a political centre.
For Napoleon it was extremely important to attract to his side the noted
scholar and leader of the German democrats. Because of the overweening vanity of
the old German professor, this was easily accomplished. Vogt was on a friendly
footing with Napoleon's brother, Prince Plon-Plon, who acted the part of a great
liberal and patron of science -- Vogt had been getting money from him for
distribution among the representatives of the various emigrant groups.
When our professor came out most decidedly for Napoleon and Italy, it of
course created a tremendous impression among the circles of emigrant
revolutionists. As always happens in such cases, among the emigrants that were most
closely connected with Marx and Engels, there were some who kept up relations with
the republican emigrants. One of the latter, Karl Blind, declared in the presence of a
few communists that Vogt was receiving money from Napoleon. This was printed in
one of the London papers. When Wilhelm Liebknecht (1826-1900), who was
correspondent for an Augsburg paper, reported these rumours, Vogt instituted a case
for libel and won, for there was no documentary evidence against him.
Jubilant over his victory, Vogt published a special pamphlet about this trial.
Being perfectly certain that Wilhelm Liebknecht did not undertake a step, did not
write a line without the direction of Marx, Vogt aimed all his blows against the latter.
And so this man on the basis of precise data, as he claimed, accused Marx of being at
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