Mark and Lincoln: And Unfinished Revolution

Republicans, who argued for a bolder strategy, both militarily and 
politically. 
Th
  e more Marx learned about militant abolitionism, the more 
impressed he became. In an article for Die Presse of August 9, 1862, 
he wrote of the growing attention paid in the North to Abolitionist 
orators, and in particular to Wendell Philips, who “for thirty years…
has without intermission and at the risk of his life proclaimed the 
emancipation of the slaves as his battle cry.” He paraphrases at 
length a speech by Phillips “of the highest importance” in which 
the veteran abolitionist indicts Lincoln’s conservative and cowardly 
policy: 
Th
  e government [of Lincoln] fi ghts for the maintenance of slavery 
and therefore it fi ghts in vain … He [Lincoln] waits … for the 
nation to take him in hand and sweep away slavery through him 
… If the war is continued in this fashion it is a useless squander-
ing of blood and gold … Dissolve this Union in God’s name and 
put another in its place, on the cornerstone of which is written: 
“Political equality for all the citizens in the world” … Let us hope 
that the war lasts long enough to transform us into men, and then 
we shall quickly triumph. God has put the thunderbolt of emanci-
pation into our hands in order to crush the rebellion.
51
 
Lincoln’s willingness to adopt an emancipation policy was some-
what greater than his abolitionist and Republican critics allowed. 
Even compensated emancipation was still keenly opposed by the 
loyal border states, and by many Democrats who declared they 
would fi ght for the Union but not for the Negro. Lincoln believed 
that maintenance of the broadest Unionist coalition was essential 
to victory. He also greatly preferred an emancipation accompanied 
by compensation, and allowing due process to the property-holders. 
Democrats and moderate Republicans long hoped to persuade 
the Confederacy to come to terms, and to this end, they opposed 
measures that would irrevocably alienate the South. But while abo-
litionists and radical Republicans railed against Lincoln’s studied 
moderation, it was the actions of a few thousand slave rebels 
51  “Abolitionist Demonstrations in North America,” Marx and Engels, Th e 
Civil War in the US, pp. 202–6.
introduction  35

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outside the political system—the “contrabands”—which helped the 
Radicals in Washington eventually to win the argument. 
Th
  e arrival of fugitive slaves in Union encampments surrounding 
the Confederacy made slavery and its role in the confl ict impossible 
to ignore. Some Union commanders tried to return the fugitives to 
their masters. Others found this a perverse and impractical response. 
General Benjamin Butler—stationed in Virginia—became the fi rst 
Union commander to obtain Washington’s backing for a policy of 
refusing to return escaping slaves; instead, he put them to work as 
civilian auxiliaries. Th
  e legal term contraband was adopted to explain 
and justify this practice, though the term awkwardly implied that 
the (ex)-slaves were confi scated rebel property. A Confi scation Act 
passed by Congress and “reluctantly” endorsed by the president 
declared that slaves working for the rebel forces would be subject 
to confi scation and would be put to good use as support workers 
by the Union Army. In August, General Frémont, commanding in 
Missouri, declared martial law and announced that rebels were lia-
ble to summary execution and that their slaves were free. Th
 ere was 
an outcry; Frémont refused to modify his order and was dismissed. 
Lincoln allowed the pragmatic use of “contrabands” but not 
advocacy of an emancipationist military policy. Frémont had acted 
impulsively and in hope of political advancement. But the deeds and 
words of two fi eld commanders—David Hunter in South Carolina 
and John Phelps in Louisiana—showed that military emancipation 
had an operational logic. General Phelps, commanding a Vermont 
regiment, urged, “Th
  e government should abolish slavery as the 
French destroyed the ancien régime.”
52
 His men enrolled all slaves 
who presented themselves, and forbade planters to use the whip. 
Similar proposals came from General Hunter, who was advancing 
along the South Carolina coast and islands. Both men would be 
removed from their commands. General Butler, who had welcomed 
the contrabands, at fi rst declined to form black regiments, but by 
mid-1862 he had dropped his opposition. (Refusing to accept 
colored soldiers in Louisiana was particularly absurd, as they had 
52 “Th
 e Destruction of Slavery,” in Slaves No More!, Ira Berlin et al., 
Cambridge 1993, pp. 1–76; 36. Th
  e full text of Phelps’s proclamation is given 
in Freedom: a Documentary History of Emancipation, Ira Berlin et al., Cambridge 
1985.
36  an unfinished revolution

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always existed in this state and had even been recognized by the 
Confederacy.) Th
 anks to his political connections, Butler man-
aged to recruit black units without getting immediately dismissed. 
Meanwhile the growing number of “contrabands” showed the folly 
of making no open attempt to deprive the rebels of slave labor and 
of not urging Union commanders to enroll as many former slaves 
as possible by off ering them their freedom.
53
 
By the summer of 1862 the Union’s failure to make mili-
tary progress led many to listen to the abolitionists and radical 
Republicans who were making the case for an immediate emanci-
pation policy. Speaking tours by Wendell Phillips, Anne Dickinson, 
and Frederick Douglass attracted huge and enthusiastic crowds. 
Lincoln became increasingly eager to break what seemed like a 
military stalemate. Th
  e Confederacy was able to send more white 
soldiers to the front because slaves were still toiling to produce the 
supplies needed by the Confederate armies. Th
  e Confederates also 
used slaves in their military camps to carry out service and support 
roles. A second Confi scation Act in July allowed Union command-
ers to commandeer rebel property, and put “contrabands” to work, 
with fewer formalities. But in Lincoln’s view neither Congress nor 
the military had the authority to determine the future fate of the 
“contrabands” who, in law, had become the property of the state, not 
free citizens. 
Th
 e president still worried about the reaction of the border 
states—their representatives in Congress ensured that—but by June 
1862 their key centers were securely held by Union troops. More 
worrying was the military impasse and a discouraging international 
reaction, with the British considering diplomatic recognition of 
the rebels. Lincoln believed that his “war powers” as president and 
commander-in-chief fully entitled him to free the slaves of rebels 
and to arm freedmen if he deemed it a military necessity. But he 
had to frame his use of these powers in such a way as to minimize 
the risk of a challenge from Congress or the Supreme Court (where 
there was still a Democratic majority). He also felt the need to jus-
tify emancipation in such a way as to avoid giving the impression 
53  Kate Masur, “ ‘A Rare Phenomenon of Philological Vegetation’: the Word 
‘Contraband’ and the Meanings of Emancipation in the United States,” Journal 
of American History, 93:4, March 2007, pp. 1050–84.
introduction  37

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