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192 
 
Chairman of the Committee of Caucasian Associations and the Coordinator for the 
Business of the CMPC as the supreme organs of the CMPC. 
As a legislative organ, the Caucasian Parliament or Assembly was 
proposed. This Parliament would consist of three plenipotentiary representatives 
from each member people who would be elected directly by the congresses of the 
participating peoples of the CMPC. The Parliament was not dependent on national 
parliamentary institutions, but was to have a direct link with them through people 
who were deputies simultaneously of the Caucasian and national parliaments. 
As an executive organ, the Treaty envisaged the Committee of Caucasian 
Associations, consisting of leading employees of the ministries, departments and 
public organizations of the republics, who would lead the various specialist 
associations. 
The President and the Presidential Council, which comprised of one 
representative of each nation, were to represent the Confederation. 
Article 12 of the Treaty conceived the establishment of the Confederation’s 
Court of Arbitration as its judicial organ. This court was given the duty of 
examining acute and complex problems between citizens of the Confederation, and 
also between citizens and the Confederation. Decisions of the Court would only be 
recommendatory in character. 
Preventing ethnic conflicts and guaranteeing stability in the region were 
among the most important aims of the Confederation. To accomplish these aıms, 
the Congress charged the Caucasian Parliament with drawing up a special statute 
on the status and functions of established forces for stability. This meant that the 
agenda of the Confederation would include the improvement of socio-cultural and 

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193 
 
political co-operation between the peoples of the North Caucasus, and the creation 
of a united defence system against foreign aggression.
487
 
Beyond that, The Confederation set up 9 special commissions: National 
Consent or Reconciliation; Economic Integration; State and Law; Culture; 
Environment; Foreign Affairs; Religious Affairs; Defence, and Relations with the 
Diasporas.
488
 
During the Congress, Musa Shanibov, a Kabardin delegate, and Yusup 
Soslambekov
489
, a Chechen delegate, were chosen as President of the 
Confederation and Speaker of the Parliament respectively. In addition, 13 deputy-
presidents, one from each participating peoples were named.
490
 
On 3 November 1993, the deputy-presidents signed the Confederation 
Treaty, in the name of their own respective peoples, in an Abkhazian village 
Likhny that was the historical center of the Abkhazian State and culture.
491
 At that 
time, the Confederation, as Fiona Hill states, “because of the lack of a regional 
native leadership and in the absence of a powerful political party with a regional 
manifesto had the only vision that had been offered to the peoples of the region.”
492
 
 
                                                 
487
 “Kuzey Kafkasya Halkları Konfederasyonu,” January 1994. Yedi Yıldız, 1: 20. 
488
 Şenıbe, Birliğin Zaferi, 3-4. 
489
 At the same time he was the head of the Committee on International Relations of the Chechen 
Parliament. 
490
 The other leading names were as follows: Den’ga Khalidov (Abkhaz), Deputy Speaker of the 
Caucasian Parliament; Konstantin Ozgan (Abkhaz), the Chairman of the Committee of the 
Caucasian Associations; Zurab Achba (Abkhaz) Chairman of the Confederation’s Court of 
Arbitration; Gennadi Alamiya (Abkhaz), deputy-president and the Coordinator for the Business of 
the Confederation. Among the other deputy-presidents there were Kargiyev (North Osetia) and 
Torez Kulumbekov (South Osetian). 
491
 Şenıbe, Birliğin Zaferi, 41. 
492
 Fiona Hill, 1995. Russia’s Tinderbox: Conflict in the North Caucasus and its Implications for the 
Future of the Russian Federation, Cambridge: J. F. Kennedy School of Government, 25. 

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Nevertheless, the Confederation had some critical problems even from thıs 
initial phase.
493
 First of all not all the Mountain peoples of the North Caucasus 
joined it. Turkic groups: the Balkars; Karachays; Nogays, and Kumuks did not 
respond to the invitation of the AMPC. Moreover, Nogays and Kumuks were 
withdrawn from the membership of the Assembly as well. Dargin and Lezgin also 
did not take part. The Ingush, even though they had named delegates, did not 
participate.
494
 
Secondly, its members, as Shanibov stressed it, were peoples, or rather their 
‘representatives’, not republics. This gave the Confederation and its members the 
image of an opposition, which was confronting the existing native governments in 
the region, except Chechens and Abkhaz. Propaganda by an old political elite who 
knew how to strengthen their own positions by playing on the national aspirations 
of the North Caucasian peoples, criticised the Confederation and its leaders. 
Related to that, thirdly, the Chechen republic was the only member of the 
Confederation from the Russian part of the North Caucasus. This was essential to 
Confederation, but at the same time created a danger of Chechen supremacy in the 
Confederation, and consequently a danger of the Confederation becoming a tool of 
the Chechen regime. The higher number of Abkhaz officials active in the 
Confederation, compared to Chechens had no negative consequences for Moscow, 
at least for the time being. This Abkhaz supremacy meant, at least for the Russians, 
leverage against Georgia. But Chechen supremacy caused serious problems and 
created opposition. 
                                                 
493
 Moshe Gammer, 1995. “Unity, Diversity and Conflict in the Northern Caucasus,” in Yaacov 
Ro'I, eds., Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies. London: Frank Cass, 173-174. 
494
 Şenıbe, Birliğin Zaferi, 3. 

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