Nissan Motors
, Carlos Chiappori Cambana is evacuated for health reasons.
Camera operator Juan Victor Sumarriva, from the local news agency who had been
caught on the grounds of the residence during the siege, walks out with this group of
people. By this time, the PNP had shut off all power and water to the residence. The
hostages began to hang cardboard signs around the residence’s windows, requesting food
and water. United Nations representative Luis Thays sends five hundred rations to the
residence. The rations were divided into two groups of diets: one specifically for the
Japanese hostages and another for the rest of the hostages based on a standard Peruvian
diet. Meanwhile at the U.S. Embassy, members of a designated crisis reaction team from
the Department of State (DOS) began to arrive and establish a crisis reaction center to
monitor the status of the crisis, specifically the seven U.S. hostages
37
that remained
inside. The crisis reaction element grows to over 50 personnel during the next several
weeks.
37
The US hostages are Narcotics Assistant John Crow, AID Officer Andrew Maxey, Economy
Counselor John Riddle, Political Counselor Jimmie Wagner, AID FSN Pedro Carrillo, Acting AID Director
Donald Boyd, AID Deputy Executive Officer David Bayer, and AID Officer Kris Merschod.
47
At approximately 1930 hours, Cerpa addresses the hostages using the name of
“Comandante Hermigidio Huerta”, in honor of his MRTA friend who had died in the
Cromotex
textile plant incident
38
. In his speech, Cerpa explained the origins of his
organization, its ideology, and differences from Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path),
previous conflicts with Abigael Guzmán Reynoso
39
, and war stories from encounters
with the PNP and armed forces in the Peruvian jungles. He mentioned that his outfit was
designated
Pelotón de Fuerzas Especiales
(trans. Special Forces Platoon)
Edgar Sánchez
and that this operation was code-named “Operación Torre Condesú” with the codeword
“
Rompiendo el silencio, el pueblo los quiere libres
” (trans. "
breaking the silence, the
people want you free
”) (Chávez López, 1998, p. 51).
During the early morning hours of 20 December 1996, several hostages hang
cardboard from the second floor bathroom window that read: “
We have no food, water,
power, or telephone. Reconnect
” (p. 55). At approximately 1925 hours, Michel Minnig
negotiates the release of 38 hostages. Peruvian Congressman Javier Diez Canseco walks
out in this group with two written demands: one from the MRTA terrorists demanding
the release of 400 of their prisoners from jails around the country, and another demand by
the hostages requesting that the PNP not shut off the power, water, or cut the food
supplies. By now the MRTA has an official list of demands. The following is the list of
demands as reported by the U.S. Embassy’s Regional Security Office (RSO:
First, a commitment to change the course of the economic policy for one
that seeks the well-being of the vast majorities. Second, the release of all
prisoners belonging to the MRTA and those accused of belonging to our
organization. Third, transferring the commando group that attacked the
Japanese Ambassador’s residence along with the comrade trade prisoners
of the MRTA to the central jungle area. Several duly selected hostages
would travel with the group as guarantors and be released once in MRTA
guerrilla area. Fourth, payment of a war tax (Department of State After
Action Report: Peru Hostage Taking Incident, dated December 30th,
1996).
38
1979 labor dispute in which six union protesters were killed by PNP forces, while attempting to take
over the plant. Néstor Cerpa participated in the strike and was arrested and imprisoned for a year as a result
of it. The dispute was one of the catalysts that led to the formation of the MRTA movement.
39
Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, leader of the terrorist movement Sendero Luminoso, was captured in
1992 together with some of his most important lieutenants.
48
On 21 December 1996, President Fujimori breaks his silence and replies to the
terrorists that he will not negotiate and for the terrorists to put down their weapons and
release all the hostages unharmed. In reply, Cerpa mentions that there would be more
hostages released in the upcoming days. Afterwards, the former counselor Francisco
Tudela and the Japanese Ambassador Morihisa Aoki send a message requesting the
Peruvian government to negotiate with the MRTA terrorists.
Rumors are “leaked” to local news agencies that British, Israeli, and U.S. Special
Forces units were sending their elite counterterrorist forces in country to resolve the
hostage situation. The Panamanian press reported that “there were elements of the U.S.’
SFOD-Delta in Panama preparing to launch a rescue mission”. Several reports around
Lima mentioned the planned use of nerve agents by different counterterrorist forces for a
possible rescue attempt. It is believed that this move was to prevent a response such as
an international rescue force intervention, mainly from the U.S. or Great Britain. Later
on that evening, approximately 8,000 people gather at the Lima cathedral to pray for a
peaceful resolution to the hostage crisis.
On 22 December 1996, the MRTA terrorists hang signs from the residence’s
windows painted on white sheets, requesting power, phone, and water to be restored. At
2140 hours, six groups of hostages totaling 225 without ties to the Peruvian government
were liberated as a “Christmas Spirit” gesture. All seven U.S. hostages were released
with this group. There were still four spouses (Peruvians or third country nationals) of
Americans held hostage. In a bold act of defiance, Jesuit priest Juan Julio Wicht decided
to stay as a hostage of his own accord, and offered a mass inside the residence for
everyone present. One hundred and six hostages were left inside the residence. One of
the released hostages, former Labor Minister Sandro Fuentes, read a new statement given
to him by the MRTA, requesting the release of the MRTA prisoners.
The following morning, President Fujimori and Minister of Interior Juan Briones
Dávila held a meeting with the regional armed forces commander, General Luis
Malásquez Durand. Representative Moisés Pantoja was in urgent need of medical
attention. From Europe, MRTA representative Isaac Velazco issued a statement and
49
warned President Fujimori that in the event of a military rescue attempt all hostages
would die.
Twelve hours before midnight on 24 December 1996, First Lady Keiko Sofia,
daughter of President Fujimori, brought eight baked turkeys to the residence. The
terrorists did not let the hostages eat the turkeys, fearing that weapons or other artifacts
were hidden inside of them. That day, the government of Uruguay released two Peruvian
MRTA terrorists from prison: Luis Alberto Miguel Samaniego and Sylvia Soria Gora.
At 1830 hours, Uruguay’s Ambassador to Peru Tabard Bocalandro Yapeyú, was released
by the MRTA. This action goes against President Fujimori’s intentions and efforts, and
in retaliation against the government of Uruguay Fujimori removed the Peruvian
Ambassador to that country.
During the following days, the S.I.N. begins to infiltrate numerous electronic
surveillance devices inside items such as thermoses, picture frames, brooms, and portable
toilets. Audio and video surveillance monitoring begins from across the main street from
the residence while the terrorists remain completely unaware of it.
On 25 December 1996, Archbishop Juan Luis Cipriani enters the residence for the
first time, and remained there for close to seven hours, offering a Christmas mass with
Father Wicht. At 1720 hours, Cipriani walks out with the First Secretary to the
diplomatic mission of Japan, Kenyi Hirota, who was released because of severe
dehydration. The same day, Russian President Boris Yeltsin offers to send a
counterterrorist unit to intervene in the crisis. President Fujimori turns down all
international assistance with respect to counterterrorist aid. There are 104 hostages still
left inside the residence.
On 26 December 1996 at 0147 hours, an explosion goes off at the residence, and
all PNP forces go on full alert. It was believed that a cat triggered one of the booby traps
placed by the MRTA members on the residence grounds. The MRTA had mined and
booby-trapped the residence’s grounds to include the residence’s windows and doors. At
1445 hours, the MRTA releases the Ambassador of Guatemala, José María Argueta. The
same day, the Bolivian government vehemently rejects negotiating the release of five
MRTA terrorists held in their country in exchange for their Ambassador Jorge Gumucio.
50
The following day, the Peruvian government declares a state of emergency in the
Callao and Lima districts because of the siege. Members of the International Red Cross
indicate that the MRTA had placed mines on the residence grounds. Also on that day, a
woman was apprehended inside the security cordon for not having proper credentials and
carrying diagrams and blueprints of the Japanese residence. That same day, the S.I.N.
begins to make arrangements in total secrecy to contract and transport 32 miners from the
Cerro de Pasco area in La Oroya, to begin digging underground tunnels to reach the
residence grounds. The miners would work in eight-hour shifts under the orders of a
Peruvian Army Corps of Engineers officer working for the S.I.N, and be paid double
their normal rates. The mining group grew to almost 60 by the end of January, with more
groups being specifically flown in from the Cerro de Pasco on a special commission
directed by President Fujimori himself.
On 28 December 1996, government spokesperson Domingo Palermo and
Archbishop Cipriani enter the residence and hold conversations with the terrorists. They
remain inside for over three hours and at 1600 hours, 20 more hostages are released,
including the ambassadors from the Dominican Republic and Malaysia. Domingo
Palermo comments that the meeting with Néstor Cerpa was very productive. Meanwhile,
dirt retrieved from digging the tunnels is constantly being taken out of the perimeter area
in the trunks of police vehicles, ambulances, and service vehicles. In addition, a group of
intelligence agents from the S.I.N. enters the residence dressed as gardeners and takes
earth samples to analyze soil composition around the residence. The results were later
used by the Corps of Engineers in the construction of the tunnels. There are 83 hostages
still inside the residence at this time.
On 29 December 1996, the International Red Cross and MRTA agree to let the
hostages write letters to their relatives. The Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto
announced in Tokyo that measures taken by President Fujimori were working. In the
meantime, MRTA terrorists hang three signs from residence windows that read,
The people want peace with social justice”, “Our prisoners do not receive
humanitarian treatment”, and “The social fighters also deserve liberty
(Chávez López, 1998, p. 87).
51
The next day, the first 83 letters from the hostages are received by the
International Red Cross and forwarded to their relatives and/or loved ones. All the letters
were carefully checked and reviewed by the MRTA. However, the hostages had already
developed a system to send secret messages by writing on the trash that was taken out
daily out of the residence by the International Red Cross.
On 31 December 1996, several news crews were allowed inside the residence for
an impromptu news conference with the MRTA terrorists. Néstor Cerpa Cartolini was
interviewed along with Francisco Tudela and Morihisa Aoki; the Japanese Ambassador
took the opportunity to apologize publicly for the situation, blaming himself for the crisis.
The S.I.N. took full advantage of this opportunity and planted several camera operators as
reporters to gather intelligence. Critical intelligence was collected depicting structural
information on the residence, weapons and ammunition of the terrorists, as well as their
strength and disposition. At 1700 hours, the Ambassador of Honduras and the
Argentinean Consul were released. Eighty-one hostages are still left inside.
On 1 January 1997, Monsignor Cipriani enters the residence to offer a New
Year’s mass. Michel Minnig and Monsignor Cipriani leave the residence at around 1700
hours. At 1725 hours, seven new hostages were released: five Japanese businesspersons
and two Peruvian government officials. Seventy-four hostages remain at the Japanese
Ambassador’s residence until 17 January and 26 January when the last two hostages are
released; after 26 January no other hostages are released. These two hostages were high-
ranking PNP officials who were released due to critical health conditions.
On 2 January 1997, the U.S. Ambassador to Peru, Dennis Jett, completely
supports Fujimori’s non-negotiating stance with the MRTA terrorists. That same day the
Japanese Emperor Akihito asked Fujimori for a peaceful resolution to the crisis. In a
reckless act by the press, the identity of Vice Admiral (ret.) Luis Giampietri is revealed,
as the officer in charge of the FOEs (Fuerza de Operaciones Especiales or Peruvian Navy
Special Forces) during the early 1980s. As a result, Giampietri was interrogated and
submitted to continuous harassment and mock executions by the MRTA terrorists during
the next several days. Giampietri maintains his calm, and vehemently denies any
criminal involvement during the prison riots involving MRTA during his tenure. Vice
52
Admiral (ret.) Luis Giampietri earns the respect of the MRTA terrorists, and they leave
him alone for the rest of his captivity.
On 3 January 1997, the Guatemalan government announced to the Peruvian
government that they are willing to negotiate with the MRTA, upon President Fujimori’s
consent. S.I.N. personnel continue the tedious process of sorting out all trash that leaves
the residence in search of messages from the hostages.
On 4 January 1997, the MRTA terrorists hang three more signs from the rooftop
of the residence, reiterating their demands to the Peruvian government and criticizing
President Fujimori’s declarations. The Japanese newspaper
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